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Abstract
This dissertation research examines the e↵ect of organizational lethality on the longevity
of terrorist groups. The current scholarship has sought to understand the demise of terrorist
groups through means such as group success, government repression, negotiations, internal
conflict, reorientation of goals, defeat, leadership decapitation and loss of public support.
However, little research is available on the determinants of terrorists’ target selection and
its implications for the group’s longevity. This study evaluates the targeting patterns and
preferences of 480 terrorist groups that were operational between 1980 and 2011 and disaggre-
gates the victims of all terrorist attacks into combatant versus non-combatant target-types.
It is hypothesized that organizational lethality – defined as the average number of civilian
killings generated by each group in its home-base country – is associated with negative group
reputation, which results in faster group mortality. Popular support for violence, however,
can influence and result from terrorism at the same time and has been found to be inherently
endogenous by many previous studies. Therefore, a Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit
Model is employed to examine this endogenous relationship, and the results confirm that
there is a significant correlation between negative group reputation and group mortality.
Moreover, the study di↵erentiates between terrorist group activity – defined as average at-
tacks generated by a group – and group lethality, and employs the Cox Proportional Hazard
Model to estimate group duration. The study includes covariates like group size, ideology,
positive consistency reputation and other factors a↵ecting group longevity and mortality.
The results imply that organizational lethality is associated with higher political risks for
terrorist groups and tends to backfire by decreasing their survival probability. However,
on the other hand, the study finds that an escalation in terrorist activity (launching more
attacks) significantly increase the group longevity over time. The results of this study are
tested by conducting group-specific case studies on the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in Pak-
istan using information collected from the English language Pakistani newspaper archives,
and Harmony Database from Combat Terrorism Center at West Point, NY.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism scholarship is interested in many factors that a↵ect the violent behavior of a
terrorist group. Academics are focused on learning the causes of terrorism and law enforce-
ment agencies are engaged in finding e↵ective counterterrorism strategies. A large amount
of money and e↵ort is spent on counterterrorism policies, particularly since the attacks on
September 11, 2001, but without much e↵ect (Lum et al., 2006). A systematic examination
of the cross-national statistics regarding the average number of victims per terrorist attack
illustrates that terrorist attacks have increased over time and become more lethal, especially
against civilians. According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the number of civil-
ian fatalities has increased from about three killings every five attacks in the pre-9/11 world
(1970-2000) to about five killings every five attacks in the post-9/11 world (2001-2014).
Although terroristic violence has increased over time in general and against civilians in
particular; an analysis of target selection across groups shows significant variance both in
intensity and frequency of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Figure 1.1 presents a
distribution of terrorist groups based on the number of civilian attacks they have launched
between 1980-2011. The figure indicates that 29% of the groups never attacked civilians
whereas 43% of groups launched 1-5 civilian attacks and 28% of groups perpetrated 6 or
more attacks against civilians between 1980-2011.
1
29%
43%
10%
18%
Groups with Civilian Attacks
Groups with 0 attacks
Groups with 1-5 attacks
Groups with 6-10 attacks
Groups with 10 or more attacks
Figure 1.1: Terrorist groups activity against civilians
The diversity in terrorist groups’ target selection demonstrates that killing civilians is
not a valued activity because about 82% of the groups have not been very active against
civilians. Moreover, terrorist groups are known to adopt specific strategies to minimizes civil-
ian fatalities. For instance, Irgun, a Zionist paramilitary organization, deliberately attacked
buildings rather than people to reduce civilian casualties (Cronin, 2009, 84). Similarly, the
Irish Republican Army (IRA), a revolutionary terrorist organization, issued advance warn-
ings before bomb attacks to minimize Irish and British civilian fatalities (Sharrock, 2001).
But on the other hand, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) are
the two most active terrorist groups against civilians. In their comparatively small lifespans
of five and eight years,1 respectively, the TTP and ALQ perpetrated 37% and 30% of their
total attacks against civilians.
Terrorism scholars highlight the importance of civilian population in conflicts and ar-
1Although the TTP is still operational and has been attacking civilians to this day, and AQI also continued
its operation until it splintered in April 2013 and became the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
However, the temporal range of this analysis has been restricted to 2011.
2
gue that non-combatants almost always play a significant role (Condra and Shapiro, 2012;
Blair et al., 2013). They assert that indiscriminate violence against civilians is immoral
and counterproductive for grassroots popular support. Namely, attacking civilians reduces
public sympathy for the terrorist group and it is likely that the general public will punish
terrorist organizations in the long run (if not immediately) (Jones and Libicki, 2008; Reich,
1998; Laqueur, 1976; Cordes et al., 1984; Crenshaw, 1987; Schelling, 1991; Cronin, 2009;
DeNardo, 2014; Lake, 2002; Getmansky and Sinmazdemir, 2012). Moreover, many terrorist
groups are defeated because they lose grassroots popular support due to their indiscriminate
violence against civilians. One such example is the aftermath of theLuxor Massacre where
62 people were killed by an Egyptian Islamist organization named Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya
(GAI) on November 17, 1997. Included in the victims of this massacre were tourists, in-
cluding a British five-year-old and four Japanese couples on their honeymoons. After the
attack, Egypt witnessed an uprising against the GAI that led to the total depletion of grass-
roots public support for GAI and it was e↵ectively disbanded (Cronin, 2009, 110).2 Other
examples of groups meeting their demise by losing popular support include the Real Irish
Republican Army (RIRA), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP-GC), Front
de libe´ration du Que´bec (FLQ), Sikh Separatists, Chechen Separatists, Euskadi Ta Askata-
suna (ETA), Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Red
Brigades (Cronin, 2009, 111).
If popular support is imperative for a group’s survival, then the gradual rise in civilian
fatalities in the post-9/11 world is confounding. In other words, if killing civilians engenders
a loss of popular support that results in the decline and potential demise of terrorist groups,
why do terrorist groups ever attack civilians? It seems that some groups intentionally target
civilians while others avoid doing so. The process of target selection of terrorist groups
is a puzzle that needs further investigation. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to
investigate why terrorist groups are likely to target civilians and the impact of variation in
terrorists’ target selection on their survival.
2According to some reports, five perpetrators of the Luxor Massacre were lynched by the local villagers.
See Cronin (2009, 110) for more details on the incident.
3
In essence, this dissertation research argues that groups that perpetrate more indiscrimi-
nate violence against civilians do so as a result of principal-agent problems (PAP). The PAP
appears when operational commanders (the agents) of a terrorist group prefer short-term
gains, such as operational success, over long-term strategic goals.When agents choose to
attack civilians, they may do so despite the negative consequences of the leadership’s (the
principal) aspirations. The leadership, on the other hand, faces a dilemma: to exert more
control over their agents and risk their own security or allow the indiscriminate killings to
continue, which is detrimental to the group’s survival. Groups that are better managers of
the principal-agent problem should be able to control group violence e↵ectively and will be
more likely to endure.3
A significant majority of terrorism scholars, however, attribute the global rise in indis-
criminate killings of civilians to the dominance of religiously motivated terrorist groups in
the post-9/11 era. They argue that religious terrorist groups are apocalyptic in their ob-
jectives and they do not actively seek popular approval and public sympathy (locally or
internationally) for their acts because they expect to obtain spiritual rewards (Benjamin
and Simon, 2002; Laqueur, 2000; Enders and Sandler, 2011; Stern, 2000b; Ho↵man, 2006).
However, ideological and religious explanations do not explain the indiscriminate violence of
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – a secular and nationalist terrorist group (Eggen
et al., 2005) – against civilians in Sri Lanka and a more restrained violence against civilians
by Islamic groups like Ahrar-al-Sham and Hizbollah in the Middle East (Pape, 2005, 2003;
Joscelyn, 2014). In other words, theories of religious motivation are inconsistent with the
variation in civilian casualties one observes.
A growing number of recent studies explain indiscriminate violence against civilians by
using an organizational framework that attributes this behavior to the internal dynamics of
terrorist groups (Horowitz and Potter, 2014; Abrahms and Potter, 2015; Abrahms et al., 2016;
3Terrorism scholarship has debated numerous advantages and disadvantages of group structure – such as
decentralized, centralized, and hierarchical – and its relevance to address the principal-agent problems. But
these studies are done either by conducting group-specific qualitative case-studies or devising formal models
and employing network analysis (Arquilla et al., 1999; Ho↵man, 2006, 1993). Many studies have found that
decentralized leadership is more likely to su↵er from principal-agent problems and to target civilians than
the organizations that are centralized (Abrahms and Potter, 2015; Shapiro and Siegel, 2009).
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Shapiro and Siegel, 2009; Shapiro, 2007, 2005; Shapiro et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2013). They see
indiscriminate attacks against soft targets as a product of the group’s internal organizational
constraints, where the leadership and rank and file have di↵erent preferences (Humphreys
and Weinstein, 2006; Weinstein, 2006; Shapiro et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2013). They contend
that terrorists’ leadership is more rational because they can foresee the long-term impact
of indiscriminate violence. However, operational commanders – given their shortsighted-
ness – are more likely to attack soft targets against the wishes of the leadership. Although
these studies explain indiscriminate attacks against civilians by examining the organizational
constraints of the terrorist groups, they do not examine the consequences of indiscriminate
violence against soft targets for terrorist groups’ popularity and survival. In short, an or-
ganizational framework may explain why civilian casualties occur, but so far has not been
utilized to explain how preference divergence makes a terrorist group more or less likely to
endure.
The research on the determinants of terrorist group’s endurance and their lifecycle has
been rare. But in recent years, there has been a renewed interest in this field. Terrorist
organizations emerge and disappear over time and the literature presents di↵erent estimates
of average group survival. Many scholars claim that a few groups can last decades,4 while
others survive for less than one year.5 The literature also highlights the role of religion,
group size, intergroup competition and other factors to explain group survival and many
studies have found that the terrorist groups parish due to government repression, the group’s
success, negotiations, internal conflict, reorientation of goals, defeat, leadership decapitation
and loss of public support (Crenshaw, 1991; Ross and Gurr, 1989; Oots, 1989; Cronin, 2009,
2006; Jones and Libicki, 2008).6 But the impact of indiscriminate terroristic violence against
4Examples include the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), Shining Path, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Hezbollah, etc.
5According to Rapoport (1992), about 90% of all terrorist groups in late twentieth century survived for
less than one year and of those that make it to one year, more than half disappear within a decade. In the
same vein, Lafree et al. (2009) found that about three-quarters of terrorist organizations disappeared in less
than a year from their sample (N = 1422) and only 24 organizations in their sample lasted more than 20
years. They measured the terrorists’ lifecycle from the time between their first and last known strike.
6Many of these explanations of group demise have been examined at length in this growing field of terror-
ism scholarship. For instance, the e↵ectiveness of leadership decapitation has been thoroughly investigated
and studies found that its e↵ects are time dependent (Jordan, 2014; Price, 2009; Johnston, 2012). The most
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civilians on the groups’ own survival remains unexplained. This dissertation research extends
the contemporary literature on the terrorist groups’ endurance by analyzing how the variation
in groups’ target selection influences their longevity.
The current understandings of the terrorist groups’ survival are generally atheoretical
and do not present any extensive models that explain why few groups last longer than
others (Miller, 2011, 79). They are also limited in their contribution to the broader and gen-
eralizable understanding of group endurance. Studies that investigate organizational lethal-
ity, grassroots popular support and group longevity address these factors indirectly (Jones
and Libicki, 2008; Abrahms, 2006, 2012; Fortna, 2015; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2013, 2014;
Miller, 2011). For instance, Jones and Libicki (2008), Fortna (2015) and Abrahms (2006)
demonstrate that violence against civilians is an ine↵ective instrument of coercion. However,
they do not examine the empirical relationships connecting violence against civilians with
the decline of popular support and eventual defeat of terrorist groups. Likewise, Gaibulloev
and Sandler (2013, 2014) use GDP per capita as a proxy to measure popular support for
terrorism. They argue that greater GDP per capita increases the citizen’s discontent with
terrorist activity and vice-versa. GDP per capita is an indirect measure of public opinion
about government performance at best and likely contains significant random measurement
error as a proxy for public sentiment about terrorist groups. In short, there is a severe lack
of systematic empirical studies to test the premise that losing popular support – in the wake
of indiscriminate attacks on soft targets – has repercussions for group longevity.
eminent example of the failure of this strategy is the killing of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011 by American
Navy Seals that did not stop Al-Qaida’s attacks. However, the assassination of Velupillai Prabhakaran, – the
founding leader of LTTE – by the Sri Lankan government on May 19, 2009, can be hailed as a possible suc-
cess because no attacks have been associated to the LTTE in Sri Lanka since May 2009 (GTD, 2016). Price
(2012) finds that a terrorist group whose leader has been decapitated in the first year of the group’s existence
is more than eight times as likely to end as a non-decapitated group. But he also argues that this e↵ect
diminishes by 50% if the group is 10 years old. Moreover, he contends that leadership decapitation has no
e↵ect on the group mortality rate for the groups with 20 or more years of lifespan. Daxecker and Hess (2013)
examine the impact of government repression on group longevity and find that government repression back-
fires in democracies and terrorist groups fair better in democracies. However, authoritarian regimes deter
groups’ engagement in terrorism by repressing them and their sympathizers with impunity, thus reducing
the lifespan of terrorist groups. Similarly, other studies about terrorist groups resistance to violence have
discussed the relevance of groups’ success, negotiations, internal conflict, reorientation of goals, defeat and
loss of public support (Cronin, 2009; Dixon, 2015; Alterman and Simon, 1999; Weinberg, 2013; Gaibulloev
and Sandler, 2013, 2014).
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Many scholars have contextualized terroristic violence as a dynamic process which is
embedded in popular sympathy or support from the local community. However, the rela-
tionship between terrorism and its support among the potentially sympathetic community is
complicated. One of the main reasons for this complexity is that we have evidence regarding
public opinion being a cause and an e↵ect of terrorism at the same time. Some scholars
claim that the indiscriminate violence is immoral and counterproductive for maintaining
public support (Jones and Libicki, 2008; Reich, 1998; Laqueur, 1976; Cordes et al., 1984;
Crenshaw, 1987; Schelling, 1991; Cronin, 2009; DeNardo, 2014; Lake, 2002; Getmansky and
Sinmazdemir, 2012). While others argue that “even if violence is seen as deplorable, it may
be seen as necessary” by the potential sympathizers of a terrorist group (Davis et al., 2012,
xviii).
Moreover, many scholars argue that violence in and of itself creates a conducive public
atmosphere that encourages sacrifice in the terrorist group’s constituency which, in turn
replenishes membership (Kimhi and Even, 2004; Krueger and Malec´kova´, 2009; McCauley;
Flanigan, 2006). Pape (2005, 2003) and Bloom (2005) provide evidence that a rise in public
support for suicide terrorist attacks allowed the terrorist organizations to use this tactic in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Similarly, Post et al. (2003) assert that family support, or at least
acquiescence, is one of the most prevalent factors among incarcerated Israeli and Palestinian
terrorists. In the same vein, other studies argue that terrorism can be used to mobilize
support in a community which is indi↵erent toward social injustice. It highlights the problems
and signals the group’s commitment to the cause, which mobilizes the people against the
aggressor (Tilly, 2004). Also, if the government’s counter-terrorism operation clamps down
indiscriminately; it can also indirectly mobilize potential sympathizers (Bueno de Mesquita
and Dickson, 2007; Sedgwick, 2004; Siqueira and Sandler, 2006; Parker, 2007; Blake et al.,
2012; Henderson, 2002; Baum, 2004).
On the other hand, terrorists’ indiscriminate violence can be counterproductive. For
instance, the demise of Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) – that
operated in Turkey and mainly launched attacks against Turks – is one of many examples of
a terrorist group’s termination due to loss of popular support. Dugan et al. (2008) claim that
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when ASALA’s target selection no longer focused exclusively on Turks, the group gradually
lost support from its sympathizers and was eventually disbanded. Moreover, studies of
collateral damage provide striking evidence regarding the morale of the local population
in the conflict zones. They argue that the role of the civilian population in conflicts is
important and non-combatants always play a significant role (Condra and Shapiro, 2012;
Blair et al., 2013). Therefore, attacks that harm non-combatants may undermine civilian
support or solidarity depending on the nature of the violence, the intentionality attributed
to the attacks, and the precision with which it is applied (Kalyvas, 2006; Downes, 2007;
Kocher et al., 2011).
So, in short, popular support for terrorism can be inherently endogenous. The loss of
popular support occurs when the group’s support is fragile to begin with, or when the
terrorists use indiscriminate violence (Siqueira and Sandler, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and
Dickson, 2007). Therefore, terrorist groups have to inflict the right amount of violence to
get a sympathetic community to mobilize enough that they will do what terrorists want but
not so much that it turns them o↵ (Berman et al., 2011; Shapiro, 2013).
A review of the extant literature reveals that to date no research study is currently
available that has examined the interaction of organizational lethality, grassroots popular
support and group longevity. The triangular relationship between these three variables dic-
tates the overall behavior of a group. Popular support is essential for membership retention
and replenishment of new recruits. It is also vital for the acquisition of other material re-
sources and most importantly to acquire critical information about the enemy. The loss of
grassroots popular support in the group’s home-base location will be a major factor leading
to the demise of a terrorist group. All of the studies mentioned above either have com-
pletely ignored the subject of targeting civilians and popular support and their impact on
the groups’ longevity or have discussed these factors individually. So there is a serious lack
of systematic and rigorous empirical studies to test the premise that losing popular support
– in the wake of indiscriminate attacks on soft targets – has repercussions for organizational
longevity. This dissertation research fills this gap and includes both active and inactive
terrorist groups in the analysis. I use logistic regression model and event history analysis
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to examine the triangular relationship between organizational lethality, popular support for
violence and a terrorist group’s mortality. In the next chapter, I will develop an argument
that clarifies the theoretical mechanism that connects the indiscriminate violence against
civilians to group mortality and the interaction between organizational lethality, grassroots
popular support and group longevity.
To analyze the consequences of political violence on group longevity, I disaggregate vic-
tims of terrorist attacks into civilian and combatant targets using data from the Global
Terrorism Dataset (GTD).7 As mentioned previously, popular support for violence may be
inherently endogenous because it can be a cause and an e↵ect of terrorism at the same
time (Sharvit et al., 2015; Hewitt, 1990; Henderson, 2002). Therefore, I account for poten-
tial endogeneity by estimating a Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Model, which allows
estimation of the error correlation between two equations (Greene, 2003, 738). The results
suggest there is endogeneity.
Moreover, my argument suggests a relationship between terrorist group tactics and the
time until a terrorist organization fails. To examine these relationships, I employ event
history analysis to estimate group duration. My hypotheses are evaluated using data on
group lethality, popular support, and organizational mortality for a diverse set of 480 terrorist
groups that engaged in operations from 1980–2011. The findings suggest that a group’s
lethality and the length of its survival are negatively related. I find that groups that exhibit
indiscriminate violence against civilians are likely to expire sooner than groups that chose
selective violence against combatants.
I contend that perpetrating lethal attacks reduces grassroots popular support, and there-
fore, groups that survive longer are more likely to abstain from launching such attacks. The
statistical results of this cross-group study are tested by conducting group-specific case stud-
ies on the Taliban to illustrate how causal mechanisms often function. The findings suggest
that the Taliban’s indiscriminate violence against civilians is the product of organizational
constraints because they also su↵er from principal agent problems.
7The author is thankful to Dr. Victor Asal for his suggestion to disaggregate target-type in an email
correspondence.
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1.1 Policy and Practice Implications
This dissertation contributes directly to counterterrorism policy. A group’s real political
motivations are revealed when we examine who or what it chooses to attack (Heger, 2010).
So, analyzing target selection processes and patterns will help counterterrorism agencies to
understand the intent of terrorist groups. This information is particularly useful when gov-
ernments consider negotiations with terrorist groups. Also, understanding the relationship
between group lethality, grassroots popular support and longevity will help authorities to
break the link between communities and violent groups which may go a long way in escalating
the decline of an organization (Cronin, 2006).
1.2 Road Map of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of six chapters and the following is a brief overview of the rest of
the project:
Chapter 2 presents the organizational process theory and analyzes ‘the terrorist’s dilemma.’
The resulting argument generates conditional hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 3 explains
the data and data collection methodology. It describes the di↵erent empirical techniques
used to examine the variation in the dependent variables. It also explains the operational-
ization of the independent variables and other known covariates of interest in the terrorism
literature, followed by a discussion of model specifications. Chapter 4 presents the results
of the analysis. It discusses the survival probabilities based on the variation in indepen-
dent variables using marginal e↵ects and Kaplan–Meier estimates. Chapter 5 presents case
studies of the Afghan Taliban and Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) in Pakistan. Finally, chapter 6
reexamines the findings and connects them to the broader understanding of how terrorist
groups end, followed by a conclusion and future outlook.
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Chapter 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
AND HYPOTHESES
To understand any aggressive and violent social behavior, it is imperative to examine all
factors – such as environmental, individual and societal – that have a bearing on such be-
haviors. Terrorism scholarship accentuates the significance of environmental, individual and
societal factors to understand the genesis of political violence, however, these factors are
also pertinent to understand terrorists’ target selection and their longevity. For instance,
interpersonal di↵erences and rivalries within a terrorist organization can be exploited to
break the operational ties among key members of the group, which may lead to total disrup-
tion of the group (Cunningham et al., 2016, 26). Similarly, grassroots public support and
environmental factors such as intergroup competition and relative political capacity of the
incumbent government can significantly constrain group behavior. In the following sections,
I will introduce a theoretical framework that explains why terrorist organizations are likely
to kill civilians and how terrorists target selection transforms public opinion and impacts
group longevity. This framework incorporates environmental, individual and societal factors
and is based on the internal dynamics of the terrorist organizations. But before we look into
the underlying theoretical channels, it is important to precisely define terrorism and explain
what constitutes a terrorist group.
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2.1 Preliminary Concepts
2.1.1 What is Terrorism?
How do we distinguish terrorists from activists and freedom fighters? Were terrorists always
terrorists and who has the authority to declare someone a terrorist? These questions show
the complexities that terrorism scholars face in defining the phenomena of terrorism, which
is still evolving both politically and emotionally (Schmid, 2004). Currently, various legal and
political definitions of terrorism have been followed by many academics, policymakers and by
di↵erent data collection agencies, leading to varying incident counts that influence the results
of research using di↵erent data sources (Chermak et al., 2012). Scholars of terrorism agree
that terrorism is a form of political protest or political violence, committed and planned by
rational actors to achieve political goals, and the targets of a terrorist episode go beyond the
actual victims of the attack.
This dissertation follows Goodwin (2006)’s definition of terrorism. According to Goodwin
(2006, 315) “terrorism refers to acts of violence that are intended to kill indiscriminately
ordinary civilians, and to frighten others, for political ends; it is thus quite di↵erent from
guerrilla warfare, political assassination, and other strategies of insurgency that have military
and political targets.”
2.1.2 What is a Terrorist Group?
The lack of consensus on a universal definition of terrorism generates serious implications
for the study of terrorist groups, so it is essential to discuss what constitutes a “terrorist
group” at the onset. Phillips (2015) presents a comprehensive analysis of di↵erent empirical
studies of terrorism that exclusively used the “terrorist group” as a unit of analysis and
suggests that an inclusive definition of a terrorist group should be employed to distinguish
terrorist groups from other criminal entities (Blomberg et al., 2011; Vittori, 2009; Jones and
Libicki, 2008; Blomberg et al., 2009; Cronin, 2009, 2006; Crenshaw, 1991; Rekawek, 2008).
He defines a terrorist group as “a subnational political organization that uses terrorism” to
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pursue its goals (Phillips, 2015, 7).1
This definition sets terrorist groups apart from criminal gangs and drug cartels. Accord-
ing to the definition, Mexican Crime Syndicates (an example being Los Zetas) – despite their
imitation of the methods of Al Qaeda – cannot be considered terrorist groups.2 Moreover,
this project does not consider normative or technical distinctions between insurgents, rebels,3
freedom fighters, or terrorists and may refer to terrorist groups as terrorist organizations,
insurgents, and dissidents interchangeably.
2.2 Theoretical Argument
“Most, if not all terrorist groups end, yet we do not fully understand why” (Young and
Dugan, 2014, 2). Current scholarship has discussed many ways of terrorist groups’ end;
however, there is no rigorous theoretical framework that may be used to analyze the life
cycle of terrorist groups (Phillips, 2011, 371). In the following subsections, I will establish
a theoretical framework that examines the longevity and mortality of terrorist groups by
incorporating societal and environmental factors. This framework will evaluate the decline
and demise of domestic terrorist organizations as a product of their lethality and is based
on two broad perspectives: the organizational process theory and the theory of agency. It
will also examine why some organizations are more lethal than others and how organiza-
tional theory and agency problems connect lethality and popular support to the longevity
of terrorist groups. To examine the triangular relationship of group lethality, popularity,
and mortality, it is important to discuss the factors that cause variation in lethality across
groups. The following subsections explain the variation in group lethality across groups in
detail.
1A subnational political organization is an entity within a nation, and it does not exclude transnational
groups. It just excludes states and groups of states.
2For more details about the technological sophistication, viciousness, and ruthlessness of Los Zetas
see Campbell (2010). Also, see Johnson (2010) for more information on Mexican Crime Syndicates’ im-
itation of Al Qaeda. And for the debate about whether to consider Mexican drug tra cking organizations as
terrorist groups despite their mainly criminal motivations see Flanigan (2012) and Longmire and Longmire
(2008).
3This dissertation research only accounts for and distinguishes between the terrorist groups that have
used guerrilla tactics to launch operations by dichotomizing the dataset in the empirical analysis.
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2.2.1 Organizational Theory: Treating Terrorist Groups as Orga-
nizations
Building on a rich organizational studies literature, I consider terrorist groups as formal
organizations (Barnard, 1968; Mintzberg, 1983; Wilson, 1974; Morgan, 1998; Gareth, 1997;
Ja↵ee, 2001; Cornelissen et al., 2005; James and Jones, 1976; Dalton et al., 1980; Blau and
Scott, 1962; Schwartz et al., 1963; Mayntz, 2004). Organizational theory scholarship defines
organizations as “formal voluntary associations” where ‘formal’ pertains to groups “with
a clearly definable membership” and with “a consciously adopted name” (Wilson, 1974,
31). The selected sample of terrorist groups for this analysis is a set of well-established
organizations.4 They not only fit the basic framework of organizational theory as formal
organizations but also strive to maintain a sizable membership, and have significant terrorist
activity associated with their names (Bruscella, 2015).5
The organizational literature is focused on analyzing firms’ behavior and examining the
business strategies of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). But like conventional organiza-
tions, terrorist groups are known to have built organizational hierarchies and structures
because “structure is the setting in which power is exercised, decisions are made, and the
organizations activities are carried out” (Hall, 1996, 109; Volders, 2016; Jackson et al., 2005).
These structures and hierarchies enable them to achieve the best possible outcomes. One
of the most important commonalities between MNEs and terrorist organizations is that
they both strive to overcome challenges to their survival and work hard to maximize their
e ciency and gains.
The terrorism literature has analyzed terrorist groups behavior as a function of its internal
dynamics even in the pre-9/11 era (Crenshaw, 1987, 1985; Oots, 1989, 1986; Lockett, 1994;
Rapoport, 1988; Post, 1987). Many scholars believe that terrorism is an expression of an
4The sample has been selected from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).
5Except for attacks perpetrated by lone wolves and unknown groups. The ‘unknown attacks’ are never
claimed by any of the terrorist groups listed in the GTD. According to the newest iteration of the GTD
(2016), unknown attacks constitute about 46% (71922 attacks out 156772 total) of the total attacks. Also,
to be in the sample, a terrorist organization has to have at least five terrorist attacks associated with their
names. For further discussion regarding the rationale of restrictive sample see Section C.2.8. To learn more
about the importance of formal association of terrorist groups with names see (Bruscella, 2015).
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organization’s struggle for survival in a competitive environment. They argue that terrorist
organizations are not monolithic entities; like any other commercial enterprise, they adapt to
circumstances, and their goals evolve over time (Crenshaw, 1987, 1985; Oots, 1989; Lockett,
1994; Rapoport, 1988). They also contend that over time ‘the group’ itself becomes ‘the
surrogate family’ of the terrorists and primary focus of their loyalties (Hudson and Majeska,
1999; Atron, 2004). Therefore, the goal of group preservation and longevity becomes the end
goal of the organization, supplanting all other motivations or goals that were consequential
for the formation of group (Crenshaw, 1987; Rapoport, 1988; McCormick, 2003; Post, 1987;
Likar, 2011; Stern and Modi, 2010).
Generally, the core managerial challenges of terrorist organizations are actually quite
similar to those faced by other, more traditional human organizations (Shapiro, 2013, 2).
However, the terrorist organizations by nature of their operations face challenges to manage
the otherwise straightforward tasks like communication, distribution of resources, etc. These
managerial and agency problems for terrorist organizations are analyzed in detail in the
following subsection.
2.2.2 Theory of Agency: The Terrorist’s Dilemma
Organizational management theorists highlight four significant challenges that MNEs face for
their survival: recruitment, control, governance, and resilience. But terrorist organizations
have to face an additional challenge (Weinstein, 2006, 42-45).6 They have to recruit and
secure funds and other logistical support in a hostile and competitive environment. The
terrorist groups also face a formidable counterterrorism resistance from the government to
perform their normal day-to-day activities. This counterterrorism resistance varies with the
relative political capacity of di↵erent governments.7 Moreover, intergroup competition makes
it harder to recruit and attract popular support.
6 Weinstein (2006, 42-45) examined organizational challenges that are highlighted by theorists of the
economics of organization and featured these five major challenges that a terrorist organization faces for its
survival. For more details about these challenges see Weinstein (2006, 42-45).
7Relative political capacity (RPC) is defined as “the capacity of the political system to mobilize the
human and material resources at its disposal and devote them to national goals.” For more details on RPC
see Hendrix and Young (2014), Young (2012) and Kugler and Tammen (2012).
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Moreover, since violence is necessary for the group’s maintenance and cannot simply be
abandoned, terrorist organizations face what Shapiro (2013, 8) calls “the terrorist’s organi-
zational dilemma” to control violence (Crenshaw, 1985). He argues that like any other con-
ventional organizations, terrorist groups want to maintain corporate control over operations;
however, they have to do so while staying covert. This dilemma causes additional internal
and external constraints on the group. As a result, the standard problems encountered by
all organizations – like convening for meetings, communication, checks and balances, etc. –
get amplified with terrorist groups forcing the leadership to make a critical trade-o↵ between
operational security8 and tactical control.9 This trade-o↵ creates operational control prob-
lems for the leadership, which lead to counterproductive violence (Shapiro, 2013; Berman
et al., 2011). The following subsections further dissect the operational security and tactical
control trade-o↵ in more detail and also discusses the implications of these two factors for
organizational violence and longevity.
2.2.2.1 Terrorist’s Target Selection and Organizational Lethality
The corporate design of terrorist groups is not only susceptible to environmental constraints –
such as intergroup competition and the relative political capacity of government mentioned in
the previous section –, but agency problems like conflicts of interest among members. These
idiosyncratic agency problems are commonly referred as the Principal-Agent Problem (PAP)
in the business literature (Miller, 1993; Kreps, 1990). The PAP in agency theory studies
refers to an asymmetric relationship between two individuals (principal and agent), in which
the former delegates tasks to the latter on his or her behalf (Valencia and Balbinotto, 2017).
During this power delegation, the principal cannot directly observe the agent’s behavior and
cannot verify if the agent is carrying out the assigned task e↵ectively (Eisenhardt, 1989).
8According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), operational security (OPSEC) “is an an-
alytical process used to deny an adversary information - generally unclassified - about our intentions and
capabilities by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with our planning process or
operations.” With regard to terrorist groups, OPSEC also pertains to concealment of operational planning,
a group’s intentions and capabilities, and potential hideouts from law enforcement agencies. For more detail
on DHS’s definition of OPSEC see http://www.d11s.org/documents/OTO/ocso-whatisopsec-brochure.pdf
9Tactical control refers to commanding authority over the assignment of tasks and resources and control
over other operations like target selection, monetary control, etc.
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The PAP creates complications that are usually dealt by conducting quarterly reviews,
surprise inspections and surveillance. But in terrorist organizations, this lack of oversight
can result in indiscriminate attacks on civilians that is particularly detrimental to the group.
The leadership finds it immensely di cult to control violence because they have delegated
operational control of the group to middle management or field commanders.10 Terrorist
leaders have to choreograph their violence for three di↵erent audiences; for their enemy
– the government they want to obtain concessions from – and for local and international
populations. They want to terrorize these audiences su ciently enough to elicit concessions
but not enough to trigger a backlash, which is detrimental for group survival (Shapiro et al.,
2013). Shapiro (2013) contends that terrorist organizations have struggled to strike a balance
between the need to inflict pain and the danger of provoking a backlash from authorities and
local population. He argues that leaders of a terrorist group want to use calibrated violence
that does not cross the societal tolerance threshold.11 But given the operational necessity of
terrorist organizations to be covert and due to PAP, the task of calibrating violence becomes
di cult.12
But why does the leadership have to give up operational control in the first place? The
operational success of terrorist activity depends clandestine tactical and financial actions
because it protects organizational secrets. Therefore, terrorist groups operate in a highly
decentralized environment where operatives are divided into small units (Arce and Siqueira,
2014). The agents (local cell commander) usually have better operational awareness; they
are familiar with the on-the-ground situation and local conditions. So, they think that they
are better equipped to select the targets, timing and location of attacks. On the other hand,
leaders (principals), have a better understanding of the long-term political consequences of
10This problem has been emphasized by many contemporary terrorism studies (Long and Sorger, 2010;
Byman and Kreps, 2010; Stern, 2000a; Byman, 2006; Kearns et al., 2014; Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2007;
Abrahms and Potter, 2015).
11In an email correspondence I asked Dr. Jacob Shaprio – the author of Shapiro (2013) – how does one
know the tipping point in the “societal tolerance” for violence, and if a terrorist group’s violence has crossed
this threshold? To which Dr. Shaprio replied, “there’s no priori way...., to recognize the [society’s tolerance]
threshold [for violence] unless groups cross it, and you get to see the population response.”
12 Shapiro (2013, 4) argues that leaders need to manage how violence is employed but to do so creates
“some measure of operational vulnerabilities and therefore increase the likelihood of operative being caught
and a group compromised.”
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attacks. They have the ability to detect the agents deviations from the group’s strategic
plans and assess the political fallouts of an agent’s actions. As long as, the principal and
agents have similar views about organizational aims and objectives, and there is no di↵erence
of opinion on the ways to achieve these goals, PAPs never surface.
But unlike business enterprises that have clear aims to maximize profits, terrorist orga-
nizations may not have clear objectives and may su↵er from a lack of direction. As Shapiro
and Siegel (2009, 405) note, “substantial evidence indicates that members of terrorist groups
are not uniformly motivated by the cause and are not equally willing to sacrifice for the
cause.” Thus, a leader’s vision does not necessarily trickle down to operational commanders.
Therefore, it is possible that the latter may select undesirable targets and use means (such
as suicide bombings) that increase civilian fatalities. In other words leaders face a dilemma:
if they exert more control on the agent and dictate how violence should be used then they
have to share more information and more frequently expose both the principal and agent to
the risk of being operations being detected. Also, given geographical separation between the
principal and the agent, it is harder for the former to e ciently communicate operational
instructions to the latter.13
Furthermore, even if the specific rules of engagement have been communicated to opera-
tional commanders, they may attack civilians to settle scores in local political rivalries (Pe-
tersen, 2002), take personal revenge (Kalyvas, 2006, 58-61), kill for private greed (Midlarsky,
2005), and act due to pure sadism (Mueller, 2007). If an employee does not play by the com-
pany’s rules, conventional organizations have clear legal and o cial procedures to reprimand
him or her. But exerting too much pressure on terrorist group members may also encour-
age defection. Given security concerns and communication gaps induced by decentralized
networks,14 leaders have to relinquish some operational responsibilities like target selection,
13 Hausken et al. (2015, 57) presents experimental evidence regarding importance of communication be-
tween the leaders and frontline fighters. He argues that disrupting the communication network is more
e↵ective in terminating terrorist organizations.
14By making use of resources and like-minded operatives scattered across borders in a decentralized net-
work, the terrorist groups can successfully evade anti-terror or counter-insurgency operations, and inflict
greater damage or more civilian attacks as compared to groups that operate under more or less centralized
leadership. So, terrorist leaders prefer group decentralization (Pearson et al., 2015).
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recruitment and other logistical tasks to lower-level operatives with minimal supervision.
In short, I argue that organizations that are better managers of the principal-agent
problem should be able to control violence against civilians and preserve grassroots popular
support. The following subsection will discuss how the public reacts to increased violence
against civilians. It will also explain why violence calibration is necessary and how it is
connected to the decline and demise of a terrorist organization.
2.2.2.2 The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Popular Support and Group Longevity
Any theoretical explanation regarding the lifecycle of a terrorist organization must embrace
the importance of grassroots popular support for the organization’s survival. Figure 2.1
formalizes a possible interdependence between Group Lethality (GL), Popular Support (PS)
and Group Mortality (GM) using a simplified diagram. The figure indicates that GM is a
dichotomous outcome and one means that the group has ended. Building upon the preceding
discussion, I argue that if a group resorts to indiscriminate violence against civilians – defined
as group lethality (GL) –, it losses the popular support (PS) of its constituency which has a
direct e↵ect on group mortality (GM) that is shown by a ‘+’ sign above the arrow that leads
from PS to GM. The e↵ect of GL on PS is negative – hence, the ‘–’ sign above the arrow
that leads from GL to PS. Finally, by extension, GL also has a positive relationship with
GM. In short, the relationships shown in the figure indicate that variation in group lethality
due to a group’s inability to control violence leads to the group losing grassroots popular
support, which hastens the demise of a terrorist group. So, the amount of PS that a group
garners will then determine the group’s duration.
Moreover, to elaborate on significance of popular support for a terrorist group’s survival,
this dissertation makes two explicit assumptions about the nature of a local population that
is living in the conflict zone.
• First, I assume that the constituents of terrorist groups cannot flee from the conflict
zone and face three options: opt-out of supporting the regime (repressive or otherwise),
support the terrorist organization, or stay neutral (Jardine, 2014, 47).
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Figure 2.1: Causal interdependence between group lethality (GL), popular support (PS),
group mortality (GL).
• Secondly, I assume that there are only three kinds of constituents that are residing in
the terrorists’ constituencies (Mesquita, 2013, 420-423):
– The true believers believe they are fighting for an indivisible good – such as
control of the government – and prefer terrorist actions regardless of how a gov-
ernment or society may respond to violence.
– The reluctant terrorists would prefer to use negotiations and diplomacy. They
may be able to accept and prefer to reach a negotiated compromise.
– The complacent opponents would rather be taken advantage by the govern-
ment than engage in terrorism.
Terrorist groups survive based on their ability to recruit operatives (Faria and Arce,
2012b, 645). To recruit, terrorist organizations have to rely on maintaining and extending
popular grassroots support (Phillips, 2011). Popular grassroots support is also required to
secure funds, weapons, forged documents, etc. So the terrorist groups need the support and
participation of all members of the constituency to function e↵ectively. Therefore, the right
target selection is key to successfully maintaining the trust and interest of those who support
or sympathize with a terrorist group (Phillips, 2011).
Furthermore, terrorist organizations compete with the government for grassroots sup-
port (Phillips, 2011, 370). In this competition, the grassroots supporters always encounter
what Phillips (2011, 370) calls switching costs – which can be tangible or psychological –
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that can push them to change their allegiance from one side to the other. The switching
cost for changing allegiance is considerably reduced if either party (government or terrorist
group) commits indiscriminate violence against civilians. Since the actions of the terrorist
groups are the primary focus of this dissertation study, therefore, I will only concentrate on
the impact of terrorist groups indiscriminate violence.15 I argued that when a terrorist group
leadership loses control of its operational commanders, the latter engage in indiscriminate
violence against civilians which may not bother the constituents who are the true believers
in the terrorist group’s ideology and its justification for violence. But it may generate un-
easy feelings among the reluctant terrorists and push the complacent opponents to change
their allegiance to the government. However, the group’s demise may not necessarily occur
immediately because the end of a terrorist group “is more likely to be a whimper than a
bang” (Weinberg, 2013, 123). But the framework for the organizational disintegration pre-
sented here produces a decline in the terrorist activity over time and facilitates a gradual
demise of the terrorist group.
So to conclude, calibration of violence is crucial for a terrorist organization to maintain
popular grassroots support because it is indispensable to its survivability (Phillips, 2011,
370). But doing so is challenging for the group’s leadership because, on the one hand, the
leader needs to become more assertive in controlling the direction of violence by maintaining
a large-scale administrative presence. But this large-scale leadership presence can backfire
and allow the states’ counterterrorism agencies to interdict and eliminate leadership, e↵ec-
tively destroying the group. On the other hand, the leadership can delegate operational
control to the junior cell-commanders and avoid detection. However, doing so would allow
the operational commanders – with a much narrower vision of success – to be reckless in
their target selection. This will not only increase the organizational lethality resulting in
depletion of popular grassroots support but will also speed up the decline and eventually
demise of a terrorist group. Also, based on the discussion mentioned above, I contend that
15Since the terrorism scholarship explicitly argues that the terrorist groups may recede for reasons that
might have little to do with the government’s actions – whether conciliatory or coercive –; terrorist groups
are the central focus of this dissertation. For more details on how a local population reacts to a government’s
indiscriminate counterterrorism operations see Lake (2002) and Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007).
21
an application of calibrated violence against civilians is imperative for the survival of a ter-
rorist group leading to the following conditional hypotheses of this dissertation study:
H-1: The probability of terrorist group survival decreases as the group kills more civilians.
H-2: Terrorist groups that kill more civilians will be associated with lower levels of popular
support.
2.3 Religious Terrorist Groups: Do They Su↵er from
Principal-Agent Problem?
Ideological and religious motivations have often been cited as one of the most important
causes of the rise in indiscriminate civilian killings in the post-9/11 World. A common
religious ideology can play a unifying role within a terrorist organization; it should be able
to minimize the PAP because the foot-soldiers and operational commanders are much more
likely to listen to the leaders and have a common purpose and vision with them. So the
leaders of religious organizations should be able to control their rank and file; hence, they
are in a better position to calibrate violence against civilians. But 2.2 shows an opposite
trend; religious groups have generated far more civilian fatalities than ethno-nationalist and
leftist terrorist groups in the post-9/11 world and are in fact more lethal. So what explains
the di↵erent levels of violence between religious and secular terrorists?
It is di cult to understand religious and theologically motivated terrorism in the post
9/11 world without the focusing on Islamic terrorism. While explaining the rise of Islamic
terrorism in the post-9/11 world, a significant majority of terrorism scholars provide three
fundamental explanations about the lethality of religious terrorist groups (Ho↵man, 1998;
Laqueur, 2000; Enders and Sandler, 2011; Crenshaw, 2008; Juergensmeyer, 1997; Benjamin
and Simon, 2002). First, they argue that religious terrorist groups define ‘the other’ –
the enemy – too broadly and sometimes too rigidly; therefore, they have less incentive to
be discriminate in their killing (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008). They contend that religious
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terrorist groups consider all members of the society as legitimate targets, including those
that are most vulnerable (Berman and Laitin, 2006; Bloom, 2004; Juergensmeyer, 1997).
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Figure 2.2: Number of yearly civilian fatalities by ideology.
Second, many studies argue that religious terrorists do not actively seek popular approval
and public sympathy (locally or internationally) for their acts because they expect to obtain
spiritual rewards (Enders and Sandler, 2011; Stern, 2000b; Ho↵man, 2006). These studies
argue that religious terrorists are often ‘their own constituencies’ and do not have an external
audience for their violence.
Finally, they argue that religious terrorists “tend to see violence as an end itself rather
than a means to an end” which makes high casualty attacks acceptable and even more
desirable (Enders and Sandler, 2011). So, in short, there is a broad consensus in the terrorism
scholarship that religiously-motivated Islamic terrorist groups in the post-9/11 world are least
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concerned about ‘winning hearts and minds,’ and creating favorable local and international
public opinion.
These assertions present a limited view of the rise of religiously motivated terrorism
because a predominant majority of terrorism scholars argue that even suicide bombers –
who attack their targets indiscriminately – are neither mentally disturbed or primarily mo-
tivated by religion (Merari, 2010; Kruglanski, 2006; Hassan, 2001; Rasler et al., 2007). For
instance, Merari (2010) recorded testimonies and interviews of failed Palestinian suicide
bombers and their families. He argues that none of the family members or the suicide
bombers mentioned religion as a motivating factor. In fact, the Tamil Tigers – an atheist
group – were the worldwide leaders in suicide bombings in the 1980s. So, religiosity does
not explain the rise of indiscriminate civilian killings in the post-9/11 world because it does
not explain the indiscriminate violence of LTTE against civilians in Sri Lanka and restrained
violence against civilians by Islamic groups like Ahrar-al-Sham and Hizbollah in the Mid-
dle East (Pape, 2005, 2003; Joscelyn, 2014). To better understand the role of religion we
need to examine the victims of modern Islamic terrorism that are discussed in the following
subsection.
2.3.0.3 Who Are the Victims of Islamic Terrorism?
Figure 2.3 shows the top three countries that su↵ered the most fatalities between 1970 and
2014 according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The figure shows that about 25%
of the total attacks in the world after 9/11 were launched in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan
that resulted in about 41% of the total fatalities in the world. Since these three countries
are mostly Muslim populated countries, it is safe to assume that Muslims were the majority
of victims these attacks.
The US government’s National Counter-Terrorism Center at West Point reported similar
victimology in Al Qaeda’s targeting choices between 2004 to 2008 by using Worldwide Inci-
dent Tracking System (WITS) dataset.16 The study claims that “in cases where the religious
a liation of terrorism casualties could be determined, Muslims su↵ered between 82% and
16The WITS dataset can be accessed at http://wits.nctc.gov/.
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97% of terrorism-related fatalities over the past five years” and only 15% of the fatalities
resulting from ALQ attacks between 2004 and 2008 in Iraq were Westerners (Helfstein et al.,
2009). This evidence clearly highlights the fundamental contradiction in the ALQ’s claims
to represent the global community of Muslims (Helfstein et al., 2009).
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Based on the empirical evidence mentioned above, it is clear that modern Islamic terror-
ist groups predominantly target fellow Muslims. ALQ leaders have been openly justifying
the killing of Muslims under a logic of ends justifying the means (Moghadam, 2008) and
they argue that killed civilians “were essentially the human shields, and if innocent, they
died martyrs” (Helfstein et al., 2009, 2).17 There are about 1.6 billion people that are adher-
ents to the Islamic faith in the world (Pew-Research-Center, 2015, Projections 2010-2050)
and despite sectarian tension between Sunnis and Shias, and their grievances against the
West and incumbent governments, not everyone agrees with ALQ’s justification of the mass
killing of Muslims. ALQ’s justification may be acceptable to the true believer in the ALQ’s
17ALQ’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was confronted with questions about the organization’s
use of violence, and especially violence against civilians in an online forum in 2007. He defended ALQ’s
use of violence, arguing that their operations do not kill Muslims, and on the rare occasions they do, such
individuals are apostates or martyrs (Helfstein et al., 2009).
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ideology, but it does not seem plausible to complacent opponents and may indeed produce
misgivings for reluctant terrorists. The following subsection reexamines the claims of schol-
ars regarding the imperviousness of Islamic terrorist groups to popular support in the light
recently unclassified letters of ALQ senior leadership and other primary documents. It also
questions whether these groups are indeed susceptible to public opinion.
2.3.0.4 Target Selection of the Modern Islamic Terrorist Groups
A recently declassified letter that was written by a senior leader of ALQ in Iraq (AQI) to his
subordinate in early 2006 shows that AQI was su↵ering from the principal-agent problem and
a common Salafi and Sunni Islamic ideology did not help to reduce the preference divergence
between the leadership and operational commander. In the letter, the senior AQI leader ex-
presses his concerns regarding indiscriminate and gruesome killings carried out by his local
operational commander named Abu-Usamah, who was a Ramadi Cell Commander. He not
only disciplines Abu-Usamah in the letter but also orders him to see him immediately. In
the letter, senior leader of AQI says (Senior-Leader-ALQ, to Abu Usamah – Harmony Letter
# IZ-060316-02):
“Stop the killing of people unless they are spying, military, or police o cers... if we con-
tinue using the same method, people will start fighting us in the streets... You have to come
with Dr. ‘Amir the day after tomorrow early in the morning... It is important that you and
Dr. ‘Amir have to come to me as soon as possible”
The senior leadership of AQI understands that violence is necessary; however, it repri-
mands the junior commander for killing civilians in gruesome ways and in the middle of town
because the leadership understands that doing so will change the local mood against AQI,
and the locals will rise against them. This letter shows that sometimes doing too much vio-
lence or doing the violence in the wrong way is also damaging to the political cause (Shapiro,
2013).
26
In another declassified letter from 2010, Osama Bin Laden cautions Attiya (a.k.a Jamal
lbrahim Ishtiwi al-Misrati), who was briefly ALQ Second-in-Command, on targeting errors
in various places including Yemen (Bin Laden, to Atiyatullah Al-Libi – Harmony Letter #
SOCOM-2012-0000015).
“The other aspect involves the impact on the nation’s impression towards the Mujahidin
and being sympathetic towards them. The operations that bear extreme negative impact on
the partisans of the Jihad, including targeting the apostates in mosques or nearby – such as
the assassination attempt of Dustum during the holiday worship location, and the assassina-
tion of General Muhammad Yusuf in one of the Pakistan mosques.”
Bin Laden is telling Attiya that he is selecting the wrong targets and does not understand
the political impact of his actions. In the same vein, before the August 2009 elections in
Afghanistan, Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, sought to centralize the Taliban
movement in a rare issuance of a code of conduct for his fighters in Afghanistan (Al-Jazeera,
2009, New Version issued on July 28, 2009; Harmony-#-AFGP-2007-K0000029).
The document was issued in the form of a booklet and was named “Rules of Mujahideen
(ROM) with “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” listed as the issuing authority. Before the
issuance of these guidelines, the individual commanders had been operating autonomously
in Afghanistan. They were selecting their targets and had operational control over their
territory. However, the new ROM sought to curtail their autonomous power. The ROM
warned against defection by stating that:
“Creating a new mujahideen group or battalion is forbidden. If uno cial groups or reg-
ular battalions refused to join the formal structure they should be disbanded.”
The new ROM also wanted to control the use of suicide bombing operations and issued
clear guidelines regarding the circumstances when such operations are permissible. It is also
advised to avoid civilian fatalities at all costs. The ROM states:
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“Suicide attacks should only be used on high and important targets. A brave son of Islam
should not be used for lower and useless targets. The utmost e↵ort should be made to avoid
civilian casualties.”
In the past, the Taliban often took hostages, and the new ROM issued clear guidelines
regarding how to handle the prisoners. The ROM further described how to treat di↵erent
types of prisoners and also curtailed the decision-making powers of local commanders re-
garding killing, releasing, or negotiating hostage release. It also prohibited taking ransoms.
The ROM states:
“Whenever any o cial, soldier, contractor or worker of the slave government [referring
to Afghan Government] is captured, these prisoners cannot be attacked or harmed. The deci-
sion on whether to seek a prisoner exchange or to release the prisoner with a strong guarantee
will be made by the provincial leader. Releasing prisoners in exchange for money is strictly
prohibited. If a military infidel is captured [a reference to the US and NATO forces], the
decision on whether to kill, release or exchange the hostage is only to be made by the Imam
[a reference to Mullah Omar] or the deputy Imam.”
Finally, the ROM instructs all Taliban fighters to do their best to win the hearts and
minds of the local population. The ROM states:
“The mujahideen have to behave well and show proper treatment to the nation, in order
to bring the hearts of the civilian Muslims closer to them. The mujahideen must avoid dis-
crimination based on tribal roots, language or geographic background.”
These ROMs show the Taliban’s top leadership recognized the divergent preferences of
the local commanders and understood the importance of favorable public opinion. However,
the options for the Taliban leadership to enforce these ROMs were limited because of the
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terrorist’s dilemma described in Section 2.2.2.
Moreover, the following two examples show the importance of local support for initiating
and sustaining any terror campaign. In the aftermath of an attack on Yemen’s Defense
Ministry hospital in Sana’a on December 5, 2013 that killed 52 people, Qasim al-Raymi, the
current emir (local chief) of ALQ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQIP), issued a rare apology.
He said,“we confess to this mistake and fault. We o↵er our apologies and condolences to
the families of the victims.” He further explained that “we did not want your lost ones; we
did not target them on purpose. This is not of our religion or our morals.” He explained
that one of the attackers made a mistake and attacked the hospital, whereas the hospital
was not the target. Peter Bergen, a renowned terrorist scholar, expressed his views on this
incident and said: “Al Qaeda leaders seem to be waking up to the fact that if they position
themselves as the defenders of Muslims, their large-scale killing of Muslim civilians needs to
stop” (Basil and Shoichet, 2013).
Last but not least, is the case of May 16, 2003, and November 9, 2005, suicide bombings
in Casablanca (Morocco) and Amman (Jordan) for which ALQ took the credit. While
these coordinated simultaneous suicide attacks were an operational and tactical success, it
infuriated the local public and the next day angry natives crowded the streets in protest and
chanted “Burn in Hell, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi” – then leader of AQI – and media called the
events the Jordanian 9/11. This incident completely depleted the local support of ALQ in
Jordon and Morocco (Kalpakian, 2005; Finer and Mehdawi, 2005). The examples illustrated
here show that tactical successes may not translate into strategic success.
The examples, declassified letters and documents from ALQ and Taliban high command
presented above show that even modern Islamic terrorist groups are acutely aware of the
significance of grassroots popular support. They also indicate that common Salafi and Sunni
Islamic ideologies of ALQ and Taliban respectively do not prevent the principal-agent prob-
lem in these terrorist organizations and fail to restrain indiscriminate violence against civil-
ians. If religious terrorist groups are also vulnerable to the principal-agent problem despite
a common unifying ideology, then what organizational attributes do make them di↵erent?
In the following subsection, I will discuss the organizational attributes of religious terrorism
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that makes them e↵ective.
2.3.0.5 Why Are Religious Terrorist Organizations More E↵ective?
As discussed in the previous section even ruthless religious organizations like ALQ, AQIP
and Taliban are also subject to the PAP and are constrained by unfavorable public opin-
ion in their constituencies. But it is surprising that despite facing the terrorist’s dilemma,
and losing operational control of their terror campaigns – which led to the killings of hun-
dreds of thousands fellow Muslims due to principal-agent problems – these organizations
managed to remain operational. Is there something unique about how religiously motivated
groups are organized that makes them unusually e↵ective to overcome the organizational
dilemma (Berman, 2011)?
First, many longtime scholars of religion and terrorism – such as Mark Juergensmeyer,
David Rapoport, Walter Laqueur and Bruce Ho↵man – argue that religiously motivated
terrorist groups use religious tradition in conjunction with their specific interpretation of
both religious texts and current world events to support their attacks. They benefit from
their idiosyncratic understanding of authoritative sacred texts because it allows followers to
take actions without fear of doing something contrary to their perceived religious morality.
Their religious worldview allows them to violate acts like suicide bombing that are considered
socially taboo.18 So religious groups get a sense of absolute and unifying cohesion from their
religious devotion and their shared understanding of something they believe is ordained by
God (Rapoport, 1983; Laqueur, 1977; Juergensmeyer, 1997; Ho↵man, 2006).
Second, religious groups “have greater opportunities to screen their operatives, thereby
reducing preference divergence and increasing control” (Shapiro, 2013, 206). For instance,
Hamas, a religious terrorist organization as opposed to the secular Fatah,19 recruited its
militants from a much more homogeneous population that had been pre-screened through
18Islamic teachings strictly prohibit individual suicide because it is regarded as a major sin. According
to Islamic teachings, those who commit suicide will live their eternity in the fire of Hell. Suicide bombing,
however, has been a controversial subject and one can find interpretations for and against this act. For more
details on individual suicide see https://quran.com/4/29.
19Both organizations faced similar external constraints and the same enemy – Israel.
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religious institutions. Therefore, Hamas faced easier managerial challenges because of a
common pool of indoctrinated people for recruitment and resource provision (Shapiro, 2013,
248).
In short, religious organizations do care about favorable public opinion and want to
maintain operational and managerial control over their rank and file. They also face sim-
ilar organizational and agency problems like mainstream conventional organizations. But
they have a slight edge over secular terrorist groups because of the availability of highly
motivated religious followers and their ability to manipulate theological understanding of
religious scriptures. So it is safe to assume that they will have a longer lifespan based on the
ability to screen their operatives, availability of true believers and spiritually based motiva-
tions (Rapoport, 1983; Cronin, 2006). These insights suggest another important hypothesis
for this study:
H-3: A terrorist group with religious motivation is less likely to end than a group with
another type of motivation.
2.3.0.6 Liability of Newness
The organizational scholarship argues that younger organizations have a higher rate of failure
than older organizations. They contend that in a competitive environment, a young organi-
zation is more likely to fail (Arthur Stinchcombe, 2000; Freeman et al., 1983; Ranger-Moore,
1997; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Stark, 1998; Stern and Modi,
2010; Saunders, 2009). The literature refers to this trend as a “liability of newness.” Orga-
nizational theory research argues that newer organizations depend on new, costly roles and
tasks that have yet to be learned, and therefore are more vulnerable. In relatively younger
organizations, social interaction – which is required for e↵ective collaboration – takes time to
develop. They also lack a common normative base, and stable linkages between the members
in the beginning (Arthur Stinchcombe, 2000; Bruderl and Schussler, 1990).
In the terrorism literature, however, it is often found that newly formed or splintered
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terrorist groups from the old groups are likely to be more popular; popular groups are more
likely to enlist new operatives, and groups that have a large number of operatives are likely
to be more active (Arquilla et al., 1999, 100). On the other hand, young terrorist groups with
weaker capabilities by necessity are more likely to kill civilians because they cannot attack
more fortified and di cult military targets. Therefore, young groups are more inclined to go
after softer targets. Also, to establish their brand name in the market, these young groups
tend to launch more spectacular attacks against soft targets. However, killing civilians is
counterproductive for grassroots popular support which is a prerequisite for survival.
Moreover, Young and Dugan (2014, 4) and Blomberg et al. (2009) argue that young ter-
rorist organizations cannot compete for resources and recruits and old organizations outbid
them. But the success of a terrorist group, nevertheless, depends on how the violence is
used. The ‘Liability of Newness’ thesis requires a closer examination; therefore, I predict
that young organizations should be less likely to survive.
H-4: A young terrorist group is more likely to end than an old terrorist group.
2.3.0.7 Targeting Logic: Suicide Bombing as a Weapon of Choice
Finally, the weapon of choice and targeting logic of the terrorists show their resolve to inflict
mass casualties indiscriminately or to calibrate the violence to a tolerable level for society.
The terrorist organizations identify the target and then seek to attain the capability to
attack these targets at the desired scale. The groups with discriminate targeting logic will
depend on weaponry that will allow them to attack specific targets. On the other hand,
the groups that have highly indiscriminate targeting logic will rely on mass bombings or
suicide bombing to cause maximum fatalities (Dolnik, 2007, 16). Since suicide bombings are
inherently indiscriminate in nature and can result in collateral damage, groups that use this
tactic will lose popular support in the long run if not immediately.
Suicide terrorism has evolved as an e↵ective strategy in the post-9/11 world. Many recent
scholars of terrorism posit that the probability of relative success of suicide attacks vis-a-
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vis conventional attacks makes them an e↵ective and a likely choice for modern terrorist
organizations (Pape and Feldman, 2010; Ho↵man, 2003). Moreover, suicide bombings are
inexpensive and less complicated than other kinds of terrorist operations; they also guarantee
media coverage (Ho↵man, 2003). Kydd and Walter (2006) argue that terrorist violence is a
form of costly signaling by which terrorists attempt to influence the beliefs of their enemy.
Therefore, the indiscriminate acts of violence committed by terrorists are instances of armed
propaganda used to achieve specific goals.
Figure 2.4 shows a scatter plot of total suicide attacks (left) and total non-suicide attacks
(right) by year from 1980 to 2011. Although suicide attacks occur less frequently than other
attacks, a clear trend of an increasing number of suicide attacks can be seen, whereas the
number of non-suicide attacks dropped from 1990 to about 2004 when it started to rise again.
It seems that suicide terrorism has become a favorite weapon of choice for the modern ter-
rorist group. The current study will determine whether suicide bombing, as an extreme form
of terrorism, has any statistically significant impact on a group’s mortality. This reasoning
leads to my final hypothesis:
H-5: The groups that use suicide terrorism as opposed to conventional terrorism are more
likely to end.
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Figure 2.4: Increase in the number of suicide and conventional attacks over time.
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Chapter 3
DATA AND QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS
The previous chapter introduced a theoretical framework of terrorist group survival and
presented some related hypotheses. This chapter presents and defends the method and sta-
tistical models that are employed to test the hypotheses. First, I introduce the research
design and methodology employed to examine the endogenous association between group
lethality, popularity, and mortality followed by descriptive statistics and operational defini-
tions of the variables and a description of the concept these variables are capturing. Then
I present the event history model specification with illustration of group duration data,
variables, and methodology to examine the expected survival time of groups.
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3.1 Group Lethality and Mortality versus Endogenous
Popular Support
3.1.1 Research Design
3.1.1.1 Unit of Analysis
This dissertation research takes ‘the terrorist organization’ as the unit of analysis instead
of the state itself and asks questions about terrorist groups, not terrorist attacks1 or ter-
rorism in general. This allows consideration of organizational attributes – such as targeting
preferences, organizational competition, and longevity – of terrorist groups that are not tra-
ditionally the center of attention in terrorism scholarship. Existing terrorism studies overlook
these group characteristics and make claims based on using the state (or state-year) as a
unit of analysis. Since terrorist groups, the target and the audience, can by definition be
from di↵erent states, using the state as a unit of analysis may lead to spurious and unreliable
inferences about terrorist group behavior (Young and Findley, 2011).2 Although using the
state as the unit of analysis does have its merits, it seems to ignore the context in which
most of the terrorist activity occurs (Phillips, 2012). Moreover, Asal and Rethemeyer (2008)
demonstrate the e cacy of using terrorist groups as a unit of analysis by demonstrating
that organizational attributes influence group lethality. Also, using larger units of analysis,
such as the state or state-year, obscures the valuable heterogeneity of these organizational
attributes (Nemeth, 2013, 356).
1However, I did account for the frequency of terrorist attacks normalized over the years in which the
terrorist organizations were operational in the empirical analyses.
2For more information on how selecting the wrong unit of analysis can sway empirical findings see (Young
and Findley, 2011).
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3.1.2 Operational Definitions of the Variables
3.1.2.1 Independent Variable
Group Lethality: Unlike many current studies, I disaggregated the victims of terrorist
attacks by target-type. Disaggregation of the victims of terrorist attacks by target-type
is consistent with the definition of terrorism in this study – which only considers violence
against civilian targets as terrorism (Abrahms, 2006; Ross, 2006; Goodwin, 2006). Group
lethality is measured as the average civilian fatalities that a terrorist group has generated
in a year from its attacks in its home-based country. In other words, to get a normalized
extent of the group’s civilian casualty ratio,3 the group’s total number of civilian fatalities
from 1980-2011 is divided by the number of years the group was operational in the same
time frame.
Total fatalities as an indicator of group lethality can be deceptive because the groups
that have survived longer may have caused higher civilian fatalities as compared to those
who are relatively new, so it is important to take into account the duration in which the
total fatalities have been caused. To make it clear, assume two groups have caused the
same number of civilian fatalities but the first group has been around for twice the time of
the second group. These two groups must not be equally lethal. In this case, the second
group will be twice as lethal as the first group. So operationalizing group lethality by taking
only the total fatalities would not be indicative of the true destructiveness of the group.
Also, the measurement of a group’s lethality conditional on incidents (the average number
of fatalities per attack) can be problematic too, because it is possible that a group with a
high fatality count may be a very active group as it may have perpetrated more attacks.
To understand this, let’s assume two groups A and B. Suppose that Group A has caused
10 fatalities in 10 attacks, whereas group B has caused 1 fatality in 1 attack in same time
interval; hence, both have caused 1 fatality per attack, however, Group A is more active than
B and has caused more damage in the same time. So it is important to treat lethality and
3The ratio of civilian casualties to combatant or overall casualties is often calculated in conventional wars
to measure the impact of the collateral damage. For more detail on the civilian casualty ratios see Eckhardt
(1989); Leep and Coen (2016).
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total attacks (activity) as separate covariates (Mierau, 2015).4 Moreover, this dissertation
research disaggregates the combatant from non-combatant targets, which allows a careful
examination of groups’ targeting patterns. This has direct implications regarding group
lethality and is not accounted for in previous studies.5
The data for the civilian and total number of confirmed fatalities for each incident comes
from the GTD. The GTD defines civilians as all non-combatants and provides information
on the type of targets attacked along with the name of the entity targeted and nationality
of the target/victim. The GTD Codebook also notes that when di↵erent sources report
di↵erent numbers of casualties, the number reported by the most recent source has been
recorded (GTD, 2016).
Currently, GTD classifies the target type into 22 categories and gives the number of fatal-
ities for each category as shown in Table 3.1. I included the civilian fatalities that occurred
as a direct result6 of an attack that is only recorded in the “Private Citizens & Property”
category, which is category 14 of target-types listed in the GTD 2016 Codebook (GTD, 2016,
30).
Figure 3.1 shows the general trends of group activity and lethality (the attacks launched
and the corresponding fatalities by the groups), where the groups are sorted into di↵erent
bins by their characteristics during the analysis period from 1980 to 2011: (A) the number
of attacks they launched, (B) the number of fatalities, (C) the number of government, police
or military fatalities, and (D) the number of civilian fatalities. The two bars for each bin
represent the total number of attacks (left bar) and the total number of fatalities (right bar)
4To see the operationalization of group activity, see Sections 3.1.2.4.
5Lethality indicators – a total number of fatalities or the average number of fatalities per attack – in the
current literature include all victims (combatants, non-combatants & the attackers) who died as a direct
result of the incident. Since the perpetrators are not the actual victims of the attack, the inclusion of the
perpetrator’s death in the total number of fatalities seems unfair because their deaths will inflate the casualty
rates. However, Alakoc (2014, 61) argues that since casualties refer to the total number of humans killed as
a direct result of terrorist attacks, the inevitable death by the design of a suicide bomber in an attack should
also be included in the casualty information. The death of the perpetrator may also indicate that the attack
was successful and e↵ective (Alakoc, 2014, 61).
6GTD advised researchers to consider the intentionality of terrorist targeting carefully because all target
categories in GTD contain information on both intended targets and incidental bystanders, so there is no
way of knowing whether a civilian target was attacked deliberately. As a result, civilian fatalities may have
been inflated, which is a shortcoming of the dataset (GTD, 2016, 30).
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Table 3.1: GTD targeting categories by target type.
No Victim Categories No Victim Categories
1 Business 12 NGO
2 Government (General) 13 Other
3 Police 14 Private Citizens & Property
4 Military 15 Religious Figures/Institutions
5 Abortion Related 16 Telecommunication
6 Airports & Aircraft 17 Terrorists/Non-State Militias
7 Government (Diplomatic) 18 Tourists
8 Educational Institution 19 Transportation (Other Than Aviation)
9 Food or Water Supply 20 Unknown
10 Journalists & Media 21 Utilities
11 Maritime (Includes Ports 22 Violent Political Parties
& Maritime Facilities)
by all the groups in that bin. Bin labels also show the number of groups that contribute
to that particular bin. The figure 3.1 (A & B) shows that only eleven groups perpetrated
about a thousand attacks that resulted in more than five thousand fatalities, whereas only
twenty groups have killed more than thousand people. About 47% of terrorist organizations
have killed no civilians between 1980 to 2011, whereas only ten groups are responsible for
killing a thousand or more civilians in their lifespan. Among these ten the Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) and Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) have been found to be the top two most lethal
terrorist organizations in the world.7 In general, figure 3.1 shows significant variation in
target diversity, activity and lethality of the terrorist groups.
7TTP perpetrated about 1022 civilian killings in 5 years and received an average lethality score of 204,
and AQI secured a lethality score of 108 by killing 1436 civilians over the course of 8 years.
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Figure 3.1: Terrorist groups’ lethality versus activity.
3.1.2.2 Dependent Variable – I
To account for the endogeneity of popular support, this research design incorporates two
dependent variables: Group End and Popular Support.
Group End: The first dependent variable, Group End, is coded one if the group is reported
to have expired in the TOPS, RTG, EOT and BAAD-1 datasets, and 0 if the group remained
operational at the end of the temporal range of this analysis (1980-2011). The end of a group
is determined when it ceased to exist as an organization due to law enforcement interdiction,8
implosion, or has given up violence to join politics Cronin (2009, 210). About 51% (246
out of 480) of terrorist groups are still operational in 2011. If information regarding the
groups’ demise was missing and/or contradictory in the datasets mentioned above9 then
8An example of the first scenario is the Shining Path and Japanese Red Army in 2001.
9If there was conflicting information, I preferred RTG over the rest given that it has been published in
2016.
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following Cronin (2009, 210) and Phillips (2014) methodology, I used the year of the last
reported attack by a group in the GTD as its end date. However, if the last reported attack
by a group is within the last three years of the temporal range (1980-2011), the analysis
assumes the group survives.10 Group revival and recidivism are explained in the following
in more detail.
Group Revival and Recidivism: A systemic examination of the data reveals that groups
stop their terrorist activity and become dormant. One such example was the revival of the
Ulster Defense Association (UDA), which was the largest loyalist paramilitary organization
in Northern Ireland with a membership of 40,000 during its peak (Cusack and Taylor, 1993).
The UDA declined and halted its activity in the late 1980s, but it re-established itself and
renewed its deadly capacity for terrorism in the early 1990s. In a more recent example, Ho↵-
man (2013, 647) argues that the formation of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in
early 2009 was the result of an “old made new” phenomenon, in which former leaders or se-
nior level fighters emerge from prison or exile and assume key positions of command in new or
existing terrorist organizations, which results in revitalization and reinvigoration of dormant
terrorist groups. In the same vein, the second Palestinian intifadah (2000-2005) rejuvenated
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine that was once dormant (Alexander and
Kraft, 2007, 696). The presidential pardon of leading jihadi prisoners from two Egyptian
terrorist groups, the al Gama’a Islamiyya and al-Jihad by the former Egyptian President
Morsi has the potential to infuse other dormant organizations in the Middle East (Rahim,
2012).
For the reasons explained above, I considered an organization dormant if it doesn’t have
a reported attack in any three consecutive years in the GTD, and if there is a history of
revival or recidivism in the group’s lifetime. The dataset shows that about 18% of terrorist
organizations have ceased their operations once for three years in their lifetime, about 19%
of the organizations have shown this behavior twice in their lifetime, and seven terrorist
organizations renounced violence and chose to restart it three times in their lifetime. This
10These are the groups that stop their terrorist activity and became dormant for the reasons specific to
the group’s internal or external conditions.
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recidivistic behavior may have direct implications for the group end variable because we
cannot code a group as ‘expired’ that has chosen to be violent again after three years of
hiatus. About 29% of the organizations have shown the recidivistic trend in their entire
lifetime.
3.1.2.3 Dependent Variable – II
Popular Support for Terrorism: Popular support is the second dependent variable. I
operationalized popular support by using Negative Constituency Reputation (NCR), which
proxies the level of public dissatisfaction with terrorist activity. The NCR11 is a four-category
ordinal variable expressing the extent to which a terrorist group garners a negative reputa-
tion by employing forced recruitment, child recruitment, and forced funding in its reference
community (the in-group) in its home base country. This additive NCR index is measured
on a scale of zero to three, with zero recorded if the group has committed none of the three
acts in a given year, and one recorded if one of the acts is committed by the group, etc. All
three measures are dichotomous, and the data are drawn from RTG.12 To make this variable
dichotomous, NCR is coded as zero when the NCR was zero or one – measuring low negative
reputation –, and one when NCR was two or three, indicating higher negative reputation
garnered by the group. In the following, I list three categories that were used to code the
original categorical variable of NCR.
Forced Recruitment: records whether a terrorist group resorts to abduction, threat or use
of force against adults for conscription in its constituency. Coercive recruitment is unpopular
11Before operationalizing NCR, we need to specify how the ‘Constituency’ of each group has been de-
termined. I adopted the Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu (2016, Appendix: C, 5) methodology to measure this
variable and the data also come from the RTG dataset. They make several assumptions to identify the
constituency of each group. First, they assume that all domestic and international terror groups have a con-
stituency they claim to represent in each country. This means that the groups have an aggrieved population
they claim to fight for against one that is economically, politically or culturally dominant. Second, Tokdemir
and Akcinaroglu (2016) assume that there is a clear ethnic/religious or ideological divide between the in-group
(terrorist groups own reference community) and out-group (the dominant community) in the constituency
that pits one against the other. For more details, see (Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu, 2016, Appendix: C, 5).
12For more details about the additive index and factor analysis of the three factors see Tokdemir and
Akcinaroglu (2016, 5).
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with the masses and it alienates people and reduces the legitimacy of the group (Eck, 2014;
Weinstein, 2006; Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu, 2016).
Child Recruitment: measures the coercive recruitment of underage children as soldiers
or as suicide bombers by terrorist organization (Eck, 2014; Weinstein, 2006; Tokdemir and
Akcinaroglu, 2016).
Forced Funding: pertains to coercive methods – extortion, revolutionary taxation, or any
other activity forcing constituents to donate money against their will – to generate finances
for group. Such behavior has a negative impact on group reputation by reducing the group’s
image and contributes to tensions between the group and its constituency (Freeman, 2011;
Weinstein, 2006; Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu, 2016).
3.1.2.4 Organizational Capacity Variables
For any plausible estimation of the organizational strength and duration of a terrorist group,
it is imperative that we account for the magnitude of the group’s capacity and the con-
straints that a group experiences in the environment in which it operates (Mierau, 2015, 5).
The ability of a terrorist organization to pursue and sustain a prolonged terrorist campaign
depends on their organizational power and capacities. Terrorist groups possess many un-
observed capacity-related factors that need to be taken into consideration and this research
design accounts for the following organizational capacity variables:
Group Age: Horowitz (2010) argues that a group’s age and innovative capacity are inversely
related. However, Miller (2008) suggests a positive relationship between the group’s age
and its e↵ectiveness. Age is the number of years since the organization began, which is
determined by taking the start and end date of the groups from TOPS, EOT, BAAD-1 and
RTG datasets.13 If the information about the start date of an organization was missing, I
13The reader should not confuse the group’s age with ‘Analysis Duration’ variable (31 years – from 1980
to 2011) that is to be discussed in Section 3.2 in detail.
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took the date of first perpetrated attack by the group as its beginning date using the attack
information from GTD (Cronin, 2009; Phillips, 2014).
Figure 3.3 (right) shows the distribution of groups’ age. The oldest operational terrorist
organizations are the Ku Klux Klan in the United States and Young Communist League in
Nepal with 139 and 88 years of age respectively. The average age of a terrorist organization
is 15 years whereas the median age is 14 years, and about 42% (200 out of 480) of terrorist
organizations lasted up to 8 years.14 Figure 3.2 shows a general trend of average age in the
data for groups that are below or above the mean value of lethality. The vertical axis gives
the average age of the groups in years. There are 415 groups with lethality at or below the
mean value of lethality in the data and 65 groups that have lethality above the mean value.
The bars show that the groups with lethality equal to or less than the average value, have
about 15 years of average age, whereas the groups with above mean value of lethality have
about 14 years of average age. Hence, the groups with higher lethality have smaller average
age in the data.
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Figure 3.2: Terrorist groups’ life span by lethality.
14This measure of organizational age is only a proxy, and it is very much possible that organizations might
have attacked outside of our documented temporal range without being attributed to the attack (Dugan,
2012), which is of course a limitation in the available attack counts in GTD.
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Moreover, Rapoport (1983, 13) and Cronin (2006, 13) argue that religious groups have a
longer lifespan because of the power of sacred or spiritually based motivations. Also, Cronin
(2006, 23) suggests that left-wing and right-wing groups tend to have the shortest duration
because they frequently have trouble identifying concrete goals and retaining popular sup-
port. However, my dataset shows the opposite trend. Figure 3.3 (left) shows the average
lifespan of the groups by ideology divided into two sub-groups, alive by 2011 and dead by
2011 (left). The number of operational groups with leftist ideology has persisted for over
20 years while ethnonationalist and religious groups persisted for about 18 and 15 years,
respectively. Religious groups have the lowest average age (as shown in figure E.1.)
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Figure 3.3: Terrorist groups’ age distribution and average age by ideology.
Group Activity: Group activity refers to the number of incidents that a militant group
was involved in between 1980 and 2011. Figure 3.1 (A) shows the distribution of terrorist
organizations by attacks. A group’s total number of attacks from 1980-2011 is divided by
the number of years the group was operational in the same time frame to get a normalized
extent of the group’s activity across time. The top three most active groups based on the
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number of attacks they launch between 1980-2011 are the Shining Path, Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front (FMLN) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
with 4503, 3329, 1920 attacks, respectively.
Government, Police and Military Personnel Fatalities (GPM): Because this study
seeks to explore the impact of terrorist groups’ attacks on civilians, I disaggregate the target-
type into combatant and noncombatants. To understand the impact of organizational vio-
lence against noncombatants, this study accounts for terroristic violence against combatants
– GPM targets. Also, if a group chooses to predominantly attack GPM targets then it is
likely to prompt a severe counterterrorism response from the government that can be detri-
mental for group survival. The combatant target-type variable is created by summing the
total killings of Government (category-2), Police (category-3) and Military (category-4) per-
sonnel by each terrorist group from 1980 to 2011 – categories are listed in Table 3.1 – and
making a composite indicator of all government, police and military killing. After calculating
the total number of GPM fatalities, this variable is later divided by the number of years a
group was operational in the 1980-2011 timeframe to obtain the normalized impact of the
extent of the group’s GPM casualty ratio.
Figure 3.1 (C) displays the absolute values (not normalized to the time duration of activ-
ity) of GPM casualties. About 40% of terrorist organization have killed no GPM personnel
from 1980 to 2011. The top three organizations that generated the most GPM fatalities
are the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al-Shabaab. ISI
killed a total of 408 GPM personnel in 5 years and received the highest GPM score (81.6).
Similarly, TTP and Al-Shabaab killed 335 and 311 GPM personnel in 5 years, so they have
average GPM killing scores of 67 and 62.2, respectively. Furthermore, figure 3.4 shows aver-
age civilian fatalities per attack (left), average government, police or military fatalities per
attack (middle) and average lethality of groups (right), as a function of time. One can see
a clear general trend of an increasing number of civilian and government, police or mili-
tary fatalities after 1995 and 2002, respectively. The average lethality of groups is generally
increasing after 1995.
45
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Average Civilian Fatalities per Attack by Year
Year
# 
of
 F
at
al
iti
es
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Average Govt./Police/Military Fatalities per Attack by Year
Year
# 
of
 F
at
al
iti
es
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
1
2
3
4
Average Lethality of Groups by Year
Year
Le
th
al
ity
Figure 3.4: Average lethality and total number of civilian and GPM fatalities.
Positive Constituency Reputation (PCR): A Group’s positive reputation matters.
Many terrorist groups are known to have maintained human aid and social service projects
that allows the group to maintain a cordial relationship with the community. Like NCR,
PCR15 is also a four-category ordinal variable expressing the extent to which a terrorist group
garners a positive reputation by employing strategies like public goods provision; maintain-
ing a viable media outlet to communicate with their audiences and by maintaining political
aspirations. All three strategies are dichotomous, and the data are drawn from RTG.16 Like
NCR, PCR is also computed using three dummy variables to get a four points additive index,
measured on the scale of zero to three where zero represents if the group has committed none
of the three PCR acts in a given year, and 1 corresponds to one of the acts committed by the
group and so forth. By adding the scores of each group on these three indicators, we arrive
15Please see footnote 23 for assumptions regarding constituency specification for all terrorist groups in the
dataset.
16For more details about the additive index and factor analysis of three factors see Tokdemir and Akci-
naroglu (2016, 5).
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at a 0-3 scale that represents the positive constituency reputation of each group. PCR has
been used as one of the control variables to gauge its diminishing impact on NCR. To be
consistent, PCR has also been used as a dichotomous variable. The PCR is coded as zero
when the PCR was zero or one – which means low positive reputation –, and one when PCR
was two or three indicating higher negative reputation garnered by the group. In the fol-
lowing, I list three categories that were used to code the original categorical variable of PCR.
Public Goods Provision: includes the provision of free education, food, security, or health
services by terrorist groups in their constituency, which promote feelings of appreciation and
allegiance towards the in-group (Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu, 2016, 5).
Media Outlet: In the age of mass media terrorist organizations are known to maintain an
online presence or printed newspapers or journals. Many organizations have established
small band radio stations. Terrorist groups use media to elevate their victories and spread
their propaganda, all of which shape the way their constituency views them (Tokdemir and
Akcinaroglu, 2016, 5).
Political Party: Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu (2016, 5) also coded whether or not terror groups
possess any political aspirations, and have an established political branch or are a liated
with a legal political party. The groups with a political branch or a liation can gain and
maintain stronger public support at the grassroots level because they have a more direct
connection to the rank-and-file.
Popular Support for Terrorism by Ideology: Ideological and theological motivations play an
important role to make sense of the world as they determine values and moral frameworks
for day-to-day activities. But di↵erent individuals consume these motivations di↵erently.
A few individuals manifest these motivations through vociferous vocal support for violent
actions while others actually engage in violent actions. In other words, ideological and
theological motivations are vital to di↵erentiate between true believers, reluctant terrorists
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and complacent opponents of terrorism as described in Section 2.2.2.2.
So, it is important to examine the group reputation of di↵erent ideological groups in
our dataset. Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the negative (top) and positive (bottom)
reputation of a group by its ideology. The bar heights for each reputation bin show the
percentage of religious, nationalist, or leftist groups out of the total groups in that ideology.
About 50% of nationalist and leftist groups have zero negative reputation. However, only
35% of religious groups fall into the category of having zero negative reputation. It is
interesting to note that about the same percentage of religious groups have zero positive
reputation as well.
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Figure 3.5: Terrorist groups’ reputation by ideology.
Group Ideologies: Ideological and theological motivation is also a vital component of the
organizational capacity of a group. Ideology has an e↵ect on targeting patterns as well as a
group’s propensity to outbid when faced with competition (Drake, 1998; Drake et al., 1998;
Nemeth, 2013). Group ideologies are coded using the BAAD-I and RTG datasets (Forest,
2012; Levy; Boyd, 2014). Each terrorist group is classified as having one of three potential
ideologies – religious, leftist and ethno-nationalist.17 All three ideologies are dichotomous
17The EOT dataset from Jones and Libicki (2008) classified ideologies in four potential categories, such as
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variables. Drake et al. (1998) and Drake (1998) argue that terrorist attacks are rarely indis-
criminate and ideology is central to the process of target selection because it sets the moral
framework within which they operate.
Figure 3.6 shows group activity by ideology. The data contains 93 religious groups, 165
ethno-nationalist groups, and 127 leftist groups. Religious groups caused the maximum
number of civilian fatalities in the minimum number of attacks. On the other hand, the
leftist groups launched the maximum number of attacks. The data can be interpreted as the
religious groups caused 10 civilian fatalities per 5 attacks, whereas both ethno-nationalist
and leftist groups caused only 3 civilian fatalities every 5 attacks on average. The religious
groups caused 8 GPM fatalities in every 5 attacks, whereas the ethno-nationalist and leftist
groups each caused only 6 such fatalities in every 5 attacks. These statistics show that
religious groups are indeed more lethal than leftist and ethno-nationalist groups.
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Figure 3.6: Terrorist groups’ activity by ideology.
nationalist, religious, left-wing, or right-wing which no doubt is a better way to measure ideological patterns.
But BAAD-I is preferred over the EOT due to completeness of the data on the group’s ideology variable.
BAAD-I incorporated ethnic and nationalist motivations of the groups and call them ethno-nationalists. But
unfortunately, it does not code right-wing terrorist groups.
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Global Versus Local Agendas: The stated goals of a terrorist organization reveal a great
deal of information about their intended targets. This is a dichotomous variable that takes
the value one if the group has globalized agendas and zero for the groups with localized
orientation. Jones and Libicki (2008, 21) argue that groups fighting to achieve globalized
goals like social revolution or implementation of ‘Sharia law’ in a non-Muslim country are
less likely to reach a negotiated settlement than groups with limited aims, such as preserving
the status quo or forcing a policy or territorial change. Kilberg (2011, 55) argues since broader
goals are more likely to be unachievable a group with little hope of achieving its goal will be
more likely to simply express its grievance through violence than take the organized steps
necessary toward achieving its goal. In addition to broad goals, states are unlikely to o↵er
concessions to religious terrorist groups because they are fighting for altruistic goals like
salvation; therefore, these groups are unlikely to settle for less than their full demands. As a
result, concessions, amnesties, and similar counterterrorism strategies that have worked with
other terrorist groups may not be successful for religious terrorist groups (Ho↵man, 2006,
127-128). Miller (2011, 341) makes a similar assessment, suggesting that religious groups are
“the most problematic for states because many are unlikely to compromise, which means
betraying their faith...” So, this variable is expected to be positively related with group
mortality.
Group Size: Oots (1989, 1986) argues that the size of a group may play an important role
in the activities and e↵ectiveness of a terrorist organization. Jones and Libicki (2008) also
finds that the group’s size is the most predominant predictor of group longevity. But the
issue of how large any group has to grow to be ine cient has been discussed at length in
the current scholarship. Historically, terrorist groups have never been large. For instance,
according to TOPS, the Red Army Faction (also known as Bader Meinhof Gang) never had
more than three dozen “actual trigger pullers” but they had a larger support network.18
Similarly, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) had the capacity to employ and
arm thousands of members, but they never had more than 400 or 500 operatives which
18According to Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC), the RAF membership at any given
time was estimated at only 10 to 20 people. See http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/red-army-faction-
raf-bader-meinhof-gang for more details.
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seems to be a conscious decision on the part of PIRA’s leadership because they could not
control or discipline a group bigger than 500 members.19 In the same vein, ALQ in Iraq
and Afghanistan has faced problems due to its enormous size because it became di cult to
manage command, control, and communication. Oots (1989, 1986) notes that terrorist groups
may be likely to su↵er from a free rider problem as they grow larger. Terrorist goals are
typically public goods that are both non-rival and non-excludable (McAllister and Schmid,
2008). As the group’s membership increases, each individual’s contribution to the final
product (attack) is lessened. Furthermore, larger groups are likely to su↵er organizational
problems and ideological heterogeneity leading to dissension amongst the membership and
less operational security (Oots, 1989, 1986). A small organization, on the other hand, may
be less likely to be plagued by the collective action problem but it is likely to be highly
vulnerable to operational failure. To operationalize the size of the group, I used data from
the EOT dataset.20 Groups are divided into di↵erent membership sizes based on the number
of core members and are scaled as follows: fewer than 100; 100-999; 1000-9999; and 10000
or more (Jones and Libicki, 2008, 6).
Rebels: The concepts of terrorism and guerrilla warfare are used interchangeably in current
scholarship (Schwartz, 2006; Fortna, 2015; Gleditsch et al., 2002; Cunningham et al., 2009;
Clutterbuck, 2011). But terrorism and guerrilla warfare are distinct strategies of warfare and
distinguishing between them is essential for conceptual clarity. The tendency of confusing
terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the current scholarship emanates from the lack of consensus
on the definition of terrorism itself, but there are other reasons as well. First, there is
a general perception that the employment of guerrilla warfare tactics by insurgent groups
is terrorism – at least the targeted state perceives it that way because its writ is being
challenged. Second, many terrorist organizations employ both strategies of terrorism and
guerrilla warfare interchangeably for the achievement of their objectives, and are listed both
in terrorism datasets like the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and in rebel group datasets
like “The Non-State Actor Dataset” from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).
19See PIRA’s TRAC profile at http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/provisional-irish-republican-
army-pira for more details.
20Whenever possible the size of terrorist groups is updated using TOPS, RTG and BAAD datasets.
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As a result, I divided terrorist groups into categories for those that used only terrorism
and those that have used both terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The data for this variable
comes from RTG, and they di↵erentiate between a rebel and terrorist by using a binary
variable called ‘Rebel’ coded as one if the terror group is also listed as a rebel group in
UCDP dataset, zero otherwise (Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu, 2016). Figure 3.7 shows the
activity of terrorist groups that use guerrilla tactics and those which do not use it. The
plot shows that the 332 groups that do not use guerrilla tactics have launched fewer attacks
overall. They caused fewer fatalities as compared to a rather smaller number of groups (148
groups) that used guerrilla tactics. A more substantive interpretation is that the groups
that use guerrilla tactics caused 5 civilians and 8 GPM fatalities per 5 attacks, whereas the
groups that do not use guerrilla tactics caused only 4 civilians and 6 GPM fatalities per 5
attacks.
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Figure 3.7: Terrorist groups’ activity by guerrilla tactics.
Group Status: Enders et al. (2011) argue that it is essential to di↵erentiate between domes-
tic and transnational terrorist attacks for a better understanding of the terrorism phenomena
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because both types of terrorism theoretically have di↵erent impacts. To control for the envi-
ronmental attributes that impact group longevity and reputation, I used the COW datasets
to characterize the nature of the country in which the organization is based (Singer and Small,
1994) – which in most cases is also the country that is most often attacked. Using Nemeth
(2013, 2010)’s methodology, each terrorist organization is linked with its associated attacks
and the location of the target using the attack information from GTD. Then the target loca-
tion is compared with the known area of operations for the organization as listed in TOPS,
BAAD-1, RTG and EOT.21 In essence, the data show that frequently attacked countries are
also the group’s known area of operations and these groups are called domestic.22 However,
if the target’s location and the group’s known areas of operation do not match then these
groups are classified as transnational terrorist organizations.
The variable international is a dummy variable that equals one for all transnational ter-
rorist groups, and zero otherwise. Figure 3.8 shows the activity of domestic and international
groups. The current dataset includes 329 domestic terrorist organizations and 151 transna-
tional groups that engaged in cross-border operations. The domestic groups launched fewer
attacks and caused a small number of fatalities as compared to that of a smaller number of
international groups. Domestic groups caused 4 civilian fatalities and 6 GMP fatalities in
every 5 attacks, as compared to 5 and 8 respectively for international groups.
21If there was a mismatch of information among the datasets regarding a group’s known area of operations,
then I applied the majority rule, that is, same home based location for a group listed in majority of the
group-level datasets.
22According to Enders et al. (2011), domestic terrorism is defined as homegrown terror in which the venue,
target, and perpetrators are all from the same country. Moreover, domestic terrorism has direct consequences
for only the venue country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies.
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Figure 3.8: Terrorist groups’ activity by its status (domestic vs. international).
3.1.2.5 Group Environment Variables
The following are variables that pose environmental constraints on group duration:
Intergroup Competition: O’Leary and Silke (2007, 397) argue that many terrorist or-
ganizations encounter intense violence from rival terrorist organizations within their own
constituencies. But if the terrorist groups are mainly motivated to achieve similar political
goals – broadcasting a grievance, producing government concessions, damaging an economy
or society, etc. – then engaging in intergroup rivalry does not help groups to come any closer
to achieving their political objectives (Abrahms, 2008, 90). Yet, even terrorist organizations,
even with “identical political platforms routinely attack each other more than their mutually
professed enemy” (Abrahms, 2008, 90).
The outbidding theorists23 explain intergroup competition as groups competing for the
support in their own reference community. Bloom (2004, 2005) argues that the groups launch
23Examples being Bloom (2004, 2005); Findley and Young (2012); Kydd and Walter (2006); Pearlman
(2009).
54
more and more spectacular attacks (sometimes on the rival terrorist groups) and essentially
try to out-carnage each other to gain attention. The outbidding theorists also argue that in
a competitive environment this attention seeking behavior compels groups to use spectacular
and gruesome violence as a tool to gain political prestige and to boost the organizational pro-
file. Resultantly, we see multiple groups often taking responsibility for a single attack (Bloom,
2005, 29). The intergroup competition amongst terrorist organizations results in some nega-
tive outcomes, such as suicide terrorism24 and deliberate civilian targeting (Crenshaw, 1981,
1985; Oots, 1989; Bloom, 2005; Chenoweth, 2010; Nemeth, 2013). It also acts to legitimize
the use of extreme violence and can have a significant impact on the group’s survival by
generating negative constituency reputation in the group’s own reference community.
Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu (2016, 8) argue that since intergroup competition reduces the
amount of resources that can be allocated to each terror group, some organizations may want
to adopt strategies that can build positive constituency reputation for encouraging voluntary
recruitment and funding. They assert that if the organizations fail to employ such strategies,
they will resort to coercion to survive and may resort to forced conscription and extortion
that may result in generating negative constituency building for the groups. Therefore, it is
expected that intergroup rivalry will lead to distinct reputation building strategies, that is,
positive or negative.
I used Nemeth (2013)’s methodology to code intergroup competition. He argues that
ideology plays a significant role in determining the scope of intergroup competition because
terrorist organizations have a certain number of ideological “markets” in which recruits
and resources are sought. For instance, Nemeth (2013) argues that a communist terrorist
organization would only face competition from groups with communist ideological goals, not
from the groups with religious ideology. Similarly, groups with religious ideologies would not
be looking for recruits with secular, leftist, or communist ideologies but for individuals with
high religiosity.25 To capture the intergroup competition among the terrorist organizations
24 Bloom (2004) observed that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) began to use
suicide attacks once it noted the rise in popularity Hamas obtained when it engaged in suicide terrorism.
A similar phenomenon was noted by Kramer (1991) in the context of rivalry between the Amal militia and
Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon in the 1980s.
25The religious terrorist groups will also be looking for the new converts seeking salvation.
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based on their respective ideological market share, Nemeth (2013) employed the inverse of
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Rhoades, 1993; Hirschman, 1980; Herfindahl, 1950).26
The HHI is calculated using the following formula:
1PN
i=1 S
2
i
(3.1)
where Si is the market share of firm i, and N is the number of firms in the market.
Unlike Nemeth (2013) I used three potential ideological “markets”: Religious, ethnona-
tionalist and Left-wing, that come from the BAAD-1 and RTG datasets and to determine
the number of potential competitors in the market – which are referred as firms in HHI –,
I aggregated all terrorist groups that exist within each of the three ideological categories
between 1980 to 2011. Later, I calculated the percentage of attacks perpetrated by each
group within each market (ideology) to compute the respective market shares for all com-
petitors.27 Finally, the groups per ideology and the number of attacks per group are used to
calculate the HHI for each ideological category following the formula mentioned above. HHI
scores near one indicate a condition of monopoly while higher scores indicate competitive
environments (Nemeth, 2013, 345). The highest intergroup competition in the dataset is 8.8,
and the lowest score is 1.0 whereas the mean value is 2.64 with the standard deviation of 2.06.
Regime Type: The impact of regime type has been thoroughly debated in previous stud-
ies (Eubank and Weinberg, 1994; Eyerman, 1998; Li, 2005; Weinberg and Eubank, 1998).
Terrorist groups may benefit from operating in democracies; their liberal characteristics such
as respect for civil liberties and freedom of the press reduce the operational costs of terrorist
groups, allowing them to persist for longer (Crenshaw, 1981; Hamilton and Hamilton, 1983;
Schmid, 1992). I account for this by using the Polity2 variable that comes from the Polity-IV
dataset, which is a ten-point scale created by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DE-
26The HHI is often used in the economic analyses to assess the concentration of firms in a marketplace.
The Justice Department and the Federal Reserve use HHI to predict the market impact of potential mergers
of companies (Hannan, 1997; Rhoades, 1993).
27The recruits may want to enlist in the most active organizations (Crenshaw, 1985; Oots, 1989; Post
et al., 2003).
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MOC score while accounting for the e↵ects of transitions, interregnums, and interruptions.
This variable has two categories, that is, democracy and autocracy (Marshall et al., 2009).
Figure 3.9 shows the proportion of groups in democratic and autocratic states by their
lethality. Democratic states have 82% of less lethal groups and 70% of more lethal groups.
Autocratic states have fewer terrorist groups regardless of lethal intensity.
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Figure 3.9: Number of terrorist groups in democratic and autocratic regimes by lethality.
Economic Development – GDP pc (log): The study will also account for a state’s eco-
nomic development. While economic discontent has been linked to a variety of political
outcomes, research on the role of economics on terrorism has found little support for a direct
e↵ect (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008; Krueger and Malekov, 2003; Piazza, 2011). However,
support and recruitment for terrorism seemed to occur more often among the educated and
employed than the poor (Krueger and Malekov, 2003). At the same time, wealthier states
that can provide adequate social welfare policies are less likely to have popular support for
terrorism and to experience terrorism on their soil (Burgoon, 2006). This is unclear at the
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level of the group; organizations in low-wealth countries may have a shorter lifespan because
it is di cult to assemble enough qualified recruits to meet a group’s operational require-
ments. At the same time, however, group duration in wealthy countries may also be low as
qualified recruits exist, but overall support for terrorism is low. The data for this variable
come from the World Development Indicators (2012).
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lethality 480 7.68 26.58 0 243.4
Death 480 0.49 0.5 0 1
GPM 480 1.96 8.20 0 81.60
Attacks 480 7.52 20.67 0.05 221.93
Age 480 14.94 14.99 1 139
Newness 480 1.46 1.13 0 3
Rel vs. Non-Rel 385 0.24 0.43 0 1
Suicide Bombing 480 0.12 0.33 0 1
NCR 480 0.81 1.04 0 3
PCR 480 .95 0.99 0 3
NCR Dummy 480 0.45 0.50 0 1
PCR Dummy 480 0.58 0.49 0 1
Size 375 2.42 1.00 1 4
Religious 414 0.23 0.42 0 1
Left Wing 414 0.31 0.46 0 1
Ethnonationalist 414 0.39 0.49 0 1
Guerrilla Tactics 480 0.31 0.46 0 1
Broad Goals 404 0.11 0.31 0 1
Competition 385 2.6 2.06 1 8.8
Group Status 480 0.32 0.46 0 1
RPC 470 0.94 0.23 0.29 1.52
State Repression 459 3.11 1.09 1 5
Regime Type 471 4.57 5.54 -10 10
GDP 455 8.48 1.20 5.01 10.62
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics.
State Repression: There is a common belief in terrorism scholarship that repression re-
duces terrorism (Frey and Luechinger, 2003; Testas, 2004; Rasler, 1996). State repression
should reduce the likelihood of terrorism by increasing the costs of terroristic violence. Since
autocratic states are less likely to have systemic constraints on the use of force; they can
employ repression freely, whereas democracies may experience more terrorism because they
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cannot use repression with impunity (Frey and Luechinger, 2003; Testas, 2004; Rasler, 1996).
Repressive states can also adopt indiscriminate counterterrorism operations which are
not conducive for terrorist groups. I expect this variable to be positively related to group
mortality. State repression is measured using The Political Terror Scale data from (Wood
and Gibney, 2010). This variable is an ordered scale measuring state repression on the
following five level scale:
• Level 1. Countries under the secure rule of law. People are not imprisoned for their
view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
• Level 2. There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity.
However, few persons are a↵ected; torture and beatings are exceptional. Political
murder is rare.
• Level 3. There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprison-
ment. Executions or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited
detention, with or without a trial, for political reasons, is accepted.
• Level 4. Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the
population. Murder, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite
of its generality, on this level terror a↵ects primarily those who interest themselves in
politics or ideas.
• Level 5. Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies
place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or
ideological goals.
Relative Political Capacity or State Capacity: State capacity plays one of the most
important roles in developing a counterterrorism strategy (Hendrix and Young, 2014; Young,
2012). I believe that state capacity will be negatively related to group survival. Overall state
capacity is measured using the Kugler and Tammen (2012) relative political capacity measure
from TransResearch Consortium datasets on Relative Political Performance of all countries in
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the world. The data were last updated on August 2013. They define political performance as
“the ability of governments to reach their population, to extract economic resources from that
population and to allocate those resources to secure the long-term survival of the political
structure.”
3.1.2.6 Method
I argue that group lethality is related to popular support for a group and that both factors
influence group longevity. In other words, I want to measure the interdependence between a
group’s reputation and mortality as a function of organizational lethality. To estimate this
interdependence, we need to acknowledge and model the endogenous association between
group lethality, mortality and popularity. The endogenous association means that there is a
common factor; popular support links the variation in a group’s lethality with the group’s
mortality. Specifically, the common factor can be referred to as an omitted variable – and is
represented by the correlated disturbances or error terms. If we do not model the correlation
between the disturbances of group popularity and mortality in the model, then our estimation
will be biased (Antonakis et al., 2010). Therefore, to model the causal structure of the data
correctly, I will use the Seemingly Un-related Bivariate Probit (SUBP) Model.28
The SUBPmodel is an extension of binary probit or logit models. Since my two dependent
variables, group mortality (hereafter called death) and Negative Group Reputation (NCR),
are correlated, I want to estimate the error correlation between them. The SUBP model
is used because it allows an estimation of the error correlations between two equations in
the model (Greene, 2003, 738-742). If the error term Rho – which shows error correlation
between two equations –, is statistically significant, the errors in these two equations are
28Another common way to account for the interdependence is to use Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
Regression Analysis. 2SLS model uses the same methodology used in the continuous cases; therefore, the
equation of interest becomes a linear probability model (LPM). Using 2SLS model is, therefore, advantageous
because of its simplicity to estimate and interpret (a 1-unit change in x causes a   change in the probability of
y). However, the disadvantage of using 2SLS model is that the LPM may imply probabilities outside the unit
interval. It is because of this reason that we prefer generalized linear models – like probit or logit – to model
binary dependent variables in applied research (Di↵useprior, 2012; Rivers and Vuong, 1988). Moreover, an
exogenous instrument to estimate the correlation between group lethality and mortality is di cult to find;
therefore, I prefer the SUBP over the 2SLS model. For more detail on the SUBP model, see Greene (2003,
738-742).
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highly correlated. Estimates of the model are provided in Table 4.1. The two dichotomous
dependent variables are death, which indicates whether a group has expired yet or not, and
NCR, which indicates whether or not a group has carried out at least two of the o↵enses
listed in Section 3.1.2.4 in its constituency.
3.2 Event History Analysis (EHA): Group Duration,
Group Lethality and Popular Support
EHA is primarily concerned with accounting for why units (which are terrorist groups in
this case) make transitions from one state to another state (Singer and Willett, 2003). In
the current analysis, the jump from one state to another would be a transition of a group
from being alive and functioning to being dead. The event of the death of a terrorist group
is called failure.29 But there will be groups that have not failed yet. The groups that did
not fail are called censored observations. I do not have any further information about the
terrorist organizations that did not expire in 2011, all I can say is that these groups were still
operational. This information is very useful and should be incorporated in the estimation.
The SUBP modeling approach explained in the previous section is useful; however, it does
not properly handle the groups that never died. EHA techniques are specifically designed
to model the observations that never fail (Box-Ste↵ensmeier and Jones, 2004), so I will be
employing this modeling technique to track terrorist organizations over time until they die
while including those who have not yet failed. In the following subsection, I elaborate some
basic concepts of event history modeling and its relevance to the current analysis.
3.2.0.7 Units at risk, Failure & Censoring
The EHA has an “implicit interest in risk” (Box-Ste↵ensmeier and Jones, 2004, 3). This
implies that when the units of analysis – terrorist groups – enter the sample, they become at
29The failure could be a result of the group’s success, government repression, negotiations, internal conflict,
reorientation of goals, defeat, leadership decapitation, or loss of public support.
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risk of experiencing failure, or the demise of a terrorist group.30 In event history analysis,
the failure rate is defined as the probability that at any given point in time the event of
interest will occur given that it has not yet occurred (Golub, 2008, 531). Also, the survival
function is defined as the probability that an entity of interest will survive beyond a specified
time (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2006).31 In the current analysis, survival is the likelihood of
terrorist group’s duration.
Units at risk or facing failure are called the risk set of the event history analysis (Allison,
1984). In the current event history analysis, all terrorist groups in the dataset are included
in the risk set because they all are at risk of experiencing mortality. Moreover, terrorist
groups are only at risk or face failure up until the time they finally experience mortality.
Figure 3.11 shows a pie chart giving the number of terrorist groups based on their entry date
in the dataset.
One of the major advantages of using event history analysis over other conventional re-
gression methods is the ability of this technique to censor certain types of data and use
the information from the censored observation to maximize the likelihood function (Box-
Ste↵ensmeier and Jones, 2004). Box-Ste↵ensmeier and Jones (2004, 16) argue that “censor-
ing occurs whenever an observation’s full event history is unobserved. Thus, we may fail
to observe the termination.” This means that there is a possibility that some of the ter-
rorist groups may never experience mortality while others die outside the duration of this
analysis (1980-2011) and their fate cannot be known. If a group never experiences mortality
in the analysis time (i.e., the group dies after Tn(2011)) this type of observation is called
right-censored (RC). But if a group dies before T0 (1980) it is a left-censored (LC) observa-
tion(Yamaguchi, 1991; Cleves, 2008; Singer and Willett, 2003). If a group ends with in the
temporal range, then this observation is non-censored (NC).
30In other analyses, this can be an undesired event such as machine breakdown or someone dies.
31The failure rate is always inversely proportional to the survival rate.
62
Figure 3.10: Censored versus non-censored data.
Figure 3.10 shows censored and NC terrorist groups in the current dataset. Based on this
censoring versus non-censoring pattern, there are six distinct categories of terrorist groups
(TG) in my dataset. TG1 amounts to 7% of the total organizations in the dataset. These
groups were already operational before 1980 – this is when I started observing the groups –,
and they remained operational until 2011. Since TG1’s fate is unknown, therefore, they are
referred as RC observations. Similarly, TG3 and TG5 are equal to 1% and 43% of the total
terrorist organizations in the dataset and they also remained operational by 2011, hence,
are RC. The main di↵erence between these two groups is that the TG3 started in 1980 and
TG5 after 1980. On the other hand, TG2, TG4 and TG6 are the groups that ceased to exist
before 2011 and (NC observations) and they are equal to 7%, 3% and 38% respectively of
the total organizations in the dataset. TG2 started before 1980, TG4 started in, and TG6
after 1980.
To sum up, figure 3.10 shows that about 49% of the groups were NC which means they
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ceased to exist within the analysis duration. Also, about 51% of the terrorist groups were
RC, which means that they are still operational until 2011 and event (demise) did not occur
for these groups within the analysis duration. Excluding these categories from the dataset
will result in the introduction of bias in the analysis (Singer and Willett, 2003). Instead
of excluding these groups, we censor them, allowing us to use information on their survival
times in the current study. 32
3.2.1 Research Design
3.2.2 Operational Definitions of the Variables
3.2.3 Dependent Variable
Group End and Duration: The dependent variable for the EHA is the combination of
group end and analysis duration. Duration is a counter from 1980 to 2011. On average,
a group has been observed for the duration of about 10 years in the current dataset.33
Figure 3.11 shows the number of organizations based on their entry date in the dataset.34
Operationalization of group end variable has been explained in Section 3.1.2.2. The end of
a group is defined as if the group ceased to exist as an organization due to law enforcement
interdiction,35 implosion, or has given up violence to join politics (Cronin, 2009, 210). The
missing and/or conflicting information about the terrorist organizations have been accounted
for using methodology explained in Section 3.1.2.2. Figure 3.11 shows the distribution of
32Although RC terrorist groups did not experience demise during their duration; they still contain useful
information. For instance, these RC groups may be indicative of the fact that non-lethality in a terrorist
group prolongs their lifespan. In other words, we want to use information on groups duration from the
survival function, not only from the failure functions in the analysis (Singer and Willett, 2003). In doing so,
we are assuming that the group did not die but we just lost sight of these RC groups, and we are telling our
dataset that the terrorist groups were no longer observed after Tn time. Since we lost these groups due to RC;
we can derive probability estimate that gives us a likelihood function of how much longer these group would
have endured, given that the technical demise has not taken place yet. It means estimating a probability
that survival time of the groups “would have equaled or exceeded the observed duration” (Warwick and
Easton, 1992, 128).
33A few groups either appeared late in the dataset and had not ended so far or they ended before 2011.
3414% of organizations were already operational before 1980 – this is when I started observing the groups
–, 4% of groups started in the year 1980, and about 81% of organizations start after 1980. There are about
51% of the terrorist groups that are still operational until 2011.
35An example of the first scenario is the Shining Path Japanese Red Army in 2001.
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organizations based on their expiration or exit from the dataset.
7% (Born before 1980, Alive)
7% (Born before 1980, Dead)
1% (Born in 1980, Alive)
3% (Born in 1980, Dead)
43% (Born after 1980, Alive)
38% (Born after 1980, Dead)
Groups by Start Date
Figure 3.11: Distribution of the terrorist groups based on their expiration or exit from the
dataset.
3.2.4 Independent Variable and Control Variables
Newness:36 is a categorical variable which is established to test the Liability of Newness
hypothesis (H-4) proposed in Section 2.3.0.6. It classifies the age of the groups into the
following four categories: Category-I includes groups with ages ranging from 0 to 5 years
36This research used group lethality as the independent variable for this EHA for the details on the
operationalization of lethality see Section 3.1.2.1. Also, the EHA used the same set of control variables
as that of the SUBP model. To see the operational definitions of the control variable, see Section 3.1.2.4
and 3.1.2.5. Both negative and positive group reputation (NCR and PCR) will be categorical for the current
EHA (see Section 3.1.2.4 for details).
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old; category-II includes groups with ages 6 to 14 years, while category-III and IV include
groups with ages from 15 to 26 years and greater than 26 years of age, respectively.
Religious versus Secular Terrorist Groups: A dichotomous variable which is one for
organizations with religious ideology and zero for all other organizations.
Suicide Bombing versus Conventional Attacks: A dichotomous variable that records
a value of one for the groups that have conducted one or more suicide attacks in the analysis
time, and zero otherwise.
3.2.5 Method
To evaluate the relationship between organizational lethality and mortality, the study em-
ploys a Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) model to estimate the survival probabilities for a
set of 480 groups spread over 84 countries from 1980 to 2011. The Cox PH model is a semi-
parametric ‘Event History Model’ that parameterizes covariates but not the baseline hazard
rate and allows estimating the hazard function without having to specify the distributional
form of the hazard function (Box-Ste↵ensmeier and Jones, 2004, 1997; Box-Ste↵ensmeier
and Zorn, 2001; Cox, 1972). The Cox model is based on the assumption of proportional
hazards, meaning that e↵ect of covariates shifts the hazard by a factor of proportionality
and that this proportional e↵ect is not allowed to vary with time (Box-Ste↵ensmeier and
Zorn, 2001, 973). In order to analyze the relationships between the variables of interest, a
unique group duration dataset has been created using the data generating process explained
the Appendix C.2.10.
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Chapter 4
RESULTS
The previous chapter discussed the research design, data, and model for the current study.
This chapter presents the results of two statistical models that are employed to empirically
analyze a triangular relationship of group lethality, mortality, and popular support. The
main hypothesis of the current study argues that the probability of terrorist group survival
decreases as the group kills more civilians (H-1). The study also posits that terrorist groups
that kill more civilians will be associated with lower levels of popular support (H-2). I expect
to find a positive relationship between group lethality and mortality and a negative relation-
ship between group lethality and popular support. Moreover, to investigate the impact of
religious and theological motivations (H-3), age (H-4) and use of suicide terrorism (H-5) by
terrorist groups in detail, the study estimates three additional models. I anticipate finding a
significant and positive association between religious motivation and group longevity. How-
ever, it is expected that young groups are likely to end sooner than old terrorist groups,
whereas use of suicide terrorism by a group reduces longevity.
This chapter proceeds as such: the first section details the results of a Seemingly Un-
related Bivariate Probit (SUBP) Model (Model-III) that fits two-equation probit models and
allows one to determine if popular support for terrorism is indeed endogenous. The equations
of the SUBP model are also estimated separately in Model-I and Mode-II to examine the
variation in magnitude and direction of coe cients across models. In the following section,
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I describe the estimates from the event history analysis and the Cox Proportional Hazard
(PH) Model which is a semi-parametric event history model. The Cox PH Model tests the
main hypothesis (H-1) and other hypothesis – such as H-3, H-4, and H-5 – discussed in
Chapter three.
4.1 Probit and Bivariate Probit Models
Model-I and Model-II are two binary outcome equations that are estimated separately using
a simple probit regression and their results are reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.1.
Since Model-I and Model-II are simple probit models, they do not account for the possi-
ble interdependence in the triangular relationship between group lethality, popularity, and
mortality. But the SUBP Model, on the other hand, does account for endogeneity. This
modeling technique allows estimation of error correlation in two equations simultaneously.
So the SUBP regression will measure the impact of variation in group lethality on group
mortality and negative constituency reputation (NCR). The estimates of SUBP model are
reported in column 4 and 5 of Table 4.1. In Model-I, the binary variable ‘death’ (coded as
0 for alive and 1 for dead) is its response variable, and the predictor variables are group
lethality, age, negative and positive reputation, etc. as shown in Table 4.1. Model-I uses a
total of 302 observations.1
The coe cients of Model-I show that the probability of death of a terrorist group increases
with greater group lethality, ceteris paribus, which confirms the primary hypothesis (H-1) of
this dissertation study. But it predicts no significant relationship between group mortality
and positive constituency reputation (PCR), size, goals, status, overall attacks and its use
of guerrilla tactics. The model also shows no significant relation of environmental variables
like relative political capacity (RPC), GDP and intergroup competition in their homebase.
The results indicate that terrorist groups are likely to endure if their violence is directed
against government, police and military targets (GPM) and also if the groups are located
under a repressive regime. These findings make sense because selective violence against
1In other words, groups for which all of the response and predictor variables are non-missing.
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GPM targets does not alienate a local population; hence, it has a positive influence on group
longevity. This result is in line with the findings of Abrahms (2006). Similarly, a state’s
repressive behavior is expected to produce a backlash e↵ect, subsequently lengthening the
duration of terrorist organizations and lowering the probability of outcomes favorable to the
government (Daxecker and Hess, 2013). Model-I also confirms the Gaibulloev and Sandler
(2013); Blomberg et al. (2011); Carter (2012) and Hausken et al. (2015) conclusions and
finds that the groups with religious or ethnonationalist ideologies are likely to endure and
it predicts an insignificant relation between group mortality and leftist ideology. Also, the
model predicts that terrorist groups fair better in democratic countries.
The most contradictory finding of the Model-I is the negative relationship of NCR and
group mortality. As I argued above, NCR should have a positive relationship with group
mortality, so the prediction that a terrorist group is more likely to endure if we witness a rise
in its NCR is counterintuitive. This result goes against the proposed argument of this study;
however, this can be an outcome of possible endogeneity in the model which is accounted
for in Model-III.
In Model-II, the response variable is NCR – which is a dichotomous variable2 – and the
predictor variables are lethality and others as shown in Table 4.1. Model II also uses a total of
302 observations.3 As explained in the Section 3.1.2.3, the NCR is originally a four-category
ordinal variable expressing discontent of the local population against forced recruitment,
child recruitment, and forced funding by terrorist groups in its home base country. The
NCR is dichotomized to show if a group has conducted at least two of these behaviors in its
constituency.
Model-II specifically tests if the variation in group lethality leads to an increase in NCR
which is the second hypothesis (H-2) of this dissertation study. The coe cients of this probit
regression model show that the increase in lethality of a group is associated with its higher
NCR, which confirms our hypothesis. This result makes sense because as the group kills
more civilians, it loses popular support. In other words, if a terrorist group becomes more
2NCR is coded as zero when the NCR was 0 or 1 – which means low negative reputation –, and one when
NCR was 2 or 3 indicating higher negative reputation garnered by the group.
3This means that groups for which all of the response and predictor variables are non-missing.
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Model-I Model-II Model-III Model-III
Variable (Death) (NCR) Eq-I (Death) Eq-II (NCR)
Lethality 0.013⇤⇤⇤(0.006) 0.021⇤⇤(0.009) 0.011⇤(0.006) 0.016⇤⇤(0.008)
GPM -0.038⇤⇤(0.018) -0.020 (0.019) 0.041⇤⇤⇤(0.015) 0.001 (0.001)
Age -0.006 (0.007) 0.003 (0.007)
NCR -0.932⇤⇤⇤(0.200) -0.154 (0.205)
PCR 0.302 (0.202) 0.065 (0.192) -0.109 (0.204) 0.070 (0.193)
Size -0.068 (0.108) 0.169 (0.103) -0.025 (0.110) 0.147 (0.105)
Left Wing -0.237 (0.411) -0.326 (0.407) -0.276 (0.395) -0.408 (0.399)
Ethnonationalist -0.849⇤⇤(0.403) -0.259 (0.408) -0.976⇤⇤(0.385) -0.269 (0.400)
Religious -1.451⇤⇤⇤(0.447) 0.094 (0.430) -1.426⇤⇤⇤(0.415) -0.013 (0.421)
Guerrilla Tactics -0.012 (0.206) 0.275 (0.199) 0.029 (0.208) 0.224 (0.203)
Broad Goals -0.041(0.277) -0.378 (0.302) -0.280 (0.292) -0.380 (0.307)
Competition -0.002 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) 0.000 (0.006)
Group Status -0.124 (0.181) 0.143 (0.187) - 0.769⇤⇤⇤(0.187) 0.237 (0.181)
RPC 0.080 (0.376) -0.058 (0.399) 0.447 (0.301) 0.203 (0.381)
State Repression -0.169⇤(0.103) 0.045 (0.118) -0.208⇤(0.107) 0.082 (0.116)
Regime Type -0.035⇤(0.021) 0.067⇤(0.022) -0.058⇤⇤⇤(0.021) 0.057⇤⇤⇤(0.022)
GDP -0.031 (0.099) -0.470⇤⇤⇤(0.114) 0.126 (0.105) -0.427⇤⇤⇤(0.117)
Attacks 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Constant 1.897(1.242) 2.631⇤⇤(1.319) 0.687(1.230) 1.918(1.329)
# of obs. 302 302 297 297
Log Likelihood -163.51 -147.91 -298.09 -298.09
Rho -0.513⇤⇤⇤(0.116) -0.513⇤⇤⇤(0.116)
 2(1df) 12.98 12.98
Table 4.1: Significance: p0.10⇤p0.05⇤⇤p 0.01⇤⇤⇤
Coe cients with standard errors in parentheses reported.
lethal against civilians, the group’s ability to recruit new members and collect funds without
using force diminishes because it will be harder for the leadership to defend its cause.
Model-III employs SUBP estimates to account for interdependence between the group’s
death, its negative reputation, and lethality with two regression equations (Model-I and
Model-II) combined in the Model-III as shown in Table 4.1. The Wald test of rho shows
that the residuals of two equations are indeed correlated.4 The absolute value of rho (0.51)
shows that the two equations are strongly correlated, and the small p-value indicates that
the correlation is significant.5
4In other words, if one becomes a relatively good or bad model (with smaller or bigger residuals respec-
tively).
5The parameter rho usually ranges from -1 to 1 and it represents the estimated correlation of the errors
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The coe cients of Model-III are not very di↵erent from the respective separate models of
lethality and popular support (Model-I and Model-II). Comparing the coe cients of Model-
III (Eq-I) with Model-I, the relationship between group mortality and lethality is the same.
With an increase in lethality, the probability of death increases. Similarly, the likelihood of
death decreases if the group’s ideology is ethnonationalist or religious. Also, the coe cients
for regime type in Model-III (Eq-I) and Model-I show that the probability of death declines
if the group is in a democratic regime as compared to an authoritarian regime. However,
the suspect relationship of group’s NCR and mortality – which was providing counterintu-
itive results in Model-I – is insignificant in Eq-I. The NCR is a rough proxy for popular
support that expresses discontent of the local population against the forced recruitment,
child recruitment, and forced funding by terrorist groups in its home base country, so an
insignificant finding is not that surprising.
Moreover, the coe cients in Model-III (Eq-I) show that the likelihood of death is smaller
for transnational groups and if the group lives under a repressive state. There is no significant
di↵erence in the coe cients of Model-III (Eq-II) and Model-II; in both, the probability of
a higher negative reputation increases with an increase in lethality. Model-III shows very
similar relationships and trends as described in Model-I and Model-II, and also validates the
correlation between the two individual equations.
To interpret the substantive impact of the variables with significant coe cients for Model-
I, Model-II, and Model-III, I calculate their marginal e↵ects – shown in Figure 4.1 – holding
all other variables at their mean. The marginal e↵ects of all variables for all 3 models
are available in Appendix E. I emphasize the variables that show a significant relationship
with the response variable. The marginal e↵ects largely reflect similar conclusions of all
three models as explained above. Figure 4.1 shows the percentage change in the predicted
probabilities for a unit change in the predictor variables like the increase or decrease in the
probability of group death (Model-1), NCR (Model-II) and that of both death and NCR
between the two equations. In social science, a positive rho is more likely than a negative one. A statistically
significant and positive rho indicates that the unmeasured factors a↵ect the outcome of both equations in a
similar way. However, a statistically significant and negative rho indicates that common unmeasured factors
a↵ect the outcomes of two equations in an opposite manner (Huth and Allee, 2002, 190).
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simultaneously (Model-III). Note that for dichotomous predictor variables; the marginal
e↵ect is expressed in comparison to the base category (x=0), whereas for continuous predictor
variables, the marginal e↵ects are expressed as a one unit change in the predictor. Both the
direction and magnitude of the marginal e↵ects are interpreted in the following.
The marginal e↵ects of Model-I in figure 4.1 indicate that a unit increase in lethality
enhances the probability of the death of a group by 0.5%.6 A unit increase in GPM killings
corresponds to 1.4% decline in the likelihood of mortality of a group. Similarly, a unit
increase in the negative constituency reputation of a group reduces the probability of the
demise of a group by 35.5%. However, this outcome may have been driven by a possible
interdependence of grassroots popular support and terrorism as discussed previously. The
adherents of ethnonationalist and religious ideologies are more likely to endure because the
likelihood of group’s demise reduces by 32.3% and 55.5% respectively. Also, the probability
of death of a group declines by 1.3% with a one unit shift of the regime towards democracy.
The marginal e↵ects for Model-II indicate that one unit increase in the group’s lethality
raises the likelihood of having a negative reputation by 7.5%. Moreover, a unit shift of a
country towards democracy results in 2.4% increase, while a unit increase in a country’s
GDP decreases the negative reputation of a group by 16.7%.
The marginal e↵ects for Model-III indicate that a unit increase in lethality increases
the likelihood of the death a group 0.2%. Similarly, a unit increase in selective violence
against GPM targets decreases the probability of death by 0.35%. The likelihood of death
and having a negative reputation is reduced by 4.4% for groups that are transnational.
Also, a unit increase in the country’s GDP declines the probability of death and having a
negative reputation of the group by 2.9%. Finally, the likelihood of death and having a
negative reputation decreases by 10.8% for ethnonationalist, and 12.4% for religious groups
as compared to those who are not ethnonationalist or religious. The marginal e↵ects of all
three models show that ideology (ethnonationalist and religious) has been consistently found
to be the most powerful determinant of group survival.
6Note that the e↵ect is small but significant.
72
Ethnonationalist
GDP
GPM
Group Status
Lethality
NCR
Regime Type
Religious
-100 -75 -50 -25 0
Predictive Margins
Model-I 
 (Death)
Ethnonationalist
GDP
GPM
Group Status
Lethality
NCR
Regime Type
Religious
-40 -20 0 20 40
Predictive Margins
Model-II 
 (NCR)
Ethnonationalist
GDP
GPM
Group Status
Lethality
NCR
Regime Type
Religious
-20 -15 -10 -5 0
Predictive Margins
Model-III 
 (Death & NCR)
Figure 4.1: Predictive margins.
4.2 Event History Analysis
Figure 4.2 presents the null model of the event history analysis (EHA) which has been
employed to understand time until an event occurs. As previously explained in Section 3.2.0.7
that the ‘event’ in the current analysis is failure or demise of a terrorist group. The EHA will
help us understand how long it takes before a terrorist group experiences failure. The null
model is also known as the Kaplan-Meier (K-M) estimates which are a series of declining
horizontal steps in survival probability, as shown in Figure 4.2. The dotted curves above and
below the K-M curve are the 95% confidence intervals. The K-M estimates do not include
any of the covariates, and all of the terrorist organizations are treated as a single population.
The K-M estimates of di↵erent covariates of terrorist groups’ mortality are available in
Appendix D. Since there are fewer organizations at the end of the groups’ duration, the
confidence intervals widen out with the progression of time which means very few groups
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are expiring in those particular years. I plotted the estimated mean group survival time for
all 480 groups at 16.4 years which is represented by the dotted vertical line that intersects
the K-M curve. The mean survival time is estimated as the area under the survival curve,
and the estimator is based upon the entire range of data.7 The mean group survival time is
estimated because 246 groups are still operational. If we exclude the groups that are alive,
then the actual mean survival time of the defunct groups (234) is 12 years.
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Figure 4.2: Terrorist groups’ survival by year.
Rapoport (1992, 1067) argues that 90% of terrorist groups last only one year. In the
same vein, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2013) reports that while 26% of terrorists do not survive
7To learn more about mean and median survival time see Buchan lecture on Kaplan-Meier Survival
Estimates at http://www.statsdirect.com/help/Default.htm.
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their first year and 68% do not survive for more than ten years. Young and Dugan (2014),
however, found that the mean group survival is 3.33 years and about 68% of groups are
terminated in the first year following an attack. These studies report a significant variance
in the average survival time of the groups. The mean survival time in my dataset di↵ers quite
drastically from the previous studies. According to my dataset, about 6% of terrorist groups
ended in their first year, and about 24% of the organizations did not survive for longer than
ten years. As previously discussed at length in Section 3.1.2.6, there is a tendency in the
current terrorism literature to use an unrestricted sample that includes groups that conduct
as few as a single attack (Blomberg et al., 2009). All studies mentioned above have generally
used a similar unrestrictive sample or defined a terrorist group too broadly. Groups that have
only one attack associated with them cannot be considered as viable groups. I restricted the
sample to the groups that had perpetrated at least five attacks between 1980 and 2011 and
killed at least one person. So my findings suggest that terrorist groups that committed at
least five attacks and kill at least one person in their lifespan are likely to endure. Moreover,
half of the groups in my sample are surviving longer than 16 years which is in line with Price
(2009) and Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu (2016).
4.2.1 Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) Models
The study estimated four di↵erent models to test the hypotheses from H-1 to H-5 listed
in Chapter 2. The results of all of these models are available in Table 4.2. Model-IV is a
general model that estimates the relationship between organizational lethality and mortality.
Model-V tests hypothesis H-4, whereas Model-VI and Model-VII test hypotheses H-3 and
H-5, respectively.
Model-IV: Group Lethality
Model-IV gives the results from the Cox PH analysis using 302 groups in the dataset, out
of 302, 124 have died. Model-IV provides the hazard ratios (relative risk of failure – death)
in column 1 along with their standard errors in the parentheses.8
8The global test of proportional hazards assumption indicates no violations of the proportional hazards
assumption.
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The results show that the groups that are more lethal are more likely to expire. In other
words, each additional civilian fatality in a year (which is an indicator of group lethality) at
the baseline is associated with approximately 2.6% increase in the hazard, holding all other
variables constant.9 On the other hand, one unit increase in government, police and military
(GPM) killings reduces the hazard by 6.5%, which shows that groups that predominately
attack civilians are more likely to die. But the groups that use selective violence against the
GPM targets are more likely to survive. These results confirm the primary hypothesis (H-1)
of this study.
Also, older groups are more likely to endure as the results show that a unit increase in the
age of a group (1 year) reduces the hazard by 5%, ceteris paribus. This means that the like-
lihood of groups’ mortality declines as they grow older which confirms the H-4 of the study.
However, the impact of age on the group’s longevity needs a closer examination which will
be presented in Model-V. One of the most surprising results of the Model-IV is the positive
relationship of group survival with the overall attacks of the groups (which is an indicator of
group activity). The results show that the survival probability of the group increases with
the increase in the group’s activity. Although the magnitude of decrease (0.01%) is small,
however, it is significant. Keeping in view the finding of a positive relationship between group
lethality and mortality (explained above), one can conclude that more active and non-lethal
terrorist groups are more likely survive. We can speculate that since lethal attacks make
a group unpopular, groups would abstain from perpetrating such attacks. Since violence is
necessary for organizational maintenance (Crenshaw, 1985), the group would continue to be
actively violent and but not lethal.
On the other hand, ceteris paribus, negative constituency reputation (NCR) has been
found to depress hazard for a given terrorist group in the Model-IV, which means that
groups that garner more NCR are more likely to survive. This is a contradictory result
which rejects the proposed hypothesis (H-2) of this dissertation study. However, grassroots
popular support for terrorism is inherently endogenous, so this contradictory finding can be
driven by interdependence.
9The hazard ratios are interpreted following the guidelines in Cleves (2008, 131-132).
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Moreover, groups that are transnational and are adherents of a religious, ethnonational
or leftist ideology are more likely to endure. A comparison of the coe cients of ideologies
of the groups shows that religious organizations are most likely to endure at a given time as
compared to the groups with other ideologies. Finally, the groups that reside in the demo-
cratic regime face 7% less hazard than the groups in autocratic regimes and transnational
groups are more likely to endure.
Model-V: Liability of Newness
As discussed in Section 2.3.0.6, younger organizations have a higher rate of failure than
older groups. Model-IV’s findings have confirmed that the older groups are more likely to
endure; however, it was not clear how old a group has to grow to be secure. The K-M
estimate of the group’s age in Figure 4.3 shows the survival probabilities of the terrorist
groups with their age greater than the mean age of all the groups in the data shown in
red10 and the survival probability of the groups with their ages less than or equal to the
mean age of the groups in the data. The curves show that young groups with shorter age
are less likely to survive, whereas the groups with higher age are more likely to survive.
The survival probability of the groups with smaller age falls rapidly with time as compared
to those with higher age. Although the K-M estimates provide visual insight, they are a
mere representation of the data distribution rather than a regression analysis with multiple
covariates.
So, for a closer examination of the groups’ ages, I classified the age of the groups into four
categories11 and estimated a separate Cox PH model using dichotomous variables of groups’
age categories. The hazard ratios of Model-V are reported in the Column-II of Table 4.2.
Note that model specification has not changed because all relevant variables are included in
the model. Also, the global test of proportional hazards assumption indicates no violations
of the proportional hazards assumption.
10The mean age is 16.4 years which includes all 480 groups.
11Category-I includes groups that are between 0-5 years old. Category-II includes groups between 5-14
years of age, while category-III and IV include groups between 14-26 years and greater than 26 years of age.
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Figure 4.3: Survival probability of terrorist groups by age.
The hazard ratios from the Model-V show that the group’s hazard reduces with a unit
increase in the newness category.12 So in other words, as the group’s newness category
changes from 0 to 1, the hazard reduces by 73%, as it varies from 1 to 2, the hazard declines
by 93%, and as the newness changes from 2 to 3, the hazard decreases by 98%. This means
that groups within the five years of their appearance are most vulnerable and after that,
the hazard to their survival become drastically small. These findings support the liability of
newness hypothesis (H-4) proposed in the study.
Model-VI: Religious versus Secular
Sections 2.3 and 2.3.0.5 deliberated at length about the e↵ectiveness of religious terrorist
organizations in the face of principal-agent problems and other organizational constraints.
12Newness = 0 for very young groups and newness = 3 for old groups.
The main Model-IV does support the proposed hypothesis (H-3) that a terrorist group with
religious motivation is less likely to end than a group with another type of motivation.
Similarly, the K-M estimates shown in Figure 4.4 indicate that the religious groups are
most likely to survive, whereas the leftist groups are least likely to survive, with the ethno-
nationalist groups having intermediate survival probability.
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Figure 4.4: Survival probability of terrorist groups by ideology.
In Model-VI, I exclusively focus on the impact of religious versus secular ideologies on the
groups’ longevity. The model uses a dummy variable, which is one for religious organizations
and zero for all other organizations. The results show that religious groups have a 64%
decline in hazard as compared to those that have any other ideology. This means that
the religious groups are more likely to survive, keeping all other variables constant. The
magnitude and direction of all covariates remained same as in the main model. Also, the
global test of proportional hazards assumption indicates no violations of the proportional
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hazards assumption.
Model-VI: Suicidal versus Conventional Terrorist Groups
Model-VII estimates the impact of suicide bombings by a group on its longevity. A
dummy variable is generated, carrying a value of one for the groups that have conducted
one or more suicide attacks in the analysis time, and zero otherwise. The results show that
the groups that have conducted suicide attacks face 64% less hazard than the groups that
use other conventional means of violence. In other words, the groups that have used suicide
bombings as a weapon of choice are more likely to endure. These results are against the pro-
posed hypothesis of this study and are somewhat counterintuitive because suicide bombings
are generally more lethal in their intensity of violence and it has been used indiscriminately
by modern Islamic terrorist groups. These contradictory findings should be further explored
in the future studies.
4.3 Conclusion
The results of the empirical analysis of this study are summarized in the following:
First, the study consistently finds evidence that targeting civilians is counterproductive
and selective violence against GMP targets increases the group’s longevity. This is the first
empirical evidence that supports Shapiro (2013)’s framework of organizational management.
These findings empirically substantiate that the “calibration of violence” is imperative for a
group’s endurance.
Second, the study confirms that grassroots popular support is inherently endogenous.
(Model-III) verifies the findings of previous studies like Tilly (2004); Sharvit et al. (2015);
Hewitt (1990); Henderson (2002); Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007); Sedgwick (2004);
Siqueira and Sandler (2006); Parker (2007); Blake et al. (2012); Henderson (2002); Baum
(2004). I also found that indiscriminate violence against civilians (organizational lethality) is
bad for group reputation in its constituency which is in line with previous studies like Jones
and Libicki (2008); Cronin (2009, 2006); Reich (1998) and Heger (2010). However, given the
interdependence of popular support for terrorism, I found contradictory evidence (in Model-
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Model-IV Model-V Model-VI Model-VII
Variable (Lethality) (Newness) (Religion) (Suicide Bombing)
Lethality 1.026⇤⇤⇤(0.009) 1.018⇤⇤(0.008) 1.025⇤⇤⇤(0.009) 1.023⇤⇤⇤(0.007)
GPM 0.935⇤⇤(0.033) 0.972(0.029) 0.969(0.033) 0.973(0.023)
Attacks 0.999⇤⇤(0.001) 0.999⇤⇤(0.001) 0.999⇤⇤(0.001) 0.999⇤⇤⇤(0.001)
Age 0.953⇤⇤⇤(0.015) 0.957⇤⇤⇤(0.016) 0.916⇤⇤⇤(0.018)
Newness-1 0.267⇤⇤⇤(0.081)
Newness-2 0.072⇤⇤⇤(0.029)
Newness-3 0.019⇤⇤⇤(0.009)
Rel vs. Non-Rel 0.360⇤⇤⇤(0.141)
Suicide Bombing 0.361⇤⇤(0.182)
NCR-1 0.519⇤⇤⇤(0.124) 0.622⇤⇤(0.143) 0.539⇤⇤(0.136) 0.624⇤⇤(0.139)
NCR-2 0.151⇤⇤⇤(0.056) 0.231⇤⇤⇤(0.086) 0.112⇤⇤⇤(0.047) 0.208⇤⇤⇤(0.073)
NCR-3 0.164⇤⇤⇤(0.68) 0.227⇤⇤⇤(0.098) 0.168⇤⇤⇤(0.074) 0.193⇤⇤⇤(0.078)
PCR-1 0.984(0.280) 1.144(0.305) 0.997(0.284) 1.155(0.315)
PCR-2 1.204(0.453) 1.730⇤(0.560) 1.268(0.488) 1.682(0.579)
PCR-3 0.863(0.349) 1.385(0.565) 0.834(0.367) 1.279(0.457)
Size 0.868(0.124) 0.859(0.121) 0.823(0.127) 0.878(0.121)
Left Wing 0.450⇤(0.191) 0.538⇤(0.196) 0.548(0.211)
Ethnonationalist 0.299⇤⇤⇤(0.128) 0.286⇤⇤⇤(0.111) 0.346⇤⇤⇤(0.134)
Religious 0.161⇤⇤⇤(0.084) 0.133⇤⇤⇤(0.069) 0.195⇤⇤⇤(0.097)
Guerrilla Tactics 0.826(0.212) 1.008(0.263) 0.756(0.199) 0.949(0.257)
Broad Goals 1.213(0.446) 1.141(0.364) 1.661(0.563) 1.269(0.485)
Competition 0.996 (0.008) 0.993 (0.007) 0.959 (0.066) 0.996(0.007)
Group Status 0.286⇤⇤⇤(0.065) 0.301⇤⇤⇤(0.061) 0.453⇤⇤⇤(0.104) 0.305⇤⇤⇤(0.066)
RPC 1.792 (0.876) 1.437 (0.589) 1.931 (0.911) 1.645 (0.737)
State Repression 0.925 (0.122) 0.938 (0.106) 0.882 (0.125) 1.017 (0.121)
Regime Type 0.933⇤⇤⇤(0.024) 0.954⇤⇤(0.022) 0.944⇤⇤(0.024) 0.936⇤(0.024)
GDP 0.919 (0.126) 1.001 (0.129) 0.826 (0.126) 1.089 (0.141)
# of obs. 302 302 289 302
# of failures. 124 124 124 124
Log Likelihood -515.12 -487.63 -483.42 -496.75
Time at risk. 3496 3496 3496 3496
Table 4.2: Significance: p0.10⇤p0.05⇤⇤p 0.01⇤⇤⇤
Hazard ratios with standard errors in parentheses reported.
IV) regarding its relationship to the group’s longevity that suggests that it also increases
group survival, and when we accounted for the interdependence, this relationship became
insignificant in Model-III. The results suggest popular support needs to be studied in greater
detail with a better operationalization of public sentiment.
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Third, the study finds evidence that the organizations that are less than five years old
are most vulnerable which confirms the findings of terrorism studies like Blomberg et al.
(2009); Young and Dugan (2014) and studies from business literature like Arthur Stinch-
combe (2000); Freeman et al. (1983); Ranger-Moore (1997); Hannan and Freeman (1984);
Aldrich and Auster (1986); Stark (1998); Stern and Modi (2010) and Saunders (2009). This
finding also suggests that the examination of terrorist organizations through the lens of a
business organizational framework is an e↵ective approach.
Fourth, I found strong evidence that despite being more violent in the post-9/11 world –
as shown in Figure 2.2 –, and facing principal-agent problems and other agency constraints,
religious terrorist groups on average fair better in terms of endurance than any other ideolog-
ical terrorist groups. These results validate the findings of Gaibulloev and Sandler (2013);
Carter (2012) and Hausken et al. (2015) and contradict the findings of Price (2009) that
argue that group ideology is of marginal importance to a group’s survival. So, it is possi-
ble that the availability of a significant majority of highly motivated religious followers – a
proposition presented in Section 2.3.0.5 – allows modern Islamic terrorist groups to endure
despite being indiscriminate in their violence against fellow Muslims in the post-9/11 world.
This finding hopefully will motivate future studies.
Fifth, the study finds no evidence that group size is a major predictor of organizational
survival which has been emphasized in Jones and Libicki (2008); Oots (1989); Faria and
Arce (2012b,a); Faria and M (2005); Gutfraind (2009); Phillips (2014) and Oots (1986).
Finally, I found that groups using suicide bombings have a better chance to endures then
the groups that use conventional weaponry and tactics. This finding also runs counter to
the premise of this study because suicide bombings are known to be more lethal in terms
of their average fatalities per attack (Pape and Feldman, 2010; Pape, 2005, 2003). These
contradictory finding should be further explored in the future studies.
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Chapter 5
CASE STUDY
The previous chapter quantitatively tested hypotheses derived in chapter III and found
empirical evidence that the probability of terrorist group survival decreases as the group
kills more civilians. This chapter looks at a case-study of Taliban for further investigation
and exclusively focuses on Taliban’s terrorist activities in Pakistan. It will only discuss the
terrorism in Afghanistan when it has implications for Pakistan. Taliban is one of the most
vicious terrorist organizations in Pakistan. According to the GTD, they are responsible for
54% of the total terrorist attacks between 1980-2011 in Pakistan that generated about 69%
of total civilian fatalities. But despite a large number of civilian fatalities, the Taliban are
still operational in Pakistan which presents a deviant case for current study. So, it will be
interesting to investigate the Taliban’s case and their target selection in more detail.
The chapter is organized into five sections. First, I will provide a brief background on the
Taliban, which will present the historical context that is necessary to examine the Taliban’s
transformation from an insurgent freedom movement against the Soviet Union to a terrorist
organization. The second section will trace the targeting patterns of the Taliban and their
weapons of choice from 1995 to 2011, which will illustrate what kind of violence has been used
by the Taliban over time; whom it is used against, and how it is employed. The third section
will situate this case study into the organizational framework described in Section 2.2. The
fourth section discusses public opinion and the Taliban’s reputation in Pakistan followed by
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a conclusion.
5.1 The Taliban : From State Actor to a Terrorist Group
Taliban has been operational in Pakistan and Afghanistan since the early 1990s, first as
an insurgent movement that drove the Soviet Red Army out of Afghanistan with the help
of the Government of Pakistan and later as a terrorist organization that turned against
the state of Pakistan in the post-9/11 world. In the following subsections, I will describe
the historical context that is necessary to examine the Taliban’s transformation from an
insurgent freedom movement against the Soviet Union to a lethal terrorist organization. It
will also review collaborative networks of the Taliban among di↵erent tribal groups that were
instrumental in their survival and major counterterrorism strategies that have been adopted
by the government of Pakistan and United States against the Taliban.
5.1.1 Rise of theTaliban (1991-2001)
Afghanistan was tormented by a protracted civil war (1989-92) after the Soviet Red Army’s
withdrawal in 1989. The Soviets left behind a weak communist proxy government that
was previously supported (1979-89) by them. This pro-Soviet government of Mohammad
Najibullah – then President of Afghanistan – was at war with the anticommunist Muslim
mujahideen and other warlords in Afghanistan (Coll, 2005). From this chaos, under the
leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar – an Afghan mujahideen commander who fought
against Soviet forces, and later became the Emir and Head of the Supreme Council of
former Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan –, the Taliban1 movement emerged in 1991 from
his hometown of Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan (Rashid, 2002, 25).2 In the following
years, with support and training from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Taliban
movement grew both in its strength and momentum, and became a formidable fighting
1In the native Pashto language of Afghanistan, ‘the Taliban’ means the students.
2 Matinuddin (2000) notes that Mullah Omar started the Taliban movement with fewer than 50 armed
madrassah – religious school – students.
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force. Taliban fighters and smugglers freely and frequently moved back and forth across the
Pakistan-Afghan border (Bajoria, 2009).3 They conscripted largely from Afghan youth –
who were mainly Pashtun – living in the squalid Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan (Byman,
2008, 17),4 and from mujahideen leaders in Pakistan (Gunaratna, 2007, 54).
On September 26, 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan. However, it was recognized as the legitimate government only by Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates (Marranci, 2006, 75-76). The Taliban
were now controlling 95% of Afghanistan (Gunaratna, 2007, 54) and became “the pride and
ally of the ‘state within a state’ in Pakistan” (Akbar, 2003, 211).5 With the rise of the
Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan was able to successfully install a pro-Pakistan government
at its western border thereby preserving de facto control of 95% of Afghanistan through the
Taliban (Beg and Bokhari, 2008, 226).6
The Taliban restored order and ended the protracted ethnic and tribal conflict in Afghanistan;
they were welcomed by the local Afghans – who were exhausted by more than a decade of
continuous war (Coll, 2005; Rubin, 2002; Treverton et al., 2005, 30). However, the Taliban’s
vision of Islam was ancient, absolute and unbending; they strictly enforced a violent and
gruesome brand of sharia where they banned music and television, and public floggings,
hangings, and executions by death squads and by stoning was normal. The Taliban were
also unable to develop the Afghan economy during their rule. In short, Mullah Omar’s
regime completely disregarded fundamental human rights and oppressed women (Marranci,
3Due to their tribal allegiances, the Pashtuns that live on both sides of the border never recognized a
century-old frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan called the Durand Line. About 40% of Pashtuns
live in Afghanistan, and about 15% to 20% of them live across the Durand Line – which has always been
considered a soft border in Pakistan. For more details on Pakistan-Afghanistan border disputes, and its
relevance in the Global War on Terror see Bajoria (2009).
4In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Afghan refugees migrated to Pakistan. Ac-
cording to the Pakistan’s chapter of the O ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR); as of December 2012, approximately 1.7 million Afghan nationals were living in Pakistan’s Khy-
ber Pakhtunkhwa, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and northwestern Baluchistan regions. For
more information on the refugee’s statistics see http://unhcrpk.org/contacts/.
5Many fighters of Saudi and Central Asian descent came to Pakistani tribal areas after the fall of Soviet
Union. They got married and permanently settled in Pakistan. They enjoyed full immunity and freedom to
operate in Pakistani tribal areas.
6The national policy of Pakistan at the time was to establish and maintain its strategic depth because it
is engaged in a protracted conflict at the eastern border with its archrival India.
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2006, 75-76) and put Afghanistan on the path to becoming a failed state (Patrick, 2011, 32).
But the Taliban regime found a rich savior whose name was Osama Bin Laden (OBL).
OBL was expelled by the Sudanese government in May 1996, and he chose to go to Afghanistan.
The Taliban treated OBL as their guest and also hosted many Al-Qaeda (ALQ) fighters who
came with him to Afghanistan.7 OBL and ALQ fighters fought hand-in-hand against the
Northern Alliance8 in Afghanistan. OBL also financed and materially assisted the Taliban
regime, and ALQ was integrated within the Taliban troops, which played a significant role
in capturing Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan from the Northern Alliance (Gunaratna,
2007, 54). OBL’s financial support and the strategic know-how of ALQ fighters made the
Taliban a decisive force in Afghanistan, and in return, the Taliban provided the OBL and
ALQ a sanctuary to operate freely. Finally, on September 9, 2001, ALQ fighters assassinated
the Northern Alliance’s last standing commander, Ahmad Shah Massod in a suicide attack,
which made the Taliban the unchallenged leaders of Afghanistan. The symbiotic relation-
ship between the OBL and the Taliban continued, and OBL and Mullah Omar had formed
a personal relationship (Bergen, 2006, 236).9 ALQ’s training camps in Afghanistan were
responsible for the United States embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, and for
the suicide bombing of the United States Navy destroyer the USS Cole in 2000 (Combs and
Slann, 2009, 353).
Following the attacks of ALQ on the United States on September 11, 2001, the US-
led NATO forces along with the Northern Alliance invaded Afghanistan. By December 9,
2001, the Taliban regime collapsed, and Taliban leadership including Mullah Omar and ALQ
relocated to the tribal areas of Pakistan (Katzman, 2010).10 They were welcomed by the
7Due to his criticism of the Saudi Monarchy, his Saudi citizenship was revoked, and under increasing
pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United States on Sudan, OBL was expelled from Sudan for a country
of his choice. He chose to return to Afghanistan – where he fought against the Soviets – on a small charter
plane on May 18, 1996, (Scheuer, 2011, 105). For more details about OBL’s life in Sudan see (Scheuer, 2011,
79-104).
8The Northern Alliance came into being for the Salvation of Afghanistan in 1996. The alliance fought
a defensive war against the Taliban government. In the post-9/11 era, the United States and NATO forces
helped Northern alliance to take over Afghanistan.
9Hamid Mir, a OBL’s Pakistani biographer, was quoted by Bergen (2006, 236) about the personal rela-
tionship between OBL and Mullah Omar. For more details, see Bergen (2006, 236).
10For more details on the timeline of the US invasion of Afghanistan and fall of the Tal-
iban see Council on Foreign Relation’s U.S. War in Afghanistan chronology from 1999-present at
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local Pashtuns in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). ALQ and the
Taliban rearmed and regrouped in FATA to initiate a similar guerrilla war against the US
and NATO forces, which they fought collectively against the Soviet Red Army (Tarzi, 2009,
275).
The allies and sympathizers of the Taliban in Pakistan had never identified themselves as
“Taliban” before the US invasion of Afghanistan (Abbas, 2008). However, the relocation of
ALQ and the Afghan Taliban to the tribal areas of Pakistan laid the foundation of what Tarzi
(2009, 274-310) and White (2008, 85) call the“Neo-Taliban”11 in Pakistan, and put the
Pakistani Taliban in the limelight. Although the Pakistani Taliban were the allies of the
Afghan Taliban in Pakistan; they had their own leaders and agenda (Abbas, 2008). The
following subsection traces the role of the Pakistani Taliban – which are the main focus
of this case-study– in the post-9/11 era and the inceptions of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), which is the largest militant group in the history of Pakistan (Stanford-University,
2012, Mapping Militant Organizations Project).
5.1.2 Neo-Taliban: From Nek Mohammad to Baitullah Mehsud
(2002-2007)
In the months following the fall of the Taliban, the government of Pakistan launched its
first ever military operation in FATA since its independence in 1947.12 This operation was
named as “Operation Meezan” (2002-2006), and was aimed to monitor and pursue militants
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/p20018.
11 Tarzi (2009, 274-310) argues that the use of the word Taliban limits our ability to understand the moti-
vations and makeup of the di↵erent actors that have surfaced after the fall of Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Therefore, he argues that the category Neo-Taliban better captures that characteristics and agendas of the
new opposition that evolved beyond the old Taliban regime.
12The Pakistan’s founding father Mohammad Ali Jinnah signed the “Instrument of Accession” with local
tribes at the Bannu Tribal Jirga in January 1948, thereby, accepting FATA as a semi-autonomous region.
According to the Instrument of Accession all tribesmen in FATA became the citizens of Pakistan; however,
the administrative system that was introduced by the British government remained intact. Therefore, FATA
is still governed under the Frontier Crime Regulation Act (FCRA) of 1901 that was introduced by the British
colonial rulers. The FCRA recognizes the role of Sardars, Maliks and Local Elders in the tribal governance
structure in FATA. FCRA also allows local customary laws to prevail and prohibits Government of Pakistan
to interfere with the local system because traditionally a “Council of Elders” called Jirga settles disputes in
FATA (White, 2008, 14).
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fleeing from Afghanistan to the tribal areas of Pakistan (Jones and Fair, 2010, 46-56). Al-
though Operation Meezan was initiated to stop the inflow of militants from Afghanistan to
FATA, Pakistan’s military was instructed by its superiors to apprehend only the “foreigners,”
which included Arabs and Central Asian ALQ fighters, but not Afghan Taliban (Bergen and
Tiedemann, 2012; Abbas, 2014, 103). Pakistan did apprehend a lot of ALQ fighters and
turned them over to the CIA; however, it kept most of the captured Afghan Taliban in this
operation (Jones and Fair, 2010, 46-56; Abbas, 2014, 104). Pakistan’s e↵orts to e↵ectively
monitor FATA were derailed when Pakistan had to divert its attention to its eastern border
towards the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict (Abbas, 2014, 104).
Given Pakistan’s India-centric strategic threat perception, and also the mounting fatali-
ties of the Pakistan Army in Operation Meezan, the army pursued a peace deal with a local
militant named Nek Mohammad Wazir. He was a local tribal commander and was accused
of harboring many foreign militants. He was successful in negotiating this peace deal called
the Shakai Peace Agreement in April 2004 with the Pakistan Army (Yusufzai, 2004). As a
part of the deal, Nek Mohammad had to renounce militancy in return for amnesty from the
army. Also, he had to produce foreign militants before the authorities for registration. Nek
Mohammad, however, was unable to produce foreign fighters to authorities despite multiple
deadlines (Khattak, 2012); therefore, the amnesty was revoked, and the military operation
resumed again in June 2004 (Abbas, 2014, 106-110). On June 18, 2004, Nek Mohammad
was killed by the CIA in a targeted predator drone strike in Pakistan (Mazzetti, 2013).13
Despite the military operation, the Taliban attacks were spreading in tribal areas and
the government was unable to contain further Taliban expansion. Therefore, the Pakistan
Army signed a second peace deal in February 2005 with Baitullah Mehsud, a successor of Nek
Mohammad. This deal was later extended and imitated in other parts of FATA in September
2006 as the third and final truce between the government of Pakistan and the Taliban.
According to the deal, the government had to compensate militants for the destruction of
13 Mazzetti (2013) claims that this was the first time the CIA had deployed a predator drone in Pakistan
to carry out a “targeted killing,” and the target was Nek Mohammad who was declared as an enemy of the
state by Pakistan. He also asserts that the CIA had agreed to kill Nek Mohammad in exchange for access
to Pakistani airspace which could be used for drone flights in the future.
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their homes during the military operations, and Baitullah Mehsud or his supporters were
not to be targeted. In return, the Mehsud militants would stop attacking Pakistani targets
and stop harboring foreign militants. But they did not have to lay down their arms or
surrender foreign militants who were fighting in their ranks at that time (Khattak, 2012).
This deal, like the previous one, was also short-lived because clashes between the military
and the Taliban increased in the subsequent months rendering the peace agreement useless.
However, this deal raised the stature and power of Baitullah Mehsud as an influential tribal
leader and set the stage for the inception of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In subsequent
years, the Pakistan Army launched many military operations,14 and it is still fighting for
control of tribal areas (Khattak, 2012; Abbas, 2014; Bergen and Tiedemann, 2012; White,
2008; Jones and Fair, 2010).
5.1.3 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): From Baitullah Mehsud
to Maulana Fazlullah (2007-2011)
Although it is very di cult to trace the exact origin of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
– which also known as Pakistani Taliban or Neo-Taliban –; many terrorism scholars have
argued that it emerged in December 2007 under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud as a
loose coalition of 13 militia groups. These groups also included Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-
e-Mohammadi (TNSM) – a rebel group from Pakistan’s district of Swat – and the Haqqani
Network, an Afghan insurgent group that fought against the Soviets and has been sup-
ported by the government of Pakistan (Bajoria and Masters, 2010; Valentine, 2009; Ab-
bas, 2014, 2008; Jones and Fair, 2010; White, 2008). Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (means
“Students’ Movement of Pakistan”) is strongly linked with ALQ and considered the Pak-
istan government as one of its main enemies. Since its inception, the TTP launched a
defensive jihad against the Pakistani army that has been chasing the TTP, Afghan Taliban
and ALQ fighters in the tribal areas of Pakistan (Bajoria and Masters, 2010). The TTP
14Examples being Zalzala (meaning ‘Earthquake’), Sher Dil (meaning ‘Lion Heart’), Rah-e-Haq (intended
meaning showing the militants the ‘Right Way’), and Rah-e-Rast (intended meaning bring the militants to
‘Right Way’).
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also wanted to overthrow the incumbent government of Pakistan which became an ally of
the US and other Western governments against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
TTP also supports the mission of the Afghani Taliban, that is, the ouster of foreign troops
from Afghanistan, and calls for the restoration of the Khilafat (Caliphate), and an impo-
sition of a strict interpretation of Sharia throughout Pakistan (Valentine, 2009). Beyond
these unifying factors, however, the TTP movement is divided, and the various groups have
di↵erent opinions regarding engaging in peace talks with the government and their modus
operandi (Valentine, 2009; Bajoria and Masters, 2010). According to Yusuf (2014), the TTP
is aligned with many criminal gangs in the tribal areas – who are not driven primarily by po-
litical or religious motivations – that raise money through kidnappings and extortion within
Pakistan.
5.1.3.1 E↵ectiveness of Leadership Decapitation Against TTP
The main counterterrorism strategy of the CIA against the TTP has been leadership de-
capitation via predator drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Although this strategy
halted group activities for the time being, it never successfully eliminated the TTP. TTP also
went through many transitions due to an abrupt change of leadership. Baitullah Masood,
the founding leader of the TTP, was killed in a drone strike on August 23, 2009. Later, his
cousin and deputy Hakimullah Mehsud, threatened to avenge Baitullah’s death and assumed
the leadership of the TTP (Bajoria and Masters, 2010). Hakimullah Mehsud spearheaded
a ferocious armed campaign against the Pakistani state and launched limited attacks across
the border on the NATO forces in Afghanistan. The TTP sent an American citizen of Pak-
istani descent named Fasil Shazad to carry out attacks on American soil. But Shazad’s car
bomb attack in New York’s Times Square failed in 2010, and he was apprehended. He later
confessed that he was trained and funded by the TTP (Hesterman, 2013, 71). The Pakistani
government was in the process of negotiating another peace deal with Hakimullah; however,
he was also killed in a drone strike on November 1, 2013. Pakistan criticized this targeted
killing of Hakimullah claiming that the US ruined the road to peace in Pakistan. Following
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the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, Maulana Fazlullah – a commander of TNSM and founding
leader of TTP in Pakistan’s Swat district– was appointed as the new chief of the TTP. Fa-
zlullah is still in hiding somewhere in the tribal areas and plotting to kill Pakistani military
personnel and civilians and also launching attacks across the border in Afghanistan.
Since the TTP has existed as a loose network of di↵erent tribal groups, leadership de-
capitation never worked as a counterterrorism strategy against the TTP. Filling a leadership
vacuum has never been a problem for the TTP. Moreover, collaboration among di↵erent
tribal and jihadi groups under the umbrella organization of TTP has also played an e↵ective
role in TTP’s resilience. In the following subsection, I will describe the collaborative network
of the TTP in more detail.
5.1.4 Collaborative Relationship of Al-Qaeda with the Afghan and
Pakistani Taliban
Before examining the significance of the TTP’s collaborative network with Al-Qaeda (ALQ),
it is important to analyze the Afghan Taliban’s collaborative relationship with ALQ. The
Afghan Taliban paid a huge price by harboring ALQ, and by refusing to hand over OBL
to the US after 9/11. They lost their country, which they fought for years to conquer, and
their prestige as a ruthless force that single-handedly restored peace by ending the civil
war in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban patronized and supported ALQ’s global jihadi
activities against the West; however, they were incompatible for a number of reasons. For
instance, the Afghan Taliban never adopted ALQ’s idea of Pan-Islamism (Iqbal, 2010, 2),
and there have been long-term theological,15 and tactical di↵erences between them.16 The
collaborative relationship between the Afghan Taliban and ALQ survived the US invasion
of Afghanistan. However, in late 2009, it appears the Afghan Taliban realized that this
collaboration has never been viewed favorably by local Afghans, and it will be a major
15ALQ is a strong adherent of Wahabism and Salafi school of thought, whereas Afghan Taliban are
influenced by Sufism (Islamic mysticism) that is an open disposition of Hanafi Islam see Donovan (2008) for
more details.
16Mullah Omar was initially against using suicide bombings. See Section 5.2.2.1 for more details on the
advent of suicide bombings in Afghanistan.
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hurdle in re-establishing their writ in Afghanistan (Iqbal, 2010, 1). Therefore, the Afghan
Taliban have been seemingly distancing themselves from ALQ’s global agenda and trying to
build a nationalistic character of their movement (Brown, 2009). The tendency to project
themselves as an organization with a domestic agenda was evident in the Mullah Omar’s
Eid-ul-Fitr message of 200917 where he referred the Afghan Taliban as an ‘Islamic and
nationalist movement’ and explicitly stated that the Afghan Taliban “wants to maintain
good and positive relations with all neighbors based on mutual respect” (Brown, 2009).
This statement from Mullah Omar shows the Afghan Taliban’s aspirations to regain their
status as a ‘State Actor.’
In the same vein, the ALQ leadership also had long-term policy di↵erences with the
Afghan Taliban and was concerned about the Afghan Taliban’s indi↵erence towards ALQ’s
global Jihadi cause. In an intercepted letter of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s, ALQs then second-in-
command expressed his concerns regarding the Afghan Taliban’s discriminating approach to
governance to Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, then AQI chief.18 He wrote that “We don’t want to
repeat the mistake of the Taliban, who restricted participation in governance to the students
and the people of Qandahar alone.” Zawaahiri also criticized the Taliban’s lack of sincerity
to ALQs global cause and wrote that “Taliban had a stronger a liation with their tribes
and villages than with the global Islamic struggle” (Iqbal, 2010, 2).
TTP and its predecessors, the Pakistani Taliban, however, were inspired by ALQ’s Pan-
Islamic ideology since their inception (Iqbal and Silva, 2013). Rehman Malik, Pakistan’s then
Interior Minister, said in a statement – quoted in the local newspaper Dawn (2008, Sep 02,
2008) – that the TTP has accepted ALQ’s global agenda, and is an extension of ALQ. The
data from GTD (2016) substantiate this claim; it shows that the Afghan Taliban has never
perpetrated a single attack outside of their Pashtun homeland, that is, the Afghanistan and
Pakistani tribal areas. Moreover, former president of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Agency
Sultan Bashiruddin Mahomood was arrested in 2001 due to his contacts with the Pakistani
Taliban. According to a few sources, the Pakistani Taliban arranged Mahomood’s meeting
17Quoted by Brown (2009). The original message is available at http://www.jihadica.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/10/10-21-09-mullah-omar-eid-message.pdf.
18Quoted in Iqbal (2010, 2).
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with the OBL and Ayman al-Zawahiri where they may have discussed the construction of
nuclear weapons for ALQ (Overbye and Glanz, 2001).
This evidence shows that the Afghan Taliban has a domestic agenda, whereas the TTP
has a global orientation, which is more enticing to ALQ. Also, Baitullah Mehsud, former
leader of TTP, categorically endorsed ALQ’s global agenda in his di↵erent interviews to Pak-
istani local media (Gunaratna and Iqbal, 2012). The Senior ALQ members are also known
to hold high-ranking positions in the TTP’s top leadership (Roggio, 2009; Gul, 2010).19 Ac-
cording to the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, John Brennan, the TTP
and ALQ train, plan, and plot together and they are almost indistinguishable.20 In short,
ALQ has more influence on the Pakistani Taliban than on the Afghan Taliban (Gunaratna
and Iqbal, 2012; Iqbal, 2010, 4). Both have established a symbiotic relationship in which the
“T.T.P draws ideological guidance from Al Qaeda while Al Qaeda relies on the T.T.P. for
safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border.”21 The TTP also had a
substantial collaborative relationship with the Haqqanis that helped the TTP leadership to
safeguard against Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations in the tribal areas. In the following
section, I will examine how this collaborative relationship contributed to TTP’s resilience.
5.1.5 Collaborative Relationship of Haqqani Network and the TTP
Since December 2007, the Haqqanis have become a formal part of the TTP in Pakistan,
and they have been playing a role of influential mediator to broker peace deals between the
TTP and Islamabad (Rassler and Brown, 2011). Sirajuddin Haqqani, the current leader of
the Haqqanis, enjoys unparalleled prestige among the Pakistani Taliban due to his family
legacy.22 Pakistan has been a supporter and promoter of the Haqqanis from the early 1970s
and used them to exert its influence in Afghanistan and against India in the struggle over
19For instance, the inclusion of Abu Kasha, an ALQ leader, who acted as a liaison between ALQ executive
council in the tribal areas of Pakistan and TTP, held a senior position in the TTP’s ranks.
20Quoted in LA Times by Hennessey (2010).
21Stated by Daniel Benjamin, a senior American Diplomat and former, Coordinator for Counterterrorism
under Obama Administration, quoted in Savage (2010).
22Baitullah Mehsud, the founding TTP leader, fought under Jalaluddin Haqqani – who was the founding
leader of the Haqqani Network and the father of Sirajuddin Haqqani – in Afghanistan during the 1990s. For
more details, see Manzar et al. (2008); Walsh (2009) and Ali (2008).
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Kashmir (Rassler and Brown, 2011). Since 9/11, the groups have been a semiautonomous
faction of both the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban. Although the Haqqanis have used Pakistani
tribal areas as a staging ground for attacks in Afghanistan (Laub, 2013), as figure 5.1 shows
they launched only one attack in Pakistan which killed no one. The Haqqanis have been
known to have paid the Pakistani tribal leaders to smuggle Afghan and Arab fighters out
of Afghanistan after the fall of Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2008, 268). They
have been recruiting fighters and suicide bombers from the Pakistani tribal areas to launch
operations against NATO forces in Afghanistan (Mahsud and Fishman, 2012, Quoted on
141).23 The following section explores the variation in the Taliban’s target selection during
its transformation from an insurgent movement to a formidable terrorist group.
5.2 Taliban’s Target Selection
Figure 5.1 illustrates the terrorist activity of di↵erent groups that operated under the um-
brella name of the ‘Taliban’ both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Figure 5.1 clearly shows that
the Afghan Taliban, referred as Taliban (Afghanistan) in the figure, attacked Afghanistan
and Pakistan was the prime target of the Pakistani Taliban before its merger into a coali-
tion of TTP. In the same vein, when TTP came into being in 2007 they rarely attacked
Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Haqqanis exclusively operated in Afghanistan. Fig-
ure 5.1 also evidently demonstrates that although these groups have similar motivations and
identical broader goals such as the restoration of Khilafat and the imposition of a strict
interpretation of Sharia in Pakistan and Afghanistan; they have clearly defined operational
boundaries and di↵erent agendas. Since this case study focuses only on the groups that
are exclusively operational in Pakistan; I will present an analysis of targeting preferences of
groups that were operational in Pakistan only.
23According to an interview with the local former Haqqani commander and the interview of a failed
suicide bomber named “Ahmad Noor” in May 2009, Haqqanis have connections with the local commanders
in Pakistani tribal areas who train and supply them with suicide bombers. For more details, see Mahsud
and Fishman (2012, 130-165).
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Figure 5.1: Terrorist activity by terrorist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan from 1980 to
2011. Source: GTD (2016)
5.2.1 Neo-Taliban’s Targeting Analysis (2002 to 2011)
The TTP often targeted members of Pakistan’s armed forces but also kills civilians for so-
called political or religious reasons. Abbas (2008, 2) notes that to establish themselves as an
alternative force in the tribal areas, TTP, under the leadership of Baitullah Masood, killed
about two hundred tribal leaders by January 2008. Figure 5.2 supports Abbas (2008, 2)
claims and shows that the TTP has been the most active and lethal terrorist group in the
history of Pakistan. It is responsible for 48% (as shown in 5.2-A) of the total attacks that
resulted in 58% (as shown in 5.2-B) of the total fatalities. Also, TTP is responsible for 64%
of civilian fatalities (as shown in 5.2-C) and 54% of GPM fatalities (as shown in 5.2-D).
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Figure 5.2: Target selection of the Taliban and its a liates in Pakistan from 1980 to
2011.Source: GTD (2016)
A similar trend can be seen in figure 5.3 that shows the target selection patterns and
attacks of the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and TTP over time in Pakistan. Figure 5.3-
A-H shows that when the Pakistani Taliban merged with other regional groups to form TTP,
they became more active and lethal because of a sharp increase (5.3-G) in the number of
yearly civilian fatalities as compared to the Pakistani Taliban (5.3-B). Although the Afghan
Taliban relocated to the tribal areas of Pakistan, figure 5.3-A shows they attacked less
consistently in Pakistan. For overall attacks and targeting selection patterns of these groups
96
in Afghanistan, see Appendix: E.5.
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Figure 5.3: Target selection of Taliban and its a liates over time in Pakistan from 1980
to 2011. Source: GTD (2016)
5.2.2 Di↵usion of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan
As discussed in Section 2.3.0.7, a terrorist group’s use of suicide terrorism as a weapon of
choice shows that the group wants to inflict mass casualties indiscriminately.24 Many have
argued that given the success of suicide bombing operations in the Middle East, this strategy
was gradually introduced in Pakistan and Afghanistan. So it is important to examine when
and how suicide terrorism di↵used into this region.
24On average a suicide attack kills 6 times as many people as compared to a conventional attack which
proves that suicide terrorism is a dangerous strategy of modern terrorist groups. Two-sample t test with
equal variances of total number of fatalities (nkill) by suicide attacks in GTD (2016) shows that the mean of
total number of fatalities caused by suicide attacks is 13.3 and the mean of total number of fatalities caused
by non-suicide attacks is 2.22.
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5.2.2.1 Advent of Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan
Suicide terrorism has become a favorite weapon of choice for the Taliban in Afghanistan.
According to the GTD (2016), as of December 2011, there had been 380 suicide terrorism
attacks in Afghanistan that killed 2561 people at an average of 7 fatalities per attack. These
fatalities include 416 civilian deaths and 1401 GPM deaths. But figure 5.4 shows a surprising
trend that before 9/11, suicide terrorism was an alien phenomenon both in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. It neither appeared during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89) nor
did it appear in the subsequent Afghan civil war (1989-96). Lewis (2012, 221-223) argues
that suicide bombing was imported by the remnants of ALQ and its allies in Afghanistan
first, and then it snowballed into Pakistan. Figure 5.4 substantiates Lewis (2012, 221)
claims because none of the four terrorist groups launched a suicide attack before September
11, 2001. Suicide bombing was introduced in Afghanistan with the killing of Ahmed Shah
Masood on September 9, 2001, then commander of the Northern Alliance, by a pair of
bombers, posing as journalists (Lewis, 2012, 221;Moghadam, 2008, 153; Pape and Feldman,
2010). The tactical success of the assassination of Masood – who had survived assassination
attempts previously by the Taliban, the Pakistani ISI, Soviet KGB, and Hekmatyar over a
period of 26 years (Gutman, 2008, 34) – was primarily due to the fact that it was carried out
by suicide bombers. However, the strategic relevance of suicide bombing as a weapon of war
in the Afghan insurgency was overlooked until 2005 as shown in the figure 5.4-A. Williams
(2007) suggests two reasons for this delay; first, suicide attacks were fundamentally alien to
the culture of the Pashtun people and second, they were not seen as being powerful enough to
redress the imbalance of forces between the Neo-Taliban and its adversaries. But Masood’s
assassination changed that perception.
Moreover, Lewis (2012) claims that remnants of ALQ worked diligently to create a climate
to import their suicide bombings in Afghanistan. They highlighted the e↵ective use of
this weapon by citing its successes in Iraq. They made Afghan-specific videos dubbed in
Pashtu, which carried laudatory messages of the suicide attacks in Iraq, and suicide bomber’s
testimonies. Lewis (2012) also argues that the first few sporadic suicide attacks in 2003 and
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2004 were carried out by Arabs already indoctrinated in the culture of martyrdom, and
these attacks served as a litmus test of the e↵ectiveness of this relatively new weapon in
Afghanistan. He claims that Mullah Omar, who had previously condemned suicide attacks,
reversed his position, and laid the groundwork for the ideological acceptance of suicide
bombing in the Taliban culture. If Lewis (2012)’s opinion is correct, then it is imperative to
note that suicide bombings defused into the Afghan culture by the virtue of its e↵ectiveness
rather than any ideological underpinning.
Figure 5.4-D also shows an interesting trend regarding the Haqqani’s weapon of choice in
Afghanistan. The Haqqanis also never used suicide bombing before 9/11 but started using
this tactic in 2006. Apparently, suicide bombing became their favorite weapon of choice since
they employed more suicide attacks than conventional attacks in Afghanistan. Figure 5.4-
D also shows that Haqqanis stepped up their suicide terror campaign against the US and
NATO forces after 2009.
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Figure 5.4: Number of yearly conventional versus suicide terrorist attacks by Taliban and
its a liates in Pakistan and Afghanistan from 1980 to 2011. Source: GTD (2016)
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5.2.2.2 Advent of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan
Pakistan has witnessed significant bloodshed due to the rise of suicide terrorism all across the
country since 9/11. Figure 5.4-B and C show that the Pakistani Taliban did not adopt suicide
bombing as a weapon of choice before 2007. However, the TTP subsequently employed this
tactic frequently and consistently from its inception in 2007. According to the GTD (2016),
as of December 2011, there had been 243 suicide terrorist incidents in Pakistan that killed
4072 people at an average of 17 fatalities per attack, which is higher than the average fatalities
per attack in Afghanistan (7 per attack). These fatalities include 1202 civilian deaths and
1525 GPM deaths. If suicide terrorism di↵used into Pakistan through Afghanistan – as Lewis
(2012, 223) has argued – then what explains much higher average fatalities per attack and
civilian deaths in Pakistan.
First, since the TTP was relatively more pro-ALQ, they had no problem adopting the
alien culture of suicide bombings. Secondly, the reason for this higher rate of average fatalities
in Pakistan is due to a shift in the targeting pattern of the terrorists from foreigners and
sectarian targets in 2002–2005 to security forces or the general public in 2006-2009 (Bhatti
et al., 2011). Bhatti et al. (2011) notes that terrorists have targeted public installations
including mosques, political gatherings, etc. which resulted in a significantly greater number
of deaths and injuries per event as compared with attacks on security installations (Bhatti
et al., 2011).25
5.2.3 Pakistani Taliban’s Targeting Analysis By Location
Before we conduct the analysis of target selection of the Pakistani Taliban and the TTP by
location, it is imperative to understand the ethnic fractionalization in Pakistan. This will
elucidate the TTP’s constituency at a provincial level in Pakistan. Pakistan is a country of
25 Bhatti et al. (2011) studied the epidemiological patterns of suicide terrorism in the civilian population of
Pakistan for the period from 2002 to October 2009. They found that of 198 suicide bombings, civilians were
involved in 194 events. Civilians accounted for 74.1% (N = 2017) of those who died and 93.8% (N = 6129) of
those who were injured. In nine districts, mortality rates were more than one death per 100,000 inhabitants
per year. Attacks on public installations (mosques) or political gatherings resulted in a significantly greater
(P 0.02) number of deaths (22 vs. 8) and injuries (59 vs. 24) per event compared with security installations.
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180 million people which are divided into five main ethnic groups: Punjabi (44%), Pashtun
(15.4%), Sindhi (14.1%), Muhajirs (7.6%), Baluchi (3.6%) and Others (15.3%). The country
is divided into five provinces: Punjab (populated by a Punjabi majority), Sindh (populated
by a Sindhi majority & Muhajir minority), Baluchistan (populated by a Baluchi majority
& a sizable Pashtun minority), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (predominantly populated by
Pashtuns) which was previously called the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) until the
name changed in 2010, currently it is referred as the KPK (short for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).
Also, there are the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA – populated by a Pashtun
majority), Pakistan-Administered Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan (CFR, Ethnic & Political
Factionalism).26
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Figure 5.5: Target selection of Pakistani Taliban and TTP by province from 1980 to
2011.Source: GTD (2016)
26For more details about Pakistan’s multi-ethnic society see Crisis Guide: Pakistan (Ethnic & Political Fac-
tionalism) in CFR at http://www.cfr.org/interactives/CGPakistan/index.html?cid = otc marketinguse 
pakistancg/making   sense  of   pakistan/.
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Figure 5.5 presents the targeting patterns by the location of the two most active and lethal
terrorist groups in the history of Pakistan, that is, the Pakistani Taliban and the TTP. It
is evident from the figure 5.5-A & B that the Pakistani Taliban – who were operational
from Dec 2001 to Dec 200727 –, were most active in FATA and KPK, which are the home
of the Pashtun ethnic majority. They launched 17 attacks in FATA that killed 72 people in
total, which involved 27 civilians and 2 GPM fatalities. Similarly, in KPK, they launched
18 attacks that killed 56 people including 11 civilians and 6 GPM personnel.
Figure 5.5-C & D shows that when di↵erent factions of the Pakistani Taliban and other
like-minded terrorist groups coalesced under the umbrella of the TTP in December of 2007;
their attacks increased both in their frequency and lethality. For instance, between Dec
2007-2011 timeframe, the TTP launched 257 attacks in KPK, killing 1078 people, which
included 557 civilians and 92 GPM personnel. This is a significant deviation and an increase
in the number of civilian fatalities as compared to their predecessor’s (Pakistani Taliban)
target selection and intensity of violence. Similarly, the figure 5.5-C & D shows that FATA
– the home of the TTP – endured 229 attacks that killed 698 people which included 333
civilians and 127 GPM personnel fatalities. Also, the TTP launched 5 attacks in Baluchistan
that generated 89 casualties which involved 66 civilians.
Figure 5.5-C & D also illustrate that the TTP expanded its operational boundaries
between December 2007-2011, and attacked other regions of Pakistan such as Punjab, which
was attacked 32 times generating 448 fatalities that included 72 civilians and 114 GPM
personnel. Islamabad was attacked 9 times resulting in 91 casualties including 2 GPM
fatalities, and Sindh saw the TTP launch 12 attacks that killed 83 people, which included
54 civilians.28
27Figure 5.5 does not provide the targeting patterns of the Pakistan Taliban and the TTP over time;
however, it has been established in Section 5.1.2 that Pakistani Taliban came into the limelight after the fall
of Taliban regime in Afghanistan, therefore, were operational between 2002-2007 timeframe. Moreover, as
discussed in Section 5.1.3 that Pakistani Taliban merged with other like-minded terrorist groups to form a
coalition called TTP in December of 2007; therefore, I will discuss the target selection of the TTP between
December 2007-2011 (I stopped collecting data in 2011).
28TTP was also involved in the cross-border terrorism but not actively; it attacked once in the Afghan
province of Paktika and generated one fatality, and twice in the Afghan province of Kunar that resulted 1
civilian and 2 GPM casualties. Last but not least, the TTP was also responsible for a failed attack in New
York in which an American citizen of Pakistani origin was apprehended.
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Since the largest ethnic group in KPK and FATA are the Pashtun;29 therefore, it is safe to
assume that a salient majority of civilians that were killed by TTP were also ethnic Pashtun.30
Ironically, TTP primarily draws its foot-soldiers from the Pashtun community (Iqbal and
Silva, 2013, 75), and considers it as its reference constituency; this means TTP has been
killing its fellow Pashtuns and may have profound implications for the TTP’s organizational
survival.31
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Figure 5.6: Total number of civilian fatalities per attack by TTP from 2007 to
2011.Source: GTD (2016)
29See the Demographic of KPK at Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa o cial website at
http://kp.gov.pk/page/demoghraphics. Also, according to PBS (2015, Pakistan’s Year Book 2014-15) about
99.1% of people in FATA are Pashto speakers.
30Due to the lack of availability of data regarding the ethnicity of the victims of the terrorist incidents;
this study assumes that majority of victims of terror attacks in KPK, NWFP and FATA are Pashtuns.
31Figure 5.5 is also in line with the Bhatti et al. (2011) findings mentioned the previous section regarding
the evident rise in civilian fatalities in Pakistan between 2002-2009 timeframe. To sum up, the figure 5.5
shows that about 91% of the overall killings generated by Pakistani Taliban between 2002-2007 period were
perpetrated in FATA and NWFP regions in Pakistan, out of which, however, only 25% were civilian fatalities.
On the other hand, due to the extension of their operational boundaries to other regions of Pakistan, TTP’s
killings in FATA, NWFP, and KPK reduced to 71% between 2007-2011 timeframe. Nevertheless, their
tendency of targeting civilians almost doubled to 46.5% in these regions, which is a departure from Pakistani
Taliban’s traditional target selection methodology.
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On the other hand, Punjab is the largest province of Pakistan with the majority of
ethnic Punjabis that constitute about 44% of the total population. Punjab’s dominance
has generated political disharmony and tussles between the provinces over the years in Pak-
istan (Dewey, 1991, 256). In addition, many separatist’s movements in Pakistan have always
seen the military as the key to Punjabi dominance of the Pakistani state because a sizable
majority of military brass comes from Punjab (Dewey, 1991, 255). So, it is understandable
that Punjabis are likely deemed as enemies by TTP. But surprisingly TTP has been equally
active against Pashtuns as well. Figure 5.6 presents a graphical representation of TTP’s
lethality in KPK, FATA and Punjab. The figure shows the number of civilian fatalities per
attack generated by TTP between 2007 and 2011. The figure presents an increasing trend
in KPK and decreasing trend both in FATA and Punjab after 2010. A closer look on the
statistics explains a more comprehensive picture about the number of civilian fatalities gen-
erated by TTP between 2007-2011. In KPK and FATA, the TTP killed 11 and 7 civilians
per 5 attacks respectively between 2007-2011 and in Punjab it also killed 11civilians per 5
attacks in the same time period, which indicates that TTP has been ironically equally lethal
in KPK and Punjab.
The figure 5.7 illustrates a more inclusive overview of the total number the fatalities that
TTP has generated over time in FATA, KPK and Punjab. The figure clearly shows a much
bigger and increasing trend of civilian fatalities over time in KPK (center figure). Although
there is a decrease in civilian fatalities in FATA (left figure) in 2010, the magnitude of killings
in FATA it is much higher as compared to Punjab. In short these figure show that TTP has
been more active against civilians in KPK and FATA as compared to Punjab.
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Figure 5.7: Total number of fatalities by TTP from 2007 to 2011 in FATA, KPK and
Punjab. Source: GTD (2016)
A favorable public opinion is a prerequisite for the operational continuity of a group,
and indiscriminate civilian killings by a terrorist group in its reference constituency generate
negative group reputation, which hurts group longevity in the long run – if not immedi-
ately.32 Also, as explained in Section 2.3 despite having a slight advantage of overcoming the
organizational dilemmas; religious terrorist organizations are not immune from local public
opinion. Given that the TTP has killed a lot of Pashtuns, and it is a Muslim terrorist organi-
zation; is there something unique about how the TTP is organized that makes it immune to
negative approval in its reference community and unusually e↵ective? The following section
will address this question by discussing the organizational dynamics of the TTP, and the
32For more details, see Section 2.3.0.4.
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relevance of local public opinion in FATA and KPK against terrorism.
5.3 Testing Assumptions of the Theoretical Framework
5.3.1 Does TTP fit the Organizational Theory Framework?
As described in the Section 2.2.1, a formal organization has “a consciously adopted name,”
and “a clearly definable membership.” The TTP certainly fits this criterion because the
TTP’s leadership went to a great length to establish their ownership over the title “Tehrik-
i-Taliban Pakistan.” Abbas (2008, 2) notes that two organizations with a similar name
emerged in the past in FATA; one in 1998, and the other announced its existence in early
October 2007 (a month before the Mehsud’s TTP formal announcement). The TTP claimed
to be the authentic Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and systemically suppressed other entities
proclaiming the same name in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Also, many recent studies
that trace the history of the Pakistani Taliban estimate the TTP’s membership size as
about 30,000 to 35,000 operatives (Valentine, 2009; Abbas, 2008; Yusuf, 2014; Abbas, 2014;
Stanford-University, 2012, Mapping Militant Organizations Project; Bajoria and Masters,
2010; Jones and Fair, 2010; Laub, 2013; Franco, 2009; Cla; Sisson, 2011).33
Moreover, organizational theory literature highlights the importance of an e↵ective lead-
ership that e ciently allocate resources, and designate labor and tasks to middle manage-
ment and operational commanders (Mintzberg, 1993, 2). The leadership of TTP at the top
has been hierarchical since its inception; they always had a head of the organization (entitled
Emir) and a second-in-command (entitled Naib Emir). Due to its large collaborative tribal
network, the TTP has been quick to fill in leadership gaps when required.34 However, the
TTP does not have a middle management structure. Instead, it exists as a loose coalition
of groups that are united by similar broader ideological goals (Valentine, 2009; Abbas, 2008;
Yusuf, 2014; Abbas, 2014; Bajoria and Masters, 2010; Jones and Fair, 2010; Laub, 2013;
33A few recent studies like BAAD (2015, Online TTP Profile) and Jamal and Ahsan (2015, 4) provided a
more conservative estimate of 25000 and 8000 operatives respectively.
34In the case of Baitullah and Hakimullah Mehsud’s killings.
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Sisson, 2011). These groups, however, vary in their size, and in their level of coordination
with other partners of the coalition. Also, most of the coalition partners are limited to their
local areas of influence and cannot expand their operations beyond that territory (Gall and
Tavernise, 2010).
The absence of middle management hierarchy does have its benefits for the TTP. The
leadership does not have to worry about mobilizing resources to local partners since they
generate their own means to support their operations using kidnapping, extortion, and smug-
gling (Stanford-University, 2012, Mapping Militant Organizations Project & BAAD, 2015,
Online TTP Profile). But on the other hand, scholars argue that the hierarchical structure is
required to run a prolonged and successful terrorism campaign (Shapiro, 2007, 2005; Shapiro
et al., 2013), which makes the TTP case unique because they not only have been successfully
launching major attacks in FATA and KPK but they also have extended their reach into
other provinces of Pakistan.
Moreover, Yusuf (2014) argues that many leaders of the local factions of the TTP simply
signed up to the movement to gain prestige or stature in their own tribes rather than for any
ideological reason. The TTP, nevertheless, has faced leadership crises and infighting regard-
ing the issue of whether to negotiate peace deals with the government. A few factions also
have splintered on the issue of attacks in public places, extortion, and kidnappings (Siddiqa,
2011; Haider and Mehsud, 2011; Jamal and Ahsan, 2015, 3). In short, the TTP does have
similar organizational constraints like other conventional organizations; however, the lack of
an e cient middle management hierarchy poses additional challenges to control the intensity
of violence, and the following subsection examines those problems in detail.
5.3.2 TTP in the light of Agency Theory
5.3.2.1 ALQ and TTP: A Principal-Agent Relation?
Section 5.1.4 discussed the aspirations of the TTP to operate as a global jihadi movement,
and many scholars and counterterrorism experts believe that the TTP leaders have been
seeking ideological guidance from ALQ. In February 2009, after meeting with Ayman al-
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Zawahiri – ALQ’s second-in-command –, Baitullah Mehsud, then TTP’s leader, announced
their allegiance to OBL instead of Mullah Omar (Abbas, 2014; Bergen and Tiedemann,
2012, 85).35 This announcement was an o cial recognition of the long-term collaborative
relationship that the TTP and ALQ have established since 9/11. But was there a principal-
agent relationship between the TTP and ALQ? If yes, are they subject to the challenges that
a conventional organization faces?36 The evidence in a December 3, 2010, declassified letter
(to be analyzed in detail shortly) from two high-ranking ALQ o cials; Abu Yahya al-Libi
and Mahmud al-Hasan to then TTP’s Emir Hakimullah Mehsud, undeniably suggests that
there is a principal-agent relationship between ALQ and the TTP. Also, due to an absence
of a middle management structure and semi-autonomous coalition partners of the TTP, the
principal (the ALQ) has had a strenuous relationship with its agent (the TTP).
In the letter, Abu Yahya al-Libi and Mahmud al-Hasan37 wrote to Hakimullah Mehsud (al Libi
and Al-Hasan, to Hakimullah Mashud – Harmony Letter # SOCOM-2012-0000007):
“The draft that was written by Hakimullah Mahsud is unacceptable and we don’t approve
it because it contains political and Shari’a mistakes. We already sent our comments on this
draft.”
From this statement, it will be not irrational to speculate that apparently, Hakimullah
Mehsud asked for advice in a written document regarding something related to the man-
agement of Jihadi campaign in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Also, it is possible that he
sought operational guidance regarding rules of engagement in the light of ALQ’s Islamic
interpretation.38 The authors’ response shows that they were not happy with Hakimullah’s
35The meeting took place in South Waziristan. Before this meeting the Pakistani Taliban answered to the
Afghan Taliban.
36For more information on principal-agent relationship see Section 2.2.2.
37Both were killed by the CIA drone attacks in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
38Although the substance of Hakimullah Mahsud’s written draft that he sent to ALQ commanders in
not known. However, it is clear from their reply that since Mehsud’s draft contained “political and Shari’a
mistakes;” this insinuates that he may have asked for some religious guidance concerning the TTP. Asking
written advice called fatwas from a religious scholar regarding religious matters is a normal Islamic practice.
The advisee uses the fatwas to defend his actions in the light this Islamic decree and enforces it in his
mandated domain. The fatwas absolve the advisee from any moral, psychological, social, and internal and
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proposal, and they outrightly rejected it. The letter did not provide any further details about
Hakimullah’s written draft. However, points 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the letter,39 that are discussed in
the following, show that both ALQ’s commanders were seriously concerned regarding TTP’s
strategy to wage Jihad in Pakistan. The authors further wrote:
“1: We have several important comments that cover the concept, approach, and behavior
of the TTP in Pakistan, which we believe are passive behavior and clear legal and religious
mistakes which might result in a negative deviation from the set path of the Jihadists Move-
ment in Pakistan, which also are contrary to the objectives of Jihad and to the e↵orts exerted
by us”
Item two in the letter addressed the leadership crises and in-fighting between di↵erent
factions of the TTP and ALQ leaders ordered everyone to swear allegiance to Hakimullah.
The authors explicitly disapproved Hakimullah’s self-proclaimed title of “Great Imam” in-
stead of “Jihad Emir,” which suggests they were displeased by Mahsud’s arrogance, and
inappropriate use of his position beyond the TTP’s amir. The authors wrote:
“2: Considering Hakimullah as the sole Emir for everyone to swear allegiance to, who-
ever oppose him and isn’t a member of the movement is an adulterer, the none di↵erentiation
between the Jihad Emirate and the Great Imam post, and neglecting the daily conditions of
the Muslims; all of which according to the Shari’a (Muslim laws) are a misconception of the
real situation, and may cause an inter-Mujahidin fighting.”
Item three sharply criticized the surging indiscriminate violence of the TTP against fel-
low Muslims and its tactics of using civilians as a human shield. They also rebuked the
TTP’s target selection that maximized civilian fatalities. The authors also condemned the
practice of calling Muslims apostates to justify killings of Muslims. The ALQ’s leaders wrote:
external stresses.
39The full text of the letter is available in Appendix B.1.
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“3: (Of the passive behavior is) killing more people, taking them as shields without basing
their action on the Shari’a, killing the normal Muslims as a result of martyrdom operations
that takes place in the marketplaces, mosques, roads, assembly places, and calling the Mus-
lims apostates.”
The fifth point denounced the TTP’s use of kidnapping to generate money, and the letter
sought to establish clear guidelines according to the Shari’a regarding kidnapping for ran-
som. The authors wrote:
“5: We are sending the attached short list on what is acceptable and unacceptable on
the subject of kidnapping and receiving money, and we hope that you and the Mujahidin in
Pakistan will approve it.”
In short, this declassified letter not only furnishes evidence that ALQ (the principal)
was, in fact, worried about its brand name, which the TTP (the agent) claimed to represent
but also it recognized the long-term consequences of the TTP’s misguided terror campaign
against civilians. This is a textbook case of the principal-agent problem as described in
Section 2.2.2. The letter clearly shows that the ALQ-TTP nexus su↵ered from preference
divergence, which is the root cause of the principal-agent problem. Hakimullah’s preferences
to gain prestige in Pakistani Muslim society by becoming a self-proclaimed “Great Imam,”
his erroneous target selection and his use of extortion and kidnapping ran counter to the
wishes of his principal (ALQ). It seems that ALQ was unable to maintain operational control
of the Jihadi movement in the tribal areas of Pakistan, and failed to regulate the level of
violence against civilians. ALQ faced the terrorist’s dilemma, where it had to lose either the
operational security – which means, evading local law enforcement, and the US drones (both
authors of the letter were later killed by the US drone strikes) – or the tactical control of the
global Jihad (where thousands of innocent fellow Muslims were killed in the name of Islam).
Moreover, the lack of middle management structure in the TTP poses additional constraints
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to establish tactical control even from within the TTP leadership (Khan, 2011).
5.4 Pathways to Public Support for Terrorism in Pak-
istan
Public opinion in Pakistan has swung from supporting military operations against the TTP
and in 2008 and 2009 to against the use of force, and for initiating talks with the TTP (Yusuf,
2014).40 Calibration of violence to a tolerable level – against Pakistani Muslims, in general,
and the Pashtun community particularly – is a pre-requisite for the TTP’s organizational
success (Shapiro, 2013). Then, given the number of civilian fatalities associated to the TTP
in Pakistan – especially in the KPK and FATA –; there should be an all out tribal uprising
against the TTP similar to Casablanca and Amman uprising against AQI in Morocco and
Jordan in 2003 and 2005 respectively (Kalpakian, 2005; Finer and Mehdawi, 2005). But
unfortunately, that is certainly not the case in Pakistan.
According to Bullock et al. (2011, 383), the attitudes toward militant groups in Pakistan
are regionally clustered, and that support is predominantly lower in the areas where there
have been a large number of militant attacks. But on the other hand, several studies mea-
suring the support for militancy in Pakistan have consistently shown that these groups enjoy
significant pockets of support, particularly in the KPK and Punjab. (Shapiro and Fair, 2010;
Fair et al., 2012, 2010; Shapiro and Fair, 2010). In Spring 2011, the Pew’s Global Attitudes
Survey was conducted in Pakistan, and it presents a clear picture of the di↵erent shades of
public support for the TTP. The survey asked the following specific question to a represen-
tative sample of respondents in Pakistan (Pew-Research-Center, 2011):
“Q105A. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat un-
favorable, or very unfavorable opinion of Tehrik-i-Taliban?”
40In an email correspondence with the author, the Dr. Jacob Shaprio, author of the book Shapiro (2013),
argued that the TTP has not been able to calibrate the level of violence to make it tolerable to its constituents,
and has clearly overstepped at many places in KPK and FATA.
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While 30% of the respondents refused to answer this question or responded ‘I don’t
know ;’ about 51% of respondents replied that they either had ‘very unfavorable or somewhat
unfavorable’ opinion of the TTP. On the other hand, only 19% of the respondents replied
that they either had ‘very favorable or somewhat favorable’ opinion of the TTP. This survey
result shows that more than half of the country’s population opposes the TTP’s violence.
However, what explains the lack of uprising against the TTP in Pakistan as a whole and in
KPK and FATA in particular and what explains the 19% support for the TTP? There are a
number of plausible explanations of unwavering support for the TTP in Pakistan.
First, the typical answer is that support of terrorists in general, is connected to abject
poverty in Pakistan. But many survey studies have found little evidence of a direct link
between poverty and terrorism in Pakistan. They instead argue that terrorism should be seen
as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity, and frustration
at lack of opportunity (Kazim et al., 2008; Blair et al., 2013; Shapiro and Fair, 2010; Fair,
2007; Abbas, 2007; Aftab, 2008; Bullock et al., 2011; Shafiq and Ross, 2010; Kaltenthaler
and Miller, 2015; Fair, 2009; Davis et al., 2012; Saif, 2011; Kaltenthaler et al., 2010). On the
contrary, according to the newspaper commentaries of the late Banazir Bhutto, former Prime
Minister of Pakistan and Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistani Ambassador to the United
States, the lack of a connection between poverty and support for militancy may explain
the motivations of the Islamist leadership or elite. However, they argue that poverty and
illiteracy may still be important motivating factors for recruitment of foot-soldiers for the
militant organizations (Bhutto, 2004; Haqqani, 2007).
Second, as discussed previously, even if violence is seen as deplorable, it may be perceived
as necessary by many sympathizers (Davis et al., 2012, xviii). Since the “Pashtun Homeland”
– which extends from Afghanistan to the tribal areas of Pakistan – was perceived to be
under the occupation of NATO forces, the Northern Alliance and their enablers, the violence
against the occupation forces and their enabler (the Government of Pakistan) was recognized
as legitimate and even preferable by many supporters of the TTP. Furthermore, the TTP
recruited its militants from a much more homogeneous population, “one that had been pre-
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screened through religious institutions” called Madrassas (Shapiro, 2013, 60). Therefore,
they were able to be more ruthless against civilians.
Third, elements in Pakistani military establishment have always seen the Afghan and
Pakistani Taliban as an asset because they helped Pakistan to install a pro-Pakistani regime
in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan’s tolerance if not support to the TTP
has contributed to the TTP’s resilience over time. The Pakistani military has been signing
peace deals with the Pakistani Taliban and has been reluctant to launch a decisive military
operation in FATA, which provided the TTP with territory to establish itself as a force in
the tribal areas of Pakistan.
Finally, one of the most compelling arguments about public support for the TTP in
Pakistan has been presented by Kaltenthaler and Miller (2015). They argue that ethnic
identification is a more important factor in explaining support for the TTP in Pakistan than
the religious ideology that the group espouses. They contend that Islamist militant groups
with more distinct, salient, homogeneous ethnic composition are likely to be supported by
their own ethnic kinsmen. Thus, the TTP should be viewed as an ethno-religious organization
rather than just a terrorist organization with the global Islamic agenda. However, these
findings still do not explain why ethnic Pashtun will support the TTP when they have been
the most favorite target of the TTP’s terrorist campaign, which is a question for future
studies.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
A thorough examination of Taliban’s resiliency in Pakistan shows that despite its burgeoning
violence against civilians, the TTP’s endurance depends on many inter-related factors.
First, one of the major successes of the TTP during its rise to the national limelight in
Pakistan has been its ability to mold public support in its favor by its ethnic similarity with
the Pashtun community. Despite the TTP’s indiscriminate violence against civilians, public
support stopped the government forces from launching a decisive action against the TTP.
Second, the TTP has managed to survive due to the ambivalence of the Pakistani gov-
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ernment to launch a decisive military operation against the TTP. The events of 9/11 and the
subsequent American invasion of Afghanistan changed security dynamics in the world, and
specifically in South Asia. However, it did not change the India-centric threat perception
of Pakistan, and its desire to restore and maintain its strategic depth at its western border
via de facto control of Afghanistan through the Taliban. Moreover, Pakistan has been very
wary of Indian involvement in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan.
Under international and American pressure, Pakistan extended its cooperation in the
Global War on Terrorism. However, elements in the Pakistani security establishment were
still hopeful for a Taliban comeback; therefore, despite su↵ering huge losses in military
operations in the tribal areas, Pakistan never launched a decisive war against the militants
in FATA until 2011. Pakistan’s ambivalent policy in dealing with the Taliban has always
been dictated by its perception to prepare itself to deal with a changed Afghanistan in the
wake of the withdrawal of American and NATO troops from the Afghanistan.
Third, the TTP endured in Pakistan due to its ability to survive many leadership decap-
itations. They have been very quick to install new leadership due to the loose collaborative
tribal network. Moreover, the Pakistani Taliban developed a distinct identity and they never
integrated themselves into the organizational structure of the Afghan Taliban under Mullah
Omar’s leadership; instead, they preferred (Abbas, 2008, 1). The TTP established itself by
engaging in military attacks and negotiating peace deals with the government of Pakistan
with the help of the Haqqanis. The TTP had seemingly recognized the security dilemma of
Pakistan, and they were always bargaining to buy time to rearm and regroup under the false
pretext of peace deals and ceasefires. The TTP was also aware of the fact that elements in
the Pakistan security establishment still viewed both Pakistani and Afghan Taliban as an
asset and played their game accordingly.
Finally, since its transformation – from an insurgent movement that was fighting against
the foreign occupation of Afghanistan, to a global jihadi organization that endorsed the Pan-
Islamization ideology of ALQ – the TTP exposed itself to agency problems. Being a loose
coalition of like-minded groups, and due to the absence of an e↵ective middle management
structure, the TTP was unable to calibrate violence to a tolerable level in its constituency
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despite ALQ wishes, as a result, it became the second most lethal group, in terms of killing
civilians in the world (GTD, 2016).
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Chapter 6
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION
6.1 Conclusion
This dissertation research set out to solve two basic puzzles:
• Why are some terrorist groups more likely to target civilians?
• How does the variation in groups’ target selection influence their longevity?
Many qualitative terrorism studies have previously argued that terrorism is inherently a
‘self-limiting’ phenomenon (Shapiro, 2013; Abrahms, 2006), and the findings of this project
concur with this proposition and present empirical support. The study has strived to explain
some of the ambiguities regarding the terrorist’s targeting behavior by focusing on terrorist
organizations as the unit of analysis, generating a unique dataset of terrorist events, and
incorporating a framework based on organizational process and agency theories. I evaluated
the targeting patterns and preferences of 480 terrorist groups that were operational between
1980 and 2011 and disaggregated the victims of all terrorist attacks into combatant and
non-combatant target-types. The study also incorporates an in-depth case study of the
Taliban.
The study consistently found a significant positive relation between group lethality (tar-
geting soft targets) and mortality. The findings also suggest that selective violence against
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hard targets prolongs the longevity of a terrorist group. This means that a discriminate
and calibrated target selection plays a pivotal role in organizational survival. Also, terrorist
activity (launching more attacks) has been found to be a significant positive but weak pre-
dictor of a group’s longevity, which suggests terrorist groups would continue to be actively
violent and but not lethal.
The study presents a simple yet logical explanation of the gradual surge in indiscriminate
violence against civilians. I argue that terrorist organizations su↵er from a principal- agent
problem; where leadership has a hard time controlling violence due to the divergent prefer-
ences of its operational commanders who prefer short-term successes over the long term goal
of preserving grassroots popular support. The leadership cannot increase its administrative
presence due to security concerns and faces a dilemma of choosing between operational se-
curity or tactical control. If the leadership chooses the former, it loses the tactical control
of the direction of violence which in turn increases indiscriminate violence. However, if the
leadership choose the latter, it exposes itself to law enforcement interdiction. Given the
rise of indiscriminate violence against civilians, I believe that leaders predominantly choose
operational security and lose tactical control of the group’s violence that makes terrorism an
inherently ‘self-limiting’ phenomenon.
I also examined the importance of ideology for group endurance. The study found empir-
ical evidence that religiously motivated terrorist organizations are more resilient and violent
than non-religious terrorist groups. Also, the study found no evidence of the irrationality
of religiously motivated terrorist groups in the post-9/11 world and rejects the premise that
they do not seek popular approval, which is highlighted in previous studies like Benjamin
and Simon (2002), etc. Instead, I found documentary evidence that religious terrorist groups
are not di↵erent from non-religious groups and a collective ideological belief does not bul-
wark against the appearance of the principal-agent problem. The leadership of the religious
terrorist groups understands the political risk of indiscriminate violence against civilians,
however, they are unable to control violence because they are also subject to the terrorists’
dilemma and other organizational constraints. Using primary sources – translations of the
original letters and documents from OBL, ALQ’s high command and Mullah Omar – from
117
the Harmony Database,1 I conclude that the post-9/11 surge in the intensity of violence
of ALQ, Afghan Taliban, and the TTP is a product of their organizational dilemma. One
reason for the increase in the intensity of violence is the divergent preferences of leadership
and the rank and file, and the leadership’s lack of control over organizational violence despite
their desperate e↵orts.
In studying the e↵ects of lethality on group mortality, it is concluded that popular support
is indeed endogenous. However, grassroots popular support is found to be indispensable to
a terrorist group’s success and survival regardless of its ideological orientation. Although
religious terrorist groups last longer because of their strong adherence to an ideology and
availability of highly motivated homogeneous population to draw membership, indiscriminate
killing of civilians bothers them too, and the leadership actively seeks to calibrate violence to
conserve popular support. The study accounted for the interdependence of popular support
for terrorism and found that the group lethality is a significant positive predictor of negative
group reputation. Nevertheless, in the case of the TTP in Pakistan, I did find that the ethnic
identification is a confounding factor that may explain support for militancy better than the
religious ideology of the TTP.
Moreover, it has been argued in previous literature that a group’s size is a positive
predictor of its survival; however, I found no such evidence in this analysis. I also found
considerable support for the ‘Liability of Newness’ hypothesis because the evidence shows
that young organizations face significantly higher hazard to their survival and are more likely
to expire as compared to older organizations.
6.2 Future Outlook
First, a simple extension of this work will be to extend the sample of terrorist groups by
including data beyond the temporal range of 1980-2011 and by adding data on the groups’
structures. Second, the study found strong evidence about the group’s religiosity as a strong
1The dataset is located at the Combating Terrorism Center at the West Point, NY and can be retrieved
from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmony-program.
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determinant of its resiliency and suggests that religious groups are in a better position to
withstand managerial constraints and agency problems. There is something more to it that
makes religious terrorist groups likely to endure. The premise that they endure because of
the availability of highly motivated homogeneous population to draw their membership from
needs further exploration and could be an avenue to explore in future. Third, the use of
suicide bombings and its impact on group endurance needs a closer examination as well.
Finally, future studies can improve our understanding of group endurance by introducing a
spatial dimension to it, that is, by adding geo-coded data on terrorist groups’ targeting and
their geographical locations.
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Appendix A
List of Terrorist Groups in the
Estimation Sample
Group Name Country Attacks Kills CVL GPM
Code Kills Kills
Al-Qaida 2 4 2996 2807 189
Americans for a Competent
Federal Judicial System 2 5 2 0 1
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) 2 74 0 0 0
Army of God 2 21 3 1 0
Aryan Nation 2 6 0 0 0
Aryan Republican Army 2 16 0 0 0
Coalition to Save the Preserves
(CSP) 2 8 0 0 0
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) 2 66 0 0 0
Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist
International Conspiracy (EMETIC) 2 5 0 0 0
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion
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Nacional (FALN) 2 13 0 0 0
Jamaat-al-Fuqra 2 5 1 0 0
Jewish Defense League (JDL) 2 30 2 0 0
Justice Commandos for the
Armenian Genocide 2 8 2 0 0
Ku Klux Klan 2 12 1 1 0
May 19 Communist Order 2 14 1 0 0
Omega-7 2 25 1 0 0
Puerto Rican Armed Resistance 2 5 1 0 0
The Justice Department 2 14 0 0 0
The Order (Silent Brotherhood) 2 8 1 0 0
United Freedom Front (UFF) 2 19 0 0 0
World Church of the Creator 2 6 3 3 0
Maximiliano Gomez Revolutionary
Brigade 42 14 7 0 0
Popular Liberation Resistance Force 42 6 0 0 0
Democratic Revolutionary Party 70 12 10 10 0
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) 70 2 0 0 0
Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) 70 14 100 98 2
Popular Revolutionary Army (Mexico) 70 21 23 0 23
Zapatista National Liberation Army 70 23 81 61 20
31 January People’s Front (FP-31) 90 17 0 0 0
Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT) 90 16 8 1 1
Guatemalan National Revolutionary
Unity (URNG) 90 131 115 0 102
154
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) 90 107 499 99 373
Rebel Armed Forces of Guatemala (FAR) 90 30 47 0 36
Revolutionary Organization of People
in Arms (ORPA) 90 109 279 35 216
Right-Wing Death Squad 90 2 1 0 0
Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA) 90 10 9 0 0
Cinchoneros Popular Liberation
Movement 91 22 8 1 7
Contras 91 2 0 0 0
Lorenzo Zelaya Revolutionary Front
(LZRF) 91 40 25 0 9
Morazanist Front for the Liberation
of Honduras (FMLH) 91 6 31 0 31
Patriotic Morazanista Front (FPM) 91 26 10 2 1
Sandinistas 91 5 4 2 2
Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN) 92 3329 8018 1157 6121
February 28 Popular League (El Salvador) 92 10 6 3 0
Manuel Jose Arce Commando 92 6 1 0 1
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade 92 7 17 0 0
Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR) 92 10 12 5 3
Revolutionary Workers Party 92 2 4 0 0
Right-Wing Death Squad 92 2 11 11 0
Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA) 92 6 0 0 0
United Popular Action Front (FAPU) 92 5 12 3 0
Contras 93 90 427 22 395
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Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) 93 139 1803 30 1759
Ex-Somoza National Guard 93 21 87 10 74
Kisan Indian Organization 93 7 8 0 2
Misurasata Indian Organization 93 34 270 69 199
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) 93 886 6630 866 5397
Punitive Leftist Front 93 5 1 1 0
Recontras 93 61 74 31 32
Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Nicaragua (FARN) 93 6 100 0 94
Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) 93 12 0 0 0
Sandinistas 93 13 0 0 0
United Nicaraguan Opposition 93 5 8 0 8
Sandinistas 94 1 0 0 0
20 December Movement (M-20) 95 15 1 0 1
Peasant Self-Defense Group (ACCU) 95 2 1 0 1
Revolutionary Front for National
Liberation 95 6 0 0 0
America Battalion 100 6 83 17 66
Black Hand (Colombia) 100 6 32 18 0
Death to Bazuqueros 100 6 0 0 0
Death to Kidnappers (MAS) 100 18 43 36 6
Jaime Bateman Cayon Group (JBC) 100 6 1 1 0
M-19 (Movement of April 19) 100 476 1297 272 971
National Liberation Army of Colombia
(ELN) 100 1226 1391 283 778
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Peasant Self-Defense Group (ACCU) 100 22 312 307 0
People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) 100 10 1 1 0
Popular Liberation Army (EPL) 100 207 494 111 329
Popular Militia (Colombia) 100 15 5 0 5
Quintin Lame 100 11 41 13 28
Red Flag (Venezuela) 100 1 0 0 0
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) 100 1920 5055 1391 3114
Revolutionary Workers Party 100 5 0 0 0
Ricardo Franco Front (Dissident FARC) 100 62 61 15 41
Right-Wing Death Squad 100 14 209 60 0
Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating
Board (CGSB) 100 202 384 114 258
The Extraditables 100 109 181 1 62
United Self Defense Units of Colombia
(AUC) 100 65 341 305 25
Workers’ Self-Defense Movement (MAO) 100 8 1 0 1
Che Guevara Guerrillas 101 5 0 0 0
M-19 (Movement of April 19) 101 5 0 0 0
Red Flag (Venezuela) 101 15 47 0 47
Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating
Board (CGSB) 101 4 7 0 7
Brunswijk Jungle Commando 115 41 20 7 11
Alfaro Vive 130 25 13 0 9
Montoneros Patria Libre 130 5 0 0 0
Movement of the Revolutionary Left
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(MIR) (Peru) 135 6 2 0 2
Patriotic Liberation Front 135 5 0 0 0
People’s Revolutionary Command
(CRP) 135 5 0 0 0
Rodrigo Franco Command 135 15 10 2 0
Shining Path (SL) 135 4503 11559 4685 5970
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement (MRTA) 135 552 560 37 433
Landless Peasants’ Movement (MST) 140 7 5 0 0
Bolivian Socialist Falange 145 8 0 0 0
Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army
(EGTK) 145 22 5 0 0
Zarate Willka Armed Forces of Liberation 145 5 2 0 0
Chilean Anti-Communist Alliance
(ACHA) 155 6 1 0 0
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front
(FPMR) 155 829 93 2 62
Movement of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR) (Chile) 155 274 41 1 31
People’s Fatherland Movement 155 8 0 0 0
United Popular Action Movement 155 109 19 0 19
Che Guevara Brigade 160 6 0 0 0
OAS-MRP 160 6 0 0 0
People’s Revolutionary Organization 160 14 1 0 1
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades 200 4 0 0 0
Continuity Irish Republican Army
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(CIRA) 200 27 7 5 2
Irish National Liberation Army
(INLA) 200 88 77 19 25
Irish People’s Liberation Organization
(IPLO) 200 20 14 6 2
Irish Republican Army (IRA) 200 1589 753 121 531
Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF) 200 22 10 6 0
May 15 Organization for the
Liberation of Palestine 200 1 1 0 0
Meibion Glyndwr 200 31 0 0 0
Oglaigh na hEireann 200 11 1 0 1
Orange Volunteers (OV) 200 11 0 0 0
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) 200 37 33 29 4
Red Hand Defenders (RHD) 200 23 9 5 0
Scottish National Liberation Army 200 7 0 0 0
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) 200 119 91 49 9
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 200 88 84 64 4
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) 205 3 1 0 0
Communist Combattant Cells
(CCC) (Belgium) 211 21 3 2 1
New Armenian Resistance 212 1 0 0 0
Action Directe 220 53 6 2 4
Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group (GAL) 220 15 17 6 0
Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN) 220 7 0 0 0
Breton Liberation Front (FLB) 220 16 4 3 0
Committee of Solidarity with Arab and
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Middle East Political Prisoners (CSPPA) 220 7 4 2 2
Communist Anti-Nuclear Front 220 5 0 0 0
Corsican National Liberation Front
(FLNC) 220 430 13 3 7
Corsican National Liberation Front-
Historic Channel 220 128 0 0 0
Fedayeen Khalq (People’s Commandos) 220 2 0 0 0
Gracchus Babeuf 220 5 0 0 0
Guadeloupe Liberation Army 220 2 1 0 0
Indipendenza 220 10 0 0 0
Iparretarrak (IK) 220 57 2 0 2
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary
Faction (LARF) 220 6 3 0 0
New Armenian Resistance 220 2 0 0 0
Orly Organization 220 5 1 1 0
Red Brigades Fighting Communist
Party (BR-PCC) 220 1 2 0 2
Resistenza 220 73 0 0 0
Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE)
(rightist) 220 5 8 0 0
Survivors of Golfech 220 7 0 0 0
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades 230 6 191 0 0
Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group
(GAL) 230 5 2 0 2
Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commandos
(CAA) 230 10 1 0 1
Basque Fatherland and Freedom
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(ETA) 230 1551 604 53 424
First of October Antifascist Resistance
Group (GRAPO) 230 108 33 2 25
Free Galician People’s Guerrilla Army 230 47 4 0 1
Terra Lliure 230 62 1 0 1
Popular Forces of April 25 235 47 10 3 4
Hekla Reception Committee-Initiative for
More Social Eruptions 255 5 0 0 0
New Armenian Resistance 260 2 0 0 0
Red Army Faction (RAF) 260 54 11 0 4
Armed Falange 325 6 0 0 0
Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR) 325 12 85 1 7
Autonomy (Italy) 325 11 0 0 0
CCCCC 325 4 0 0 0
Ein Tyrol (One Tyrol) 325 5 0 0 0
Grey Wolves 325 4 0 0 0
Informal Anarchist Federation 325 15 0 0 0
Prima Linea 325 6 4 0 2
Red Brigades 325 59 37 1 29
Red Brigades Fighting Communist
Party (BR-PCC) 325 6 2 0 1
Workers Brigade for Communism 325 6 1 0 0
Albanian National Army (ANA) 343 4 2 0 2
National Liberation Army (NLA)
(Macedonia) 343 35 17 0 15
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 345 40 35 15 18
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1 May Group 350 10 2 0 1
Anti-Authority Group (Greece) 350 13 0 0 0
Anti-State Justice 350 5 0 0 0
Athens and Thessaloniki Arsonist
Nuclei 350 8 0 0 0
Black Star 350 7 0 0 0
Conscientious Arsonists (CA) 350 5 0 0 0
Conspiracy of Cells of Fire 350 42 0 0 0
Fighting Guerrilla Formation 350 5 0 0 0
Illuminating Paths of Solidarity 350 6 0 0 0
November 17 Revolutionary Organization
(N17RO) 350 111 25 1 8
November 21 Organization 350 5 0 0 0
Revolutionary Nuclei 350 12 1 0 0
Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA) 350 82 1 0 1
Revolutionary Popular Left 350 7 0 0 0
Revolutionary Struggle 350 22 1 0 1
Cyprus Turkish People’s Movement 352 7 0 0 0
Kach 352 1 0 0 0
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 352 1 3 0 0
Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic
of Ichkeria 365 12 99 0 77.75
Caucasus Emirate 365 30 132 10 16
Dagestani Shari’ah Jamaat 365 5 13 0 13
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabo-
-tage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs 365 10 412 18 24
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Fedayeen Khalq (People’s Commandos) 385 1 0 0 0
Movement of Democratic Forces of
Casamance 433 67 206 72 94
Movement of Niger People for Justice
(MNJ) 436 9 37 0 37
National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL) 438 1 2 2 0
Liberians United for Reconciliation and
Democracy (LURD) 450 6 6 3 1
National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL) 450 6 66 48 7
National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL) 451 9 128 0 125
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 451 63 532 425 57
Africa Marine Commando 471 5 7 0 2
Boko Haram 475 152 703 130 256.54
Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta (MEND) 475 66 255 11 11
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 483 1 0 0 0
Ninjas 484 6 91 63 11
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 490 1 16 16 0
Democratic Front for the Liberation
of Rwanda (FDLR) 490 29 215 167 11
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 490 45 1045 602 0
Mayi Mayi 490 13 56 23 0
National Congress for the Defense of the
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People (CNDP) 490 5 0 0 0
Popular Front for Justice in the Congo 490 5 1 1 0
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 500 40 295 208 5
Holy Spirit Movement 500 7 80 18 58
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 500 130 1319 826 107
Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) 500 19 44 0 38
Uganda People’s Army 500 15 136 60 22
Kenya African National Union (KANU) 501 5 5 0 5
Oromo Liberation Front 501 1 1 0 1
Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) 516 4 9 2 5
National Council for Defense of Democracy
(NCDD) 516 15 73 11 47
National Liberation Front (FNL) (Burundi) 516 26 27 1 26
Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
(PALIPEHUTU) 516 38 269 78 137
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) 517 10 102 6 41
Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) 520 3 18 0 15
Al-Shabaab 520 276 771 132 421
Hizbul al Islam (Somalia) 520 17 44 6 0
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) 520 12 8 0 4
Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM) 520 23 58 0 55
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 520 1 48 0 0
Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) 520 7 109 31 0
Somali National Movement 520 7 31 0 0
Somali Salvation Front (SSF) 520 8 0 0 0
Front for the Restoration of Unity and
164
Democracy 522 5 236 60 176
Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) 530 2 5 0 0
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 530 4 86 5 4
Oromo Liberation Front 530 7 136 1 1
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) 530 5 217 200 0
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of
Cabinda (FLEC) 540 14 23 6 11
National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola (UNITA) 540 391 2700 1378 524
Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola 540 9 54 43 0
Mozambique National Resistance
Movement (MNR) 541 174 2323 1050 388
Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union
(ZANU) 552 9 24 1 6
African National Congress (South Africa) 560 572 613 60 367
Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) 560 5 6 3 3
Azania People’s Organization (AZAPO) 560 5 12 0 5
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 560 50 345 139 2
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs
(PAGAD) 560 9 2 0 1
White Wolves 560 9 7 0 0
South-West Africa People’s Organization
(SWAPO) 565 31 55 13 16
White Wolves 565 2 0 0 0
Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) 570 10 19 0 15
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Al-Adl Wal Ihsane 600 5 3 0 3
Polisario Front 600 7 202 0 200
Salafia Jihadia 600 5 45 6 0
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 615 153 578 20 490
Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN) 615 1 1 0 0
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 615 224 1444 821 227
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 615 152 211 6 182
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting
(GSPC) 615 212 567 120 409
Black September II 625 1 1 0 0
Janjaweed 625 7 168 168 0
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 625 11 251 82 149
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 625 37 624 589 7
Sudan Liberation Movement 625 8 19 14 0
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 625 42 218 107 87
Sudanese People’s Liberation Forces 625 5 32 0 0
Jundallah 630 13 161 88 72
Kurdistan Free Life Party 630 9 47 1 46
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) 630 71 66 24 28
Orly Organization 630 2 0 0 0
Dev Sol 640 235 122 4 105
Devrimici Halk Kurtulus Cephesi
(DHKP/C) 640 17 13 0 9
Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front
(IBDA-C) 640 36 27 1 0
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) 640 12 2 0 0
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Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 640 1050 3508 703 2411
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 640 1 0 0 0
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist
(TKP-ML) 640 27 18 2 13
Turkish Hezbollah 640 6 9 0 9
Turkish People’s Liberation Army 640 5 5 0 2
Turkish People’s Liberation Front
(TPLF)(THKP-C) 640 28 24 2 9
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades 645 1 7 0 0
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 645 1 10 0 0
Al-Qaida in Iraq 645 246 2891 1436 927
Ansar al-Islam 645 25 88 5 48
Ansar al-Sunna 645 17 163 49 110
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq 645 10 4 0 0
Islamic Army in Iraq
(al-Jaish al-Islami fi al-Iraq) 645 8 21 1 17
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 645 144 1720 630 693
Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq (KDP) 645 8 64 0 40
Mahdi Army 645 18 57 53 1
Mujahedeen Shura Council 645 8 67 59 8
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 645 6 128 51 0
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (SCIRI) 645 10 31 0 31
Tawhid and Jihad 645 49 842 208 371
Abdullah Azzam Brigades 651 3 129 0 0
Al Jihad 651 9 14 0 5
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Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya (IG) 651 257 489 62 283
Arab Revolution/Liberation Vanguard
Organization 652 4 4 0 1
May 15 Organization for the Liberation
of Palestine 652 1 0 0 0
Muslim Brotherhood 652 70 207 11 105
16 January Organization for the
Liberation of Tripoli 660 24 1 0 1
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 660 17 10 0 3
Amal 660 25 24 8 0
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation
of Armenia 660 19 8 0 2
Beirut Martyrs Battalion 660 7 2 0 2
Force 17 660 1 0 0 0
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon
from Foreigners 660 13 196 47 91
Hezbollah 660 291 701 64 440
Jund al-Sham for Tawhid and Jihad 660 6 6 0 6
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary
Faction (LARF) 660 2 0 0 0
Lebanese Liberation Front 660 7 7 0 2
Lebanese National Resistance Front 660 24 46 1 16
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) 660 3 1 0 1
Orly Organization 660 2 0 0 0
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 660 92 191 80 99
Shaykh Subhi Al-Salih Forces 660 18 4 0 4
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Soldiers of Truth 660 2 1 0 0
Syrian Social Nationalist Party 660 7 24 1 23
Black September II 663 2 1 0 0
Tawhid and Jihad 663 1 1 0 0
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 666 76 175 97 15
Al-Fatah 666 10 11 3 1
Black Panther Group (Palestinian) 666 4 5 2 3
Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP) 666 21 9 2 7
Force 17 666 9 6 2 2
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) 666 129 508 114 53
Hezbollah 666 33 55 34 20
Kach 666 6 6 5 0
Keshet 666 7 0 0 0
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 666 21 33 1 27
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 666 122 163 60 13
Palestinian Revolution Forces 666 5 0 0 0
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) 666 56 20 10 6
Popular Resistance Committees 666 34 1 1 0
Terror Against Terror 666 2 0 0 0
Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia 670 7 63 39.66 8
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) 670 6 38 1 2
Al-Qaida 679 4 22 0 19
Al-Qaida in Yemen 679 12 49 0 14
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Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) 679 122 591 48 380
Southern Mobility Movement (Yemen) 679 11 9 0 9
Haqqani Network 700 39 405 97 160
Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan 700 5 5 0 0
Hizb-I-Islami 700 24 27 18 5
Taliban 700 1618 4752 1215 2605
Aum Shinri Kyo 740 8 21 8 0
Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction) 740 52 2 0 0
Revolutionary Workers’ Council
(Kakurokyo) 740 16 3 2 1
Senki (Battle Flag) 740 8 0 0 0
Al-Mansoorian 750 16 70 0 70
Al-Umar Mujahideen 750 10 24 14 8
All India Sikh Students Federation
(AISSF) 750 5 1 0 0
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) 750 13 95 81 14
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) 750 10 81 25 23
Bhinderanwale Tiger Force of
Khalistan (BTHK) 750 9 50 12 23
Black Widows 750 12 55 33 17
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) 750 9 78 38 6
Communist Party of India - Maoist
(CPI-Maoist) 750 1418 1894 556 1002
Communist Party of India- Marxist-Leninist 750 8 20 7 9
Deccan Mujahideen 750 8 184 0 4
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Dima Halao Daoga (DHD) 750 24 32 8 12
Dishmish Regiment 750 43 6 0 4
Garo National Liberation Army 750 25 17 3 7
Gurkha National Liberation Front
(GNLF) 750 59 43 8 29
Harkat ul Ansar 750 11 17 0 0
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami 750 10 39 1 18
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) 750 85 281 37 231
Indian Mujahideen 750 13 64 29 0
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) 750 18 51 5 46
Jamaat-E-Islami (India/Pakistan) 750 1 0 0 0
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM) 750 9 43 0 43
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 750 53 65 18 43
Jharkhand Liberation Tigers (JLT) 750 5 8 5 0
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) 750 9 21 3 12
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) 750 30 6 4 0
Karbi Longri North Cachar Liberation
Front (KLNLF) 750 15 10 4 3
Karbi People’s Liberation Tigers
(KPLT) 750 7 7 2 5
Khalistan Commando Force 750 19 114 21 38
Khalistan Liberation Force 750 15 125 35 11
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 750 97 745 284 240
Maoist Communist Center (MCC) 750 33 226 124 58
Mujahideen Kashmir 750 6 3 0 0
National Democratic Front of
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Bodoland (NDFB) 750 93 405 250 68
National Liberation Front of
Tripura (NLFT) 750 59 254 102 123
National Socialist Council of
Nagaland 750 17 146 0 116
National Socialist Council of
Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) 750 33 58 13 20
National Socialist Council of
Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) 750 14 10 2 0
Naxalites 750 64 402 88 308
People’s Committee against
Police Atrocities (PCPA) 750 22 11 5 5
People’s Liberation Army (India) 750 15 41 0 36
People’s Liberation Front of India 750 16 15 13 0
People’s Revolutionary Party of
Kangleipak (PREPAK) 750 11 1 0 0
People’s United Liberation Front
(PULF) 750 6 5 4 1
People’s War Group (PWG) 750 97 410 26 297
Ranbir Sena 750 5 95 89 0
Students Islamic Movement of
India (SIMI) 750 8 63 52 0
Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) 750 29 154 118 10
Tritiya Prastuti Committee (India) 750 9 3 0 1
United Liberation Front of Assam
(ULFA) 750 243 578 278 158
United National Liberation Front
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(UNLF) 750 7 9 0 9
United People’s Democratic
Solidarity (UPDS) 750 7 17 8 9
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) 750 5 3 3 0
Abdullah Azzam Brigades 770 2 1 0 1
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 770 1 20 0 0
Al Zulfikar 770 7 13 0 10
Al-Mansoorian 770 1 2 0 2
Al-Qaida 770 19 179 19 133
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) 770 63 139 14 71
Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) 770 7 14 2 5
Baloch Republican Army (BRA) 770 49 41 9 16
Balochistan Liberation United Front
(BLUF) 770 8 10 8 2
Hizb-I-Islami 770 2 2 0 0
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) 770 3 5 0 0
Jamaat-E-Islami (India/Pakistan) 770 9 7 0 5
Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan) 770 35 46 31 3
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 770 30 366 202 21
Mohajir National Movement 770 9 31 9 6
Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM) 770 170 229 53 55
Pakistani People’s Party (PPP) 770 7 5 1 0
Sindhu Desh Liberation Army (SDLA) 770 6 0 0 0
Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) 770 17 61 39 5
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 770 545 2491 1022 742
Awami League 771 20 15 6 8
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Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 771 32 11 9 0
Bangladesh Sarbahara Party 771 6 47 5 17
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami 771 1 8 8 0
Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
(JMB) 771 20 38 11 25
Jamaat-E-Islami (Bangladesh) 771 15 29 9 6
Purbo Banglar Communist Party 771 21 49 17 24
Shanti Bahini - Peace Force 771 99 439 268 76
All Burma Students’ Democratic
Front (ABSDF) 775 5 1 0 0
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) 775 12 57 4 37
Karen National Union 775 72 203 126 27
Shan United Revolutionary Army 775 5 16 1 1
Colonel Karuna Faction 780 9 35 12 0
Eelam People’s Revolutionary
Liberation Front (EPRLF) 780 7 60 0 56
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 780 1592 10900 2597 6042
People’s Liberation Front (JVP) 780 433 859 241 472
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
(TELO) 780 8 38 24 4
Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist
(CPN-M) 790 23 654 1 652
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
(JTMM) 790 26 7 3 2
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Goit
(JTMM-G) 790 27 14 5 5
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Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Jwala
Singh (JTMM-J) 790 78 32 15 9
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Rajan
Mukti (JTMM-R) 790 13 11 0 10
Madhesi Mukti Tigers (MMT) 790 6 1 0 0
Maoist Communist Center (MCC) 790 2 0 0 0
Ranbir Sena 790 10 0 0 0
Terai Army 790 10 15 4 2
United Liberation Torchbearers Forces 790 5 6 0 6
Young Communist League 790 10 0 0 0
Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) 800 5 7 5 2
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
(DKBA) 800 18 23 7 3
Karen National Union 800 5 12 0 0
Pattani United Liberation Organization
(PULO) 800 30 33 2 19
Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) 800 24 13 6 6
United Front for Democracy Against
Dictatorship 800 21 0 0 0
Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF) 811 5 8 0 8
Khmer Rouge 811 158 353 184 43
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 840 201 530 251 69
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB) 840 11 7 1 2
April 6th Liberation Movement 840 31 1 0 0
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) 840 16 35 4 1
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
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(MILF) 840 334 729 331 229
Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) 840 125 440 75 216
New People’s Army (NPA) 840 1307 3381 388 2550
Reform of the Armed Forces
Movement 840 9 0 0 0
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) 850 115 139 32 71
Free Papua Movement
(OPM-Organisasi Papua Merdeka) 850 16 23 3 6
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) 850 57 304 22 0
Laskar Jihad 850 7 12 12 0
Ninjas 850 3 3 0 0
Revolutionary Front for an Independent
East Timor (FRETILIN) 850 11 112 6 102
Justice Commandos for the
Armenian Genocide 900 1 2 0 2
Bougainville Revolutionary Army
(BRA) 910 28 45 0 44
Table A.1: List of Terrorist Groups in the Estimation
Sample.
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Appendix B
Declassified Letters From Harmony
Database
B.1 A LETTER TOHAKIMULLAHMAHSUD – HAR-
MONY # SOCOM-2012-0000007
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To the good brother Hakimullah ((Mahsud)), the Emir of Tahrik-e 
Taliban in Pakistan (TN: TTP - Taliban Movement in Pakistan) 
 
Greetings, 
 
There are certain important issues that we like to bring to your 
attention: 
 
1: We have several important comments that cover the concept, 
approach, and behavior of the TTP in Pakistan, which we believe 
are passive behavior and clear legal and religious mistakes 
which might result in a negative deviation from the set path of 
the Jihadists Movement in Pakistan, which also are contrary to 
the objectives of Jihad and to the efforts exerted by us. Here 
are some facts to consider: 
 
2: Considering Hakimullah as the sole Emir for everyone to swear 
allegiance to, whoever oppose him and isn’t a member of the 
movement is an adulterer, the none differentiation between the 
Jihad Emirate and the Great Imam post, and neglecting the daily 
conditions of the Muslims; all of which according to the Shari’a 
(Muslim laws) are a misconception of the real situation, and may 
cause an inter-Mujahidin fighting. 
 
3: (Of the passive behavior is) killing more people, taking them 
as shields without basing their action on the Shari’a, killing 
the normal Muslims as a result of martyrdom operations that 
takes place in the marketplaces, mosques, roads, assembly 
places, and calling the Muslims apostates. 
 
4: The draft that was written by Hakimullah Mahsud is 
unacceptable and we don’t approve it because it contains 
political and Shari’a mistakes. We already sent our comments on 
this draft. 
 
5: We are sending the attached short list on what is acceptable 
and unacceptable on the subject of kidnapping and receiving 
money, and we hope that you and the Mujahidin in Pakistan will 
approve it. 
 
6: We want to make it clear to you that we, the al-Qa’ida is an 
Islamist Jihadist organization that is not restricted to a 
country or race, and that we in Afghanistan swore allegiance to 
the Emir Mullah Muhammad ((‘Umar)) who allowed us to carry 
Jihad. Those that call us as guests do that for political 
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reasons and don’t base this attribute on the Shari’a, and we ask 
you and all the Mujahidin not to use this attribute. 
 
7: We make it clear to you that the brother Badr ((Mansur)) is 
one of the soldiers of the Qa’idat al-Jihad Organization who 
swore allegiance to Shaykh Usamah ((Bin Laden)), is with us, 
under our command, the Emir of a of a company of ours. Badr 
Mansur and other members of our group are not to be approached 
to join another organization or to deploy to other locations. 
Good manners and group work mandate that such a request be 
presented to his Tanzim (TN: al-Qa’ida) Emir and superiors. 
 
8: We stress on the fact that real reform is the duty of all, 
and to succeed we should look for and correct our mistakes and 
take the advice of others. 
 
We hope that you will take the necessary action to correct your 
actions and avoid these grave mistakes; otherwise we have to 
take decisive actions from our end. 
 
We pray to God to grant us success, 
 
Regards, 
 
Mahmud al-Hasan ((‘Atiyatullah)) and ((Abu Yahya)) al-Libi 
 
27 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431 (3 December 2010) 
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B.2 A LETTER TO ABU-USAMAH – HARMONY
# IZ-060316-02
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To: Abu-Usamah  
I read your reports about Al-Ramadi, and I have some remarks, and it is as follows:  
1. I have a feeling you are going very easy w2ith the brothers in Al-Anbar. For example the operators 
matter (Phones). If you did not issue the order who did? We have to charge whoever did it no matter 
who it was so it will be an example for everybody else, because we are going through a very 
sensitive period with people and we have to hit anyone that helps the enemies. Immediately. 
According to Islamic laws, make sure not to go easy in these kinds of situations.  
2. I read the investigation with (Janti) from Sharkas. What happened to him was wrong. Be more 
strict and responsible.  
3. The killing of the four people who are engaged in the election. I agree we should kill them because 
they were carrying weapons, what appears to people they are not military or police. We should have 
securely gotten them out of there. But the way you killed them was not the correct way.  
4. The weakness of work in Rawah and Al-Qa’im is clear.  
5. Stop the killing of people unless they are spying, military, or police officers. We have to find a 
secure method because if we continue using the same method, people will start fighting us in the 
streets.  
6. What the status of the subject of the tribes? Also, Sheikh (illegible, possibly Albu-Yas) wants to 
repent. Please take his repentance and give him something to work on.  
Regarding the statues (people) whom are sitting with al-Ja’fari, like Sheikh Abu ‘Ubayd. Someone 
has to meet with them and let them know we knew they met with Al-Ja’fari also warn them to stop 
meeting with Al-Ja’fari, or otherwise their fate is known.  
7. We have to attack and attack hard where it hurts and with accuracy by using rockets. We have to 
attack Albu-Nimr in Hit. Even if we have to use rockets. For the rest of the statues (people) who met 
with Al-Ja’fari, we have to get them securely (meaning secretly) and make them anywhere far (get 
them far away) and kill them, and  
not like what we did with Nasr Al-Fahadawi. We killed him in front of everyone. Leave no evidence 
after the killing and bury them in far-away places and not like what we did with Nasr al-Fahadawi—
in front of the people.  
8. Do not forget the matter of Amir Jaysh al-Mujahidin and the little boy we killed. You have to 
follow up on that matter by any means.  
9. You know, I like you working with us and I love you more than the members of my family, and 
we our hopes on you are great, so do what we ask you to do.  
I got your letter in which you mentioned Dr. ‘Amir’s point of view regarding the council, therefore 
you have to come with Dr. ‘Amir the day after tomorrow early in the morning (this is an order). It 
will be coordinated with Karar to discuss this matter and other matters. It is important that you and 
Dr. ‘Amir have to come to me as soon as possible the day after tomorrow (Sunday)  
Signed,  
Your Brother 
B.3 2007 Version of the Taliban’s Rules of Jihad –
HARMONY # AFGP-2007-K0000029
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Source language: Pushtu 
 
Translation: Full  
 
Page: 1 of 5 
 
 
The Rules of Jihad established for Mujahideen by the Leadership of Afghanistan Islamic 
Emirates  
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In the name of God, 
 
Afghanistan Islamic Emirate’s Resolutions 
 
 
Jihad in the name of God is such a high level of prayer and a holy mission for Muslims 
that makes the Apostles and the Islamic believers proud to be part of it. 
Obviously, this holy mission has many rewards both in this life and life after death, and it 
could be achieved only if it is done according to the Laws of God and to the framework 
of the established rules and regulations. 
 
1.  An Authority [Translator Comment (TC): From Taliban side] can invite those 
Afghans that are supporting and working for the Infidels to join the true path of Islam. 
 
2.  Those that break up their ties with the Infidels should be given full protection for their 
lives and properties. 
 3.  Those Mujahideen that have contacts with someone or gives guarantees to someone 
that works for the opposition must inform the people in charge in their own area of 
operations and get their advanced approval. 
 
4.  Those that do not fulfill their promises and betray us, after the acceptance of the 
invitation, then the promised amnesty for them is annulled, and we will not make any 
more promises to them again.  
 
5.  If a person breaks up his ties with the Infidels, and the Mujahideen give him 
guarantees for full protection, and this person is killed by a Mujahid or harmed in some 
way, then the person who committed the crime in not backed up by the Islamic 
Movement, and he would be dealt according to the laws of Shariha [TC: Laws based on 
Islamic Principles]. 
 
6.  If a group Leader from one district or province is going to fight in a different district 
or province, he should obtain permission form the authorities of his own district or 
province and also from the authorities of the newly arrived district or province. 
 
7.  If Mujahideen capture a soldier from occupying foreign forces, they are not allowed to 
exchange that prisoner for money or for a captured Mujahid, without obtaining 
permission from the Movement’s leadership. 
 
8.  Those who are in charge of a province, district, or specific area are strictly prohibited 
from making deals with the opposition for self-benefit in the form of money or other 
tangible materials. The Organizations [TC: such as non-governmental organizations, or 
anyone working for the government or Coalition forces] are also classified as opposition. 
.  
9.  Personal use of equipment that belongs to the cause of Jihad is strictly forbidden, and 
it is completely wrong. 
 
10.  Every person in a superior position can question any other individual working under 
his supervision, from time to time, for the accountability of the properties that belong to 
the cause of Jihad [TC: Called from now on: “Jihadi equipment or properties”] and also 
other related expenses. 
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11. Mujahideen do not have the authority to sell the properties that belong to the cause of 
Jihad without getting authorization from the Provisional leadership. 
 
12.  Mujahideen are strictly prohibited from inviting members from other groups for the 
purpose of strengthening their own positions. If a Mujahid is willing to transfer to another 
group for a good reason, he should then first get permission from his higher commander 
and return all Jihadi equipment assigned to him by his original team leader, and also 
return all those captured belongings from the enemy, since their ownership to the team 
was already established. 
 
13.  Weapons that are captured from the Infidels or their supporters should be divided 
among the Mujahideen according to the Islamic laws. 
 
14.  If a Mujahid establishes contacts, for the benefit of Islam and Jihad, with someone 
working for the current Infidel Administration, he should disclose it to the Mujahidin 
authorities in his area of operations. Killing this person [TC: Government employee] is 
not allowed, and if someone kills him, then that person is subject to the justice based on 
the laws of Shariha. 
 
15.  If an official or individual misuses his authority as a Mujahid, and causes harm to the 
public, then it is the responsibility of his immediate supervisor to correct his actions. In 
case the person is uncorrectable, he should then be referred to the leadership and be 
expelled from the rank of Mujahideen. 
. 
16.  It is a strict order for Mujahideen to not take away by force the people’s weapons, 
unless an order was issued by the higher authorities. 
 
17.  It is an order for Mujahideen to not take people’s money or personal properties by 
force.  
 
18.  As per issued decree, Mujahideen should strictly avoid smoking cigarettes.  The 
same decree is still valid. 
 
19.  Taking drugs into Jihadi operations, or sending it to your frontline forces is strictly 
prohibited.   
 
20.  The Management for each province, by taking into consideration the circumstances 
in the province under their control, has the full authority to invite [TC: Islam and support 
of Jihad] those that are in the support of Infidels. After they surrender, their life and 
properties should be fully protected, but only if they accept specific conditions. Before 
you give any guarantees, you should consult with the Military Commission. 
 
21.  Those that have worked for the current Infidel Administration, recruited people to 
serve the current Infidel Government, searched people’s houses, have been implicated for 
killing Muslims, have insulted Muslims, and finally those that are hated by Muslims, 
should be not allowed to stand in the rank of Mujahideen. If such a person is given 
amnesty by the Islamic Emirate leadership, he should then not be given any government 
position [TC: The way this sentence was written could also have another meaning of 
“Under house arrest”]. 
 
22.  If a team leader expels a Mujahid member from his group, because of committing a 
crime, another Group Leader doesn’t have the right to take this person as their associate.  
If a Regional Leader fires a team leader from his group leadership position, because of 
committing a crime, nobody has the right to supply this person until he fully 
acknowledges his mistakes. 
 
23.  If there are situations that have not been discussed in this Guideline, the people in 
charge for a particular area can discuss and resolve the outstanding issue. 
 
24.  It is forbidden for anybody, from an instructor in a Madrassa to a schoolteacher, to 
work for an empty-name government, because this would help the government to 
strengthen its position.  Certainly, Muslims should take the education of their children, 
that are today’s new generation, very seriously and provide in the scale of their financial 
ability home studies for them, and also send them to those mosques that are teaching 
children according to Mujahideen’s or Islamic Emirate’s era curriculums. Avoid those 
Mosques that follow the Infidel Administration’s curriculum.   
 
25.  We are informing all those teachers and mullahs that are working for the current 
empty-name government that they should immediately stop their cooperation, and if they 
don’t then they should be punished by beatings. 
If this teacher or mullah teaches against Islam, they should be punished to death, after a 
complete investigation by the district leader. 
 
26.  All the organizations functioning under the current Infidels occupation are 
instruments and tools in the hand of the Infidel system. Their services are only a cover-up 
for their main goal of destroying Islam. For this reason all their activities, whether 
constructing a road, bridge, clinic, school, or Madrassa, or any other similar activities are 
forbidden. 
If a school is designated for burning, all the religious books should be removed ahead of 
time, so you do not disrespect holy books. 
 
27.  Punishing a spy is not the right of every authority. This right is given only to the 
District’s General Leader or the War Fronts’ Councils. They should do a full 
investigation about the crime and after they have the full proof and there is no doubt 
about it, they still should first evaluate the crime. If it is a small crime, and if the person 
has done much good in the past, and finally if he was a person who did good deeds, then 
the District’s General Leader or the War Fronts’ Councils should warn him to stop his 
activities. In case he continued his actions, he should be punished, first by beating, and if 
that didn’t help, then he is subject to death.   
 
28.  If a person comes with complaints to Mujahideen, not everyone has the right to 
intervene into the people’s personal affairs. Only the District’s General Leader or the War 
Fronts’ Councils can interfere into the matter. They should first refer the matter to  
religious scholars and tribal elders for solutions through mediation and arbitration.  If a 
final agreement cannot be reached then the matter should go to the Supreme Religious 
Council. 
 
29.  Following the above-mentioned Guidance is essential to everyone. If anyone breaks 
these Rules and Guidance, he should be dealt with according to Afghanistan Islamic 
Emirate laws. 
 
God Gives Us Victory 
 
This Guidance is a powerful instruction for all Afghanistan’s Islamic Emirate 
Mujahideen that are ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of God and for the cause of 
the Holy Jihad. This is their religious and Jihadi duty. 
 
All are rewarded according to their actions both in this life or the life after death. 
 
 
        
 
     
Appendix C
Data Sources
C.1 Data Collection Methodology
The data sources used to compile final dataset for this study are mostly chosen due to the
availability of information on relevant variables, such as group ideology, its area of operations,
size, and lifespan, etc. which are discussed in Appendix C. The following subsections discuss
the di↵erent open-source datasets used for the study and describe the routes and procedures
by which data reach a final database.
C.2 Sources
C.2.1 Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPS)
Terrorist Organization Profiles (hereafter TOPS) was one of the rare datasets with group-
level information. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START) hosted this dataset which was originally maintained by the Memorial
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) with the name, Terrorism Knowledge Base
(TKB) dataset.1 However, the START did not actively maintain or take responsibility for
1The TKB’s online portal was active from September 2004 to March 2008 and is now out of com-
mission. MIPT-TKB later became the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPS). TOPS was available
at https://www.start.umd.edu/TOPS until recently. According to an email correspondence between the
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the data. TOPS had information on both international and domestic terrorist organizations
starting with the year 1998 to 2005. It included 856 terrorist groups that spread over
112 countries. TOPS contained group-level information on many di↵erent organizational
attributes of the terrorist groups such as leadership hierarchy, ideology, age, last recorded
attack, funding sources, state-sponsorship, group splintering, and so forth.
C.2.2 Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD)
The Big Allied and Dangerous Dataset (hereafter BAAD – Version 1)2 BAAD-1 is established
by Prof. Victor Asal and Prof. R. Karl Rethemeyer from University at Albany, State
University of New York. BAAD-1 contains information on terrorist groups active during the
period 1998-2005. The BAAD-1 dataset has quantified information from the MIPT-TKB
dataset, which was later extended in BAAD-1 dataset through open-source coding. The
dataset includes 395 terrorist organizations that conducted at least one attack and operated
between 1998 and 2005. BAAD-1 provides group-level information about the group’s country
of origin (referred to as the home-base country), group’s ideology, size, state sponsorship,
and the number of allies with other terrorist groups.
C.2.3 Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
The Global Terrorism Database (hereafter GTD) is an open-source event database that codes
information on domestic and international terrorist attack on terrorist events around the
world from 1970 through 2015.3 The GTD is one of the most comprehensive and often cited
terrorist event databases. In total, this dataset is a repository of over 156772 cases. For each
incident (each attack), GTD provides information on the date and location of the incident,
the type of weapons used and nature of the target attacked, the number of casualties, and
author and START representative, the TOPS portal has been removed from the START website and will no
longer be available. The visitors are now being directed to view similar information available at Big, Allied,
and Dangerous (BAAD) database.
2The work on Version 2 of the dataset is currently underway, and it incorporates variation over time within
the 1998-2012 time frame. However, BAAD-2 is only accessible online and is currently not available in the
downloadable format. To access the BAAD-2 dataset see here https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/database.
3See https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
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the group or individual responsible for the attack (if the group accepts responsibility, or it
is known). The GTD uses a variety of open media sources – such as the media, government,
and non-governmental sources – to collect information (LaFree et al., 2010; LaFree, 2010).
C.2.4 Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset (RTG)
The Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset (hereafter RTG) is the only available dataset that
systemically measures the popularity or public support of terror groups across countries and
time. The dataset includes 443 terror groups operating across 31 years – between 1980 to
2011 –, which makes a total of 2,641 observations. RTG is established by Prof. Seden
Akcinaroglu and Efe Tokdemir from Binghamton University, State University of New York,
and they introduced RTG in their recent publication Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu (2016).
Additionally, the dataset provides information on both positive and negative reputation
building by the terrorist group. RTG4 provides group-level information about the group’s
country of origin, ideology, size, goals and intergroup competition.
C.2.5 End-of-Terror Dataset (EOT)
The End-of-Terror Dataset (hereafter EOT) is a pioneer group-level dataset in contemporary
global terrorism that includes 648 groups that existed between 1968 and 2006. EOT was
established by Dr. Seth Jones and Dr. Martin C. Libicki from RAND Corporation, and they
introduced EOT in Jones and Libicki (2008), which is a leading and the most comprehensive
study of “how terrorist groups ends” that uses group-level data. EOT provides information
about group’s age, size, the national economic situation of group’s base country of operation
and ideology. EOT has quantified the terrorist event information from the RAND Database
of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI).5
4For more information on the RTG see http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/02/15/0022343315626506.abstract.
5For more information on RDWTI see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-
incidents/download.html.
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C.2.6 Political Terror Scale Dataset (PTS)
The Political Terror Scale Dataset (hereafter PTS) is one of the most frequently used datasets
in the comparative analyses of human-rights practices. PTS covers a time span from 1976 to
2010 in 187 countries in the world. PTS also measures the respect for the rights associated
with the integrity of the person. The latest version of the PTS dataset is maintained by Mark
Gibney, Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood from the University of North Caroline, Asheville.
The information used to compile the PTS comes from three di↵erent sources: the yearly
country report of Amnesty International, the U.S. State Department Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices (Wood and Gibney, 2010).6
C.2.7 Relative Political Capacity Dataset (RPC)
The Relative Political Capacity Dataset (hereafter RPC) estimates the state capacity of 201
countries from 1960 to 2012 across countries and over time. I chose not to use the more
common Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) measure from National Material
Capabilities dataset (NMC)7 because of temporal constraints – since CINC scores are only
available until 2007 – and also because RPC additionally captures a state’s Resource Ex-
traction Capability. RPC consists of three major indicators: Relative Political Extraction
(RPE), Relative Political Reach (RPR), and Relative Political Allocation (RPA).8
C.2.8 Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics Dataset
The Polity IV project provides the characteristics of political regime. It has been the only
known dataset that codes the authority characteristics of states for comparative and quan-
titative analysis. The current version of the Polity-IV dataset was published in 2015, and
it provides information on 206 countries from 1800 to 2014. It also contains information
6For more information about the PTS dataset see http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Documentation.html.
7For more information about the NMC dataset see http://cow.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc4.htm.
8For more information about the NMC dataset see Kugler and Tam-
men (2012) or visit http://www.rpcmap.com/. To download dataset
visit https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/16845.
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on some other variables on state fragility, such as regime durability, political fragmentation,
political persistence, openness, competitiveness and regulations of executives, executives
constraints and so forth.9
C.2.9 Sample Description
To analyze the dynamic relationship between variables of interest, groups were selected that
matched among the datasets (TOPS, BAAD-1, GTD, RTG, and EOT). The sample was
restricted to groups that had perpetrated at least five attacks and and killed one person
between 1980 and 2011.10 Due to the clandestine nature of terrorism, finding yearly data for
many attributes of the terrorist groups, such as group’s size, funding, competition, are not
only hard but sometimes unlikely – especially for developing countries. The selected temporal
range (1980-2011) for this study, therefore, was restricted to include the maximum number
of matched groups among the datasets listed above. Also, the final data sample contains
far less missing data on the covariates of the group’s reputation and duration; providing
advantages over all existing group-level data collections. Moreover, since the reputation
building is time-consuming, and can only be employed by groups that survived for some
time; restricting the sample of groups to those engaged in attacks above this threshold (five
attacks and one killing) is reasonable (Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu, 2016). The final sample
is 480 groups operating in 85 countries existing for a total of 31 years.
9For more information about the Polity-IV dataset see Marshall and Jaggers (2002). To down-
load the dataset see http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. For the codebook of the dataset
see http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2015.pdf.
10Due to temporal constraints and unavailability of data on some groups; the current study has been
restricted to the 1980 to 2011 timeframe.
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C.2.10 Data Generating Process, Reliability, and Validity
C.2.10.1 Data Generating Process:
Initially, the Nemeth (2010) dataset has been used as a foundation to developed a group-
level dataset for this dissertation project.11 The first step in creating a group-level dataset
was to define, what is a terrorist group? Identifying the appropriate terrorist organizations
is crucial because the range of actors listed in GTD – which is the master dataset –, is
diverse; spanning groups that range from well-known and established organizations like Al-
Qaeda to more amorphous aggregations known as “unknown,” “rebels,” “rioters,” “activist,”
“youth”, etc. Therefore, all ambiguous terrorist groups were removed from the sample to
keep the focus simply on terrorist organizations, hence, avoiding confusion that may result
from analyzing all potential actors that may engage in terrorism.
Although the basic infrastructure of the group-level data was available, however, Nemeth
(2010) dataset had very few variables and had a lot of missing data. So many additional
variables were added, and missing data were filled in by reading the terrorist groups profiles
from Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) dataset which was maintained by the Memorial
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT).12 Later, through extensive research and
verification, the coding errors – such as s multiple spellings of the same group or the same
group given two names – were corrected to get the maximum number of matching groups from
all the group-level datasets. The information on the new variables across matching groups
was later cross-referenced using EOT, BAAD, and RTG datasets. Whenever possible, before
making a final coding decision about filling in the missing or contradictory information in
group-level datasets, many secondary resources containing terrorist groups information were
employed – example being (Janke, 1983; Rosie and Rosie, 1986; Jongman, 1988; Schmidt
11I along with Dr. Stephen Nemeth, Assistant Professor at Oklahoma State University, started collaborat-
ing on this mutual data collection project in 2013, and we extended the Nemeth (2010) dataset using TOPS
and EOT datasets. The author thanks, Dr. Nemeth, for his permission to use Nemeth (2010) dataset and
for providing his insight and services to extend the dataset.
12The TKB’s online portal was active from September 2004 to March 2008 and is now out of com-
mission. MIPT-TKB later became the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPS). TOPS was available
at https://www.start.umd.edu/TOPS.
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and Jongman, 1984; Schmid, 2011).13 Subsequent, the datasets were merged and restricted
to the groups that matched in the TOPS, GTD, EOT, BAAD, and RTG datasets, which
allowed the collection of additional groups, variables and filled in a lot of gaps in the final
dataset. Final dataset has 480 terrorist groups.14
C.2.10.2 Data Reliability and Consistency:
In any evidence-based and predictive analysis on terrorism, the reliable data increase the
strength, accuracy, and validity of the inferences drawn from a correctly specified model (Rus-
nak et al., 2012, 180). Most of the currently available datasets on terrorist activities use
information from the open-sources like the print and electronic media, government reports,
non-governmental organizations, and other relevant secondary sources (Silke, 2001; Drakos
and Gofas, 2006). While using the open-source information may be cost-e↵ective, but draw-
ing data-driven inferences about terrorism, in general, may have some inherent limitations.
Definitional Issues: As with any global dataset composition involving terrorism inci-
dents, the major di culty lies with the nature of the data itself. Many of the outlets that
record open-sourced information on terrorism events vary widely in their definition of the
terrorism, and in the range of years they cover (Shor, 2011).15 This problem has already
been alleviated in the current dataset because data on the terrorism events (attack variable)
come from the GTD, and the author concurs with the definition of terrorism that has been
used by GTD. All definitional issues and concepts about terrorism have been discussed at
length in Section.??. Moreover, a consistent definition that specifies a violent event as ter-
rorism has been followed by all other datasets used in the data generating process, i.e. GTD,
TOPS, BAAD-1, EOT, and RTG. The temporal range; however, has been di↵erent in all
datasets which was restricted from 1980 to 2011 to get a complete and consistent data across
13Due to the lack of availability of workforces, funding and time constraints, the search was never extended
to collect information from other sources like Lexis-Nexis, ProQuest, Westlaw, Human Rights Watch, and
search engines like Google, Yahoo, etc.
14Although some models involve fewer groups because of missing data on covariates.
15 Shor (2011) discussed the concerns regarding the data reliability and limitation of constructing the
Global Counterterrorist Legislation Database (GCLD) which are valid concerns for constructing any global
dataset on terrorism.
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all datasets.
Levels of Intercoder Reliability: The intercoder reliability is referred as the extent to
which di↵erent people are independently coding the same material, would produce the same
results (Gochman et al., 1976). Best Jr and Cumming (2007) argue that individuals who are
not trained properly in the use of open-source resources are at a disadvantage because the
reliability of a dataset depends on coding consistency over time and across raters (Sheehan,
2012, 21). Since 1998, the GTD data – which is the primary source of the terrorist incidents
data in the current study – were collected by coders from the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. In e↵orts to ensure intercoder
reliability, the perpetrator group attributions entries are routinely reviewed for accuracy
and consistency by members of the START sta↵.16 Similarly, the data are coded by trained
coders to construct the BAAD-1, RTG and EOT datasets. The manual entries, – from the
terrorist organization profiles from MIPT-TKB dataset – in the final dataset are reviewed
by Dr. Nemeth and his team at the Oklahoma State University. Moreover, the author also
followed the consistent coding schemes while merging, collapsing and entering the missing
data to construct the final dataset, which ensures intercoder reliability and the quality of
the data used in this study.
Sources Reliability: The data reliability becomes a particular concern when data are
repurposed (Popp and Yen, 2006, 454) because the data may su↵er from inherent systematic
bias caused by underreporting. For instance, information about terrorist incidents may su↵er
from systematic underreporting in the press reports which can limit the scope of a given
dataset and raise questions on data accuracy – this happens specifically in autocratic states
where press freedom is limited (Drakos and Gofas, 2006). Although all of the datasets that
have been repurposed to create a final group-level dataset for this study uses the open-sources
information; however, these data have been corroborated by supporting information with
multiple valid sources by the data collection organizations maintaining these data. Moreover,
the data-collection methodologies of these datasets are transparent and are publicly available,
which increases the sanctity of these data. The current study has no means to independently
16Although no formal tests have been used to check the intercoder reliability (Miller, 2011, 83).
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verify the validity and accuracy of the original open-sources, therefore, cannot account for
these inherent systematic biases that may already exist in the datasets that are repurposed
to collect di↵erent organizational attributes of the terrorist groups.17 Finally, the manual
entries to fill in missing data and remove the conflicting information in the di↵erent sources
were all corroborated by information from multiple secondary sources such as, Janke (1983);
Rosie and Rosie (1986); Jongman (1988); Schmidt and Jongman (1984) and Schmid (2011).
17See Silke (2001) for more on the benefits of using open-sources data for inferential statistics in the
terrorism analysis.
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Appendix D
Kaplan-Meier Estimates
The analysis also looks at the survival probabilities of di↵erent groups when they are divided
into 2 or more sets based on their characteristics. Figures D.1- D.11 show the Kaplan-Meier
non-parametric survival probabilities of the terrorist groups by their di↵erent traits.
Figure D.1 shows that the survival probability of groups who launched fewer attacks is
smaller as compared to those who launched more attacks at a given time.
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Figure D.1: Survival probability of terrorist groups by number of attacks.
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Figure D.2 shows the survival probability as time progresses for the groups which faced
higher competition and those which faced relatively lower competition. The groups are
divided into two sets; one set includes groups which faced below or equal to the average
competition in the data, and the other set includes the groups that faced above average
competition in the analysis time. As the curves show, the survival probability at a given
time for the groups with low competition (blue) is higher than the groups with higher
competition (red).
Figure D.3 shows the survival probability curves for the groups with more than mean
killings in data (red) and the ones with the lower than or equal to mean killings in the data.
The curves show that the survival probability of groups with higher killings is higher at a
given time as compared to those with lower number of killings.
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Figure D.2: Survival probability of terrorist groups by intergroup competition.
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Figure D.3: Survival probability of terrorist groups by average GPM killings.
Figure D.4 shows the survival probability curves for the groups that are operating domes-
tically (blue) and those operating internationally (red). The curves show that the survival
probability of the groups operating internationally is always higher as compared to the sur-
vival probability of the groups operating domestically as the time progresses.
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Figure D.4: Survival probability of terrorist groups by status (domestic vs. international).
Figure D.5 shows the survival probability curves for the groups with above mean negative
reputation (red) and groups with the negative reputation at or below mean value (blue). The
curves show that the groups with lower negative reputation have lower survival probability
as compared to those, which have a higher negative reputation.
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Figure D.5: Survival probability of terrorist groups by Negative Constituency Reputation.
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Figure D.6: Survival probability of terrorist groups by Positive Constituency Reputation.
Figure D.6 shows the survival probability curves for the groups with above mean positive
reputation (red) and groups with the positive reputation at or below mean value (blue). The
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curves show that the groups with lower positive reputation have lower survival probability
as compared to those, which have a higher positive reputation.
Figure D.7 shows the survival probability curves for the groups that are rebel groups
(red) and those which are not (blue). The curves show that rebel groups (the groups that
used guerrilla tactics) are more likely to survive as compared to non-rebel groups at any
given analysis time.
Figure D.8 shows that the groups that reside in autocratic states (blue) (Regime Type <
0) are less probable to survive as compared to those in democratic states (red) (Regime Type
  0). This results is line with the arguement described in the Chapter 3.1.2.5. So terrorist
group will survive longer in democracies because they provide more avenues to terrorists to
endure, whereas, groups do not endure in autocracies because they can repress their people
and employ forces with impunity.
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Figure D.7: Survival Probability of terrorist groups by guerrilla tactics.
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Figure D.8: Survival probability of terrorist groups by regime type.
Figure D.9 shows an opposite trend as compared to figure D.8. It shows the survival
probability of the groups that are in a state where the state repression is higher than the
mean value in the data (red) and the groups that are in a state where the state repression
is lower than the mean value or equal to the mean value in the data (blue). This result
goes against the common belief in terrorism scholarship that repression reduces terrorism
– as argued by Frey and Luechinger (2003); Testas (2004); Rasler (1996) – because we can
see that the groups that are in a repressive state are more likely to survive as compared to
those that are in less repressive states. This result shows that terrorist groups, in general,
succeed in exploiting the popular grievances in the repressive state and thrive because of the
favorable public opinion.
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Figure D.9: Survival probability of terrorist groups by state repression.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Survival Probability of Terrorist Group 
 by Revival
Analysis Time
Su
rv
iva
l P
ro
ba
bil
ity
Never Revived
Revived
Figure D.10: Survival probability of terrorist groups by recidivism.
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Figure D.11: Survival probability of terrorist groups by size.
Figure D.10 shows that the groups that have revived at least once during the analysis
time are more likely to survive at any instant in the analysis time as compared to those that
have never revived.
Figure D.11 shows the survival probability curves for the groups with the size of 1000
members or less (blue) and for the groups that have a size bigger than 1000 members (red).
The curves show that the groups with bigger size are more likely to survive as compared to
those with relatively smaller size.
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Appendix E
Additional Figures
E.1 Number of Groups by Ideology Over time
The Figure E.1 shows the scatter plot of the total number of religious (left), ethno-nationalist
(middle) and leftist (right) groups in a given year. One can see a clear trend of increasing
number of religious groups and decreasing number of leftist groups in the recent years.
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Figure E.1: Increase in the number of terrorist groups by ideology over time. Source: GTD
(2016)
The Figure. E.2 shows that this new wave of religiously-motivated terrorist groups are
indeed more lethal than all other terrorist groups (revolutionary and nationalist) combined
in the post-9/11 era because the former caused a far greater number of fatalities per year
than the latter.
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Figure E.2: Number of fatalities: religious versus secular terrorist groups from 2002 to
2014.
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E.2 Predictive Margins
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Figure E.3: Predictive margins.
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E.3 Targeting Selection of Taliban in Afghanistan
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 by Taliban (Afghanistan) in Afghanistan
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(E) Number of Yearly Fatalities 
 by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Afghanistan
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Figure E.4: Targeting selection of Taliban and its a liates overtime from 1980 to 2011 in
Afghanistan. Source: GTD (2016)
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Figure E.5: Targeting selection of Pakistani Taliban from 1980 to 2011 in Pakistan.
Source: GTD (2016)
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